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Are EU policies on legal migration fit for managing and governing 
the movement of people across borders? Over the last 15 years, the 
‘Europeanisation’ of policies dealing with the conditions of entry and 
residence of third-country nationals has led to the development of a 
common EU acquis. However, questions related to policy consistency, 
legal certainty and fair and non-discriminatory treatment in working 
and living standards still characterise the EU’s legal framework for 
cross-border mobility. 
This book critically explores the extent to which EU legal migration 
policies and their underlying working notions match the transnational 
mobility of individuals today. It addresses the main challenges of 
economic migration policies, both within the EU and in the context 
of EU cooperation with third countries. Special consideration is given 
to the compatibility of EU policies with international labour standards 
along with the fundamental rights and approach to fairness laid down 
in the EU Treaties. 
The contributions to this book showcase the various uses and potential 
of social science and humanities research in assessing, informing and 
shaping EU migration policies. Leading scholars and experts have brought 
together the latest knowledge available to reappraise the added value 
of the EU in this area. Their reflections and findings point to the need 
to develop a revised set of EU policy priorities in implementing a new 
generation of legal pathways for migration. 
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FOREWORD  
he refugee crisis has dominated the policy agenda for the past two 
years, certainly in the area of migration and home affairs, but also 
beyond. Much has been achieved to date, including significant steps 
to propose reforms of rules and procedures on asylum, to strengthen border 
protection, to combat trafficking and smuggling, and in the area of return. 
But we also need migration policy to be developed with a wider and more 
long-term outlook.  
The reflections on the future of the EU as laid out in the Commission’s 
recent White Paper map the drivers of change in the next decade and present 
a range of scenarios for how Europe could evolve by 2025. ‘Schengen’, 
‘migration’ and ‘security’ are among the key policy domains, illustrating 
once more how central migration and home affairs have become at the EU 
level within a relatively short period. 
Have the refugee crisis and our responses changed the way we look at 
legal migration policies? Yes and no. ‘No’ in the sense that the EU is and 
remains an attractive place to study or to work, and migration for these 
purposes makes the EU a more competitive and prosperous place. ‘Yes’ in 
the sense that legal migration, now even more than in the past, can be seen 
as providing positive incentives for more resilient relations with the main 
countries of origin of migrants, including those coming via irregular 
channels. 
If we look at legal migration flows over the past years, the picture that 
emerges is one of relative stability. Even during the peak of new arrivals of 
asylum seekers in the EU during 2015, immigration for purposes such as 
education, work or family reunification numerically outweighed those 
arriving to seek protection. Does that mean it is ‘business as usual’ in the area 
of legal migration? 
Certainly not. Already back in 2015, prior to what could be seen as the 
peak of the refugee crisis, the European Agenda on Migration foresaw 
nothing less than a ‘new’ policy on legal migration, with a focus on the EU 
Blue Card for highly skilled workers. But while the majority of the actions 
contained in the agenda have been completed or are in the process of being 
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completed, including the ongoing negotiations on a proposed revision of the 
EU Blue Card, we are still some way from comprehensive answers to current 
and future challenges in the area of migration.  
This holds true particularly for legal migration, where we are finding 
ourselves confronted with a series of questions. For example, has the 
approach pursued in this area – i.e. through separate legal instruments 
covering specific categories of third-country nationals – been effective, and 
is it still viable? Do we need more comprehensive rules on legal migration, 
and particularly on labour migration, or should the EU do less in this area 
and leave it to the Member States? Should we look for alternative models for 
managing labour migration? 
It is in this context that a thorough evaluation (a so-called ‘Fitness 
Check’ in EU jargon) of the entirety of EU-level rules on legal migration was 
launched last year. This publication, and the policy workshop on 
“Reappraising the EU legal migration acquis: Legal pathways for a new 
model of economic migration, and the role of social science research” that 
preceded it, addresses some of the most pertinent questions in the 
framework of the Fitness Check and beyond: 
 First and most generally, how are the legal rules ‘performing’ in 
meeting the demands to form a cornerstone of a comprehensive 
migration policy? Is the ‘equal treatment’ principle effectively 
implemented across the legal migration directives? From an economic 
and innovation-led perspective, is the EU on course to be at least as 
attractive as ‘classic’ destination countries such as Canada or 
Australia?  
 Second, and in keeping with the international outlook, what role is 
there for legal migration in the overall cooperation with third 
countries? How can we harness the benefits of circular migration, and 
effectively contribute to tackling the root causes of irregular migration? 
 Third, how do our migration policies and instruments perform in trade 
relations? Are there already first lessons emerging from the 
implementation of the Intra-Corporate Transfer (ICT) Directive? 
Linking to the Fitness Check, are there gaps in EU legislation for other 
‘Mode 4’ categories, such as contractual service suppliers? 
 Finally, as a cross-cutting issue, how can research help us answer these 
questions and develop appropriate responses and policies? 
Finding appropriate answers to these questions is by no means 
straightforward. The legal migration acquis has been developed over more 
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than a decade and in changing institutional and law-making backgrounds. 
Legal migration rules now cover in (mostly) separate directives long-term 
residents, family members, students, researchers, highly qualified workers, 
seasonal workers and intra-corporate transferees, and trainees and 
volunteers under the European Volunteer Service are joining these groups. 
We have to add to this list the Single Permit Directive with its more 
horizontal nature of establishing EU rules for a single application/permit 
and equal treatment provisions for third-country workers. 
Most of the directives have been evaluated individually, but there has 
never been a comprehensive review of the legal migration acquis in its 
entirety. The Fitness Check will now do this: if there are gaps, inconsistencies 
or possible ways of simplifying and streamlining the current EU framework 
in order to contribute to a better management of legal migration flows, the 
Fitness Check should tell us so.  
For the directives dealing with workers or talent (or both), this is 
possible only in parts, as they are too recent. What we do know already from 
the joint work by the OECD and the Commission,1 as well as from the Impact 
Assessment accompanying the Commission proposal revising the EU Blue 
Card Directive – is that Europe is underachieving in the global competition 
for talent. 
Embedding legal migration more strongly in the international 
dimension of EU migration policy has proved tricky, not least because in the 
area of labour migration Member States have the right to determine volumes 
of admission. At the same time, there is unused potential to pool more efforts 
at the EU level. 
For example, in the implementation of the Valletta Action Plan, 
designed to promote concrete cooperation between the EU and African 
countries in the area of migration management, there has indeed been 
limited progress in relation to economic migration, whereas in the area of 
migration for the purposes of study and research, there has been a 
substantial upscaling of the funding provided through Erasmus+ and the 
Marie Sklodowska-Curie programme. More can and needs to be done, so 
that legal migration can be a weightier part of the package of positive 
incentives that can be offered to third countries in the context of a 
comprehensive approach to migration management. 
                                                     
1 See OECD and European Commission, Recruiting immigrant workers: Europe 2016, Paris: 
OECD Publishing, June 2016.  
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Regarding trade relations, although the ICT Directive has been 
adopted only recently and few Member States have fully transposed it, it is 
important to closely monitor the performance of our policies and legal rules 
with regard to service providers and intra-corporate transferees: too much 
depends on these rules in the context of the EU’s role as a trading partner 
with countries outside the EU. We need more clarity as to whether our 
immigration rules sufficiently facilitate the application of our international 
commitments as regards international service providers not covered by the 
ICT Directive. These include contractual service suppliers, business visitors 
and vendors as well as independent professionals. 
Questions are manifold while clear and obvious answers are scarce – a 
result not least of the multilayered and complex (inter-)institutional context 
in which we operate. This makes thorough stocktaking and analysis all the 
more important as a basis for future decision-making to, at best, shape, 
anticipate or at least respond to fast-changing developments.  
The Commission has a number of well-established fora and processes 
to do so, including the European Dialogue on Skills and Migration, the 
European Migration Forum and bodies allowing for a direct exchange with 
Member States. Gathering and analysing information is done through, 
among others, the European Migration Network, specific study contracts or 
other initiatives like the Commission’s Knowledge Centre on Migration and 
Demography. 
The coming years may well prove decisive for the direction the EU is 
taking in general, and with that of its migration (and integration) policy in 
particular. At stake are key operational and strategic questions. Will we 
move towards a scenario of ‘deeper integration’ in the area of migration and 
home affairs, including a more general framework for legal migration? What 
would it mean for this policy field if the focus were only on the single 
market?  
This publication unites the expertise of academics as well as expert 
practitioners. It helps strengthen the all-important link between research and 
policy-making, and most importantly provides input for a well-informed 
discussion on how to shape future migration policies and instruments that 
benefit host societies, countries of origin and the migrants themselves. 
 
Matthias Ruete 
Director General for Migration and Home Affairs 
European Commission
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INTRODUCTION 
SERGIO CARRERA, ELSPETH GUILD  
AND MARCO STEFAN  
n 27 January 2017, the Justice and Home Affairs Section of CEPS and 
the Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs (DG 
HOME) of the European Commission co-organised a policy 
workshop in Brussels entitled “Reappraising the EU legal migration acquis: 
Legal pathways for a new model of economic migration, and the role of 
social science research”. The event brought together leading academics, 
practitioners and European Commission representatives to assess and 
discuss the state of play in the (internal and external) EU legal migration 
acquis, and its role in developing legal pathways towards economic 
migration. 
Held under the Chatham House Rule, the policy workshop’s 
roundtable discussions allowed participants to identify and address some of 
the key challenges, inconsistencies and gaps in the standing EU policies and 
legislation in the area of legal and economic migration. Scholars involved in 
EU and nationally funded, collaborative research projects on social science 
and humanities (SSH) had the opportunity to exchange interdisciplinary 
knowledge with European Commission officials representing the different 
services working on legal migration policies. The role and potential of 
independent academic research in the framework of EU migration policy-
making were also discussed. The full programme of the policy workshop is 
reproduced in the annex of this book.  
The policy workshop fell within the scope of EURA-NET 
(“Transnational Migration in Transition: Transformative Characteristics of 
Temporary Mobility of People”), an international research project financed 
by the European Commission under the 7th Framework Programme (2014–
17) and coordinated by the School of Education at the University of 
Tampere.1 EURA-NET addressed three main research questions: 
                                                     
1 For more information about the EURA-NET project, visit the project website 
(http://www.uta.fi/edu/en/research/projects/eura-net/index.html). 
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 What are the transformative characteristics and development impacts 
of the temporary transnational migration of people?  
 What are the policy implications of people’s temporary migration at 
national, regional (European and Asian) and international levels?  
 What can we learn from temporary migration in the Euro–Asian 
transnational space to better understand other regions? 
The main objective of the EURA-NET project was to attain a better 
understanding of the current features and related policy impacts of the 
temporary transnational mobility of people in the Euro–Asian context. The 
main goal of the policy workshop was to bring together the best academic 
knowledge to feed into the Legal Migration Fitness Check (REFIT Initiative), 
first announced in the 2016 Commission Communication “Towards a 
Reform of the Common European Asylum System and Enhancing Legal 
Avenues to Europe”.2 
The Fitness Check’s purpose is to “consider possible ways of 
simplifying and streamlining the current EU framework in order to 
contribute to a better management of legal migration flows”.3 According to 
the Commission’s Evaluation and Fitness Check Roadmap, the REFIT results 
will be instrumental to assessing “what actions (both legislative and non-
legislative) might be required to improve the coherence of the legal 
migration legislation, as well as its effective and efficient application”.  
This book draws on the main EURA-NET research findings, and 
further elaborates on the practical experiences presented and debated on the 
occasion of the policy workshop. It addresses the main issues and challenges 
pertaining to legal migration policies in the EU as well as in the context of 
the EU’s cooperation with third countries.  
Are EU legal migration policies, and the concepts substantiating their 
rationale, well suited to capture the social characteristics and changing 
                                                     
2 See European Commission, Towards a Reform of the Common European Asylum 
System and Enhancing Legal Avenues to Europe, COM(2016) 197 final, 6.4.2016, p. 18. 
See also European Commission, “Regulatory Fitness and Performance Programme 
(REFIT) – State of Play and Outlook – REFIT Scoreboard”, Commission Staff Working 
Document, SWD(2015) 110 final, annexed to the Communication on Better Regulation 
for Better Results – An EU agenda, COM(2015) 215 final, Strasbourg, 19.5.2015. 
3 See European Commission, Evaluation and Fitness Check (FC) Roadmap, REFIT Legal 
Migration Fitness Check, Brussels, 1 September 2016 (http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/roadmaps/docs/2016_home_199_fitnesscheck_legal_migration_en.pdf). 
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trajectories of individuals exercising cross-border mobility? The book 
addresses this overarching question by incorporating and expanding on 
lessons learned and key findings from previous analysis dealing with the 
various interdisciplinary components of legal migration governance in 
Europe and beyond. As such, it also contributes to the open consultation 
procedure on “the European Union’s (EU) legislation on the legal migration 
of non-EU citizens”4 of the Commission over the period 19 June 2017 to 18 
September 2017 as part of the Fitness Check. 
The policy workshop, which laid down the foundations of this 
collective volume, was structured around a set of four main ‘challenges’ that 
are respectively outlined in the questions below.  
Challenge 1. The EU legal migration acquis: Taking stock and main 
challenges 
1) Has the current EU legal and policy framework on legal migration 
attained its objectives, in particular by ensuring an effective and 
efficient management of legal migration flows to the Union? Are there 
any gaps that would need to be addressed by future EU policy in this 
domain? 
2) Have equal and fair treatment for third-country nationals – as 
originally set out in the 1999 Tampere European Council Conclusions,5 
and now formally enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty6 – been ensured and 
promoted? How can ‘fairness’ be understood in light of international 
labour and human rights standards?  
3) Have labour migration flows responded to the actual ‘needs’ of the 
EU’s economy and labour market, and what are those needs? Have the 
admission procedures been simplified, and are they more efficient? 
                                                     
4 For more information, see “Public Consultations” on the website of DG HOME 
(https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/content/consultation-european-unions-eu-
legislation-legal-migration-non-eu-citizens-fitness-check-eu_en). 
5 See European Council, Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere European Council, SN 
200/99, 15–16 October 1999.  
6 Art. 79.1 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) stipulates that 
“[t]he Union shall develop a common immigration policy aimed at ensuring, at all stages, 
fair treatment of third country nationals”. For a detailed discussion, refer to ch. 21 of this 
book. 
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4) What role could EU policy play in addressing the exploitation of third-
country workers and the dilemmas related to the attractiveness of the 
EU for migrant workers?  
Challenge 2. Migration and cooperation with third countries 
5) What are the main issues affecting EU policy and legal approaches to 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation with third countries on 
migration, and what is the place and potential for legal paths for 
migration?  
6) What should be included and prioritised in a ‘comprehensive’ EU 
approach to cooperation with third countries? How to reach an EU 
external policy approach that considers and covers the many issues 
and policy domains connected with migration? 
7) In addition to the work done on scholarships for students and 
researchers, what avenues are there to pursue further action in the 
domain of legal immigration to the EU? How could Member States and 
the EU better cooperate in this area? 
8) In its external relations, the EU has often been criticised for carrying 
out migration policies based on conditionality and security, linking 
incentives (such as visa facilitation and other legal paths for mobility) 
to return and readmission agreements. Have any advantages 
materialised from this approach and what shortcomings have 
emerged? What should be the way forward, in particular concerning 
legal pathways towards migration? 
Challenge 3. Migration and trade 
9) Are existing and future Mode 47 trade commitments covered by EU 
legislation? Are there categories of service providers that should be 
covered by additional EU legislation? 
10) If there are gaps in the current EU legislation, do these gaps entail 
coherence problems with national legislation? What might be the 
impacts of any incoherence or inconsistencies? 
11) Although the Intra-Corporate Transfer (ICT) Directive is recent, can we 
say that it offers ‘value’ for third-country nationals providing services 
in the EU when compared with the existing national schemes?  
                                                     
7 Mode 4, in the language of the World Trade Organization, refers to the movement of 
natural persons to supply services internationally. 
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Challenge 4. Research and policy-making in the field of migration 
12) What are the interactions between research and policy on migration in 
the EU? What is ‘policy-relevant’ research in the field of legal 
migration? How can SSH research better inform EU policy-makers? 
13) How can the research and policy nexus be better understood when 
looking at EU migration policy? What assumptions and premises need 
to be critically explored regarding the role of SSH research in 
informing and interacting with policies and relevant actors? 
14) How can the right balance be set in this tension between research and 
policy when defining the migration challenges needing SSH research 
in a highly politicised field?  
 
This book incorporates these four challenges across its five main parts. 
Each part takes into consideration the framing and questions addressed in 
the various panels of the policy workshop, as well as the cross-cutting 
research objectives and questions explored in the EURA-NET project. Part I 
of the volume deals with “Temporary Migration: Concepts, Policies and 
Transnational Mobility Trajectories”. It considers the conceptual, normative 
and societal issues arising from the incorporation of the notion of 
‘temporariness’ in the existing policy frameworks aimed at managing 
transnational human mobility. Adopting a comparative perspective, it 
encompasses the analyses of temporary and selective labour-migration 
schemes applied in different Asian and European contexts. This part 
illustrates the risks and challenges that these laws and policies pose to the 
socioeconomic inclusion and labour security of temporary migrants, and to 
the labour and living conditions and the rights of persons on the move as 
well as their families. 
The state of play and main features of the EU legal migration acquis 
and the issue of discrimination among predefined categories of migrant 
workers are the key topics covered in Part II. Dealing with the “EU Legal 
Migration Acquis: Taking Stock and Main Challenges”, this part provides a 
succinct and detailed overview of EU labour migration policy and law. It 
also highlights the consequences of the ‘sectorial’ nature and fragmentation 
of the present normative shapes and dispersed matrix of legal and policy 
instruments composing EU policy. Particular attention is given to the 
examination of issues related to policy consistency, legal certainty and non-
discrimination. 
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Part III, entitled “Legal Migration through External Cooperation”, 
continues the journey by investigating the scope and influence of concerns 
about irregular migration in relation to the short-, medium- and long-term 
outcomes of the EU’s legal and policy framework for international 
cooperation on migration. While dealing with specific aspects and 
instruments composing the external dimension of the EU’s migration 
policies, the different contributions help to put into perspective the costs and 
opportunities of framing EU external cooperation on legal migration in 
terms of incentives offered to secure commitments by the EU’s partners on 
border controls and readmission. 
The legitimacy and effectiveness of the EU’s choice to use trade 
agreements as migration tools is investigated in Part IV of the book, entitled 
“Legal Migration and Trade Policies”. The various contributions underline 
the opportunities and potential positive effects as well as the possible 
dangers arising from the use of trade agreements and related instruments to 
deal with legal pathways for labour mobility.  
The role and functions of SSH research in relation to EU policy-making 
processes and actors on migration are addressed in Part V, on 
“Reconsidering the Research and Policy Nexus on Migration and Ways 
Forward for the EU”. Here the chapters critically examine the false 
assumptions often underlying simplistic and instrumental uses of scholarly 
research made by EU policy-makers. The authors outline the functions of 
SSH research and the kinds of support it can offer in reappraising current 
and future EU migration policies. 
The final chapter concludes the book with an in-depth analysis of the 
main research findings and issues emerging from the various contributions. 
It also puts forward policy recommendations for the European Commission 
and other relevant EU institutional actors to take into account when moving 
beyond the European Agenda on Migration,8 and towards a new generation 
of legal avenues for migration to the EU. The chapter calls for the EU to 
implement a ‘beyond crisis’ policy, including as a core component a fair EU 
agenda facilitating legal channels for migration. 
 
                                                     
8 See European Commission, Communication on A European Agenda on Migration, 
COM(2015) 240 final, Brussels, 13.5.2015. 
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1. TEMPORARY MIGRATION BETWEEN  
THE EU AND ASIA 
MARI KORPELA AND PIRKKO PITKÄNEN 
1.1 Introduction 
In the contemporary world, an increasing number of people move back and 
forth between nation-states for various reasons: people may leave one 
country, move to a second, and then either settle there or return to their 
country of origin, or move on to a third. Some move away from their 
countries of origin permanently, others temporarily.  
The research project “Transnational Migration in Transition: 
Transformative Characteristics of Temporary Mobility of People” (EURA-
NET) focused on people’s temporary migration between Asia and the EU. 
The project was funded by the 7th Framework Programme of the European 
Commission from February 2014 until January 2017.  
The project countries were Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Greece, Hungary, Ukraine, Turkey, India, China, Thailand and the 
Philippines. Some of the EURA-NET countries are predominantly source 
countries of temporary migration, others predominantly destination or 
transit countries, but the project looked at each country from all three 
perspectives, thereby emphasising that temporary migration is a complex 
phenomenon involving various types of migratory moves and that people 
move in both directions between Asia and the EU. The project focused on 
the EU–Asia context because people’s transnational mobility is increasing in 
this respect and it is thus gaining more relevance than it has earlier had.  
The EURA-NET project was set up to investigate the characteristics 
and development impacts of the temporary mobility of people in the 
European–Asian transnational space and the policy implications of 
temporary migration at the national, European and international levels. 
First, the project investigated policies related to temporary migration in the 
project countries and at the EU level. Second, it investigated the experiences, 
practices and views of individual migrants and eventually also the views of 
policy-makers, officials and other stakeholders in 11 project countries 
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(empirical research was not conducted in Belgium, whose project team was 
responsible for the EU-level policy analysis). The views of migrants and 
policy-makers were gathered through extensive interviews.  
Temporary migration, to frame it simply, can refer either to people’s 
personal intentions (that is, a person wants to stay in a destination only 
temporarily) or to a specific policy and legal framework within which a 
person is given only temporary entry or residence and one must leave after 
a certain period irrespective of one’s willingness to do so. Temporariness is 
above all the perspective of the receiving state: temporary migration schemes 
are seen as convenient solutions for (temporary) labour shortages and the 
assumption is that when their labour is no longer needed, people return to 
their home countries, in other words the receiving state conveniently gets rid 
of them when they are no longer needed.  
Temporary migration schemes are thus a means to control and manage 
migration and they are used as tools to limit migrants’ rights in the 
destination country. In reality, however, the phenomenon is much more 
complex and multifaceted than the schemes assume. Above all, the simplistic 
nature of temporary migration schemes fails to take into account that 
people’s intentions and life situations change over the course of time, and in 
practice it is very difficult to manage temporary migration.  
During the policy reviews that the project researchers conducted, it 
became clear that European schemes for temporary migration are chiefly 
related to security concerns, economic needs and the needs of European 
labour markets. Populations in various European countries are ageing 
rapidly and both cheap low-skilled labour and highly skilled experts are 
needed in order to ensure success in global competition. The interview data, 
however, reveal that when labour market needs guide policies on temporary 
migration, people tend to be treated merely as labour instead of as human 
beings who also have needs and wishes other than those related to work.  
1.2 EURA-NET data 
Within the EURA-NET project, extensive interview data were gathered. A 
total of 883 semi-structured interviews were conducted among various types 
of temporary migrants and their family members remaining in the country 
of origin. The groups of temporary migrants who were identified and 
interviewed through the project were highly skilled professionals, low-
skilled workers (e.g. seasonal harvesting workers), university students, 
accompanying family members, entrepreneurs, humanitarian migrants 
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(refugees, asylum seekers), irregular migrants, returnees and lifestyle 
migrants. The interviews – about 80 in each project country – were 
conducted between November 2014 and June 2015.  
As the categories of interviewees illustrate, temporary migration 
cannot be limited solely to labour movements, although the theme seems to 
dominate policy debates. The aim of the interviews was to understand the 
reasons why people move on a temporary basis and to gain knowledge on 
the experiences they have while migrating temporarily as well as on the 
transnational practices and the ties that different types of temporary 
migrants have.  
In addition, 395 public officials and other stakeholders were 
interviewed between November 2015 and April 2016, 30–40 in each project 
country. Some of them were representatives of national ministries and other 
national-level institutions, some represented municipalities and others non-
governmental organisations, trade unions, etc. The aim of was to investigate 
the interviewees’ views and concerns with regard to temporary migration in 
the country in question.  
Already at an early stage of the project, it became clear that there is no 
clear definition of temporary migration, either in academia or at the policy 
level; consequently, the related phenomena are often rather invisible in 
terms of statistics. In fact, there are no accurate statistics on temporary 
migration in the EU or in the other EURA-NET countries.  
In the EU, there are statistics on people who get fixed-term residence 
permits in particular countries but one cannot know how many of them 
eventually leave Europe or how many renew their permits and may even 
stay permanently. Registration processes also vary in different countries. 
When the phenomenon is not recognised and is difficult to quantify, it is 
likewise difficult to plan policy measures. Nevertheless, amid the lack of a 
common definition on temporary migration, within the EURA-NET project, 
the rough guideline was a temporary migrant staying in the destination for 
more than three months but less than five years. 
1.3 Challenges of temporary migration to the EU 
The EURA-NET project found various challenges in terms of temporary 
migration in the European context.  
First of all, many of the temporary migrants interviewed complained 
about a slow and complicated bureaucratic process related to their 
migration, especially concerning the residence permits. This means not only 
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personal frustration but also a risk of Europe losing out in the competition 
for the most skilled and talented migrants, as highly skilled experts are 
welcome to work in various countries in the world and some of them may 
choose a non-European destination at least partly because it is much easier 
and faster to obtain employment visas or residence permits for those other 
countries. The slow and complicated processes also generate a feeling among 
the (potential) temporary migrants that they are not welcome in Europe. 
Second, it became evident that in many countries, it is very difficult, or 
even impossible, for the spouses of the highly skilled Asian experts to get 
jobs in Europe. When highly skilled experts are recruited from abroad, it is 
enough that they speak English. However, when their spouses, who are 
typically highly skilled as well, seek employment after arriving in the 
destination country, fluent skills in local languages are required. The 
spouses’ unemployment gives way to personal frustrations as well as a waste 
of resources, as these highly educated and skilled people are already residing 
in the country. In addition, if the spouse wants to work but cannot get a job, 
some families end up leaving the country earlier than initially planned, 
which means that the skills and labour of the initially recruited person are 
lost.  
Another group of temporary migrants suffering from unemployment 
or underemployment consists of students graduating at the tertiary level. 
Students are an important category of temporary migrants and in many 
European countries, the internationalisation of higher education is 
considered desirable. Many foreign graduates would like to stay to work in 
Europe at least for a couple of years after graduation, and many countries – 
for example Germany, Finland and the Netherlands – give the graduates 
fixed-term residence permits that allow them to look for work in the country, 
typically for a year. Although the graduates have earned their degrees in the 
destination country, many of them lack local language skills, as a 
consequence of which it is very difficult for them to become employed there 
according to their qualifications. This is obviously a waste of resources for 
the destination country.  
A common assumption is that temporary migrants come to Europe 
because of money. Although it is clear that better earnings are a significant 
factor in temporary labour migration and the role of financial remittances is 
important, the interviews with temporary migrants revealed that money is 
not necessarily the only significant motivational factor. For many highly 
skilled migrants, hopes of career advancement were equally or even more 
important. In addition, it became apparent that some temporary migrants do 
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not earn enough in order to be able to send remittances to their relatives and 
in fact, some of them receive reverse remittances – that is, their family 
members send them money from Asia in order to support their everyday 
living in Europe. This was the case for some low-skilled migrants, some 
students and some of those who had accompanied their spouse to Europe.  
EURA-NET research focused on non-English-speaking countries on 
purpose, as they are not necessarily the most attractive immigration 
destinations. It became evident that in many of the project countries, the 
language skill requirements for foreigners are rather unrealistic. Especially 
with regard to temporary migration, it is not practical to expect the migrants 
to learn local languages. If one intends to stay in the destination only 
temporarily or knows that staying permanently will not be allowed in any 
case, the limited attraction of studying a language that is not of much use 
beyond the borders of that country is obvious.  
Moreover, those temporary migrants who come to work in Europe do 
not have time for serious language studies. In a similar vein, temporary 
migrants are, understandably, not very interested in heavy integration 
measures. Yet, if they end up staying much longer than initially planned, or 
even permanently, the lack of integration can cause problems, and it could 
be the case that those who entered as temporary migrants are not entitled to 
integration measures, including language tuition, even if they end up 
staying.  
It also became clear that the status of a temporary migrant means 
insecurity. Being a temporary migrant can be a useful and fun experience for 
an individual: she or he may gain a better salary than in the country of origin 
or may learn new skills, and it can be personally rewarding to live in another 
country for a while. Still, temporary migration is not a long-term solution 
from an individual migrant’s perspective.  
Prolonged temporariness and insecurity of residence status mean 
living in a limbo state, being unable to plan the future or build one’s life with 
a long-term perspective. This is obviously not a desirable situation. 
Temporariness does not just mean that one must leave eventually, but in fact 
many of our interviewees did not know how long they would be able and 
willing to stay.  
EURA-NET looked at both Asian nationals who migrate temporarily 
to Europe and European citizens who temporarily live in Asia. The findings 
reveal two major challenges. First, European returnees sometimes face 
problems with integration back into labour markets (as their experiences 
from abroad are not appreciated by employers) and social security and 
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healthcare systems after their return to Europe. Such problems obviously 
make it less attractive for them to return and there is thus a risk of brain drain 
for Europe. In contrast to the problems of return migration in the European 
context, the EURA-NET studies conducted in Asia showed that in China and 
India, the job markets appreciate the returnees’ skills and the return 
migration of students and highly skilled migrants has brought positive 
effects to the countries’ economic development. 
Another challenge that concerns Europe is that an increasing number 
of European citizens are leading transnationally mobile lifestyles: for 
example, increasing numbers of retirees spend winters in Thailand and a 
growing number of skilled experts work in Asia for longer or shorter stints. 
Yet, European policies tend to define people in sedentary terms, with the 
result that many mobile people fall out of social security and healthcare 
systems. Although this does not yet concern great numbers of people, the 
numbers are rising and there is a risk that the situation will affect European 
societies at large if many of their citizens are not entitled to various benefits 
that are available only to those whose lifestyles are less transnationally 
mobile in Europe.  
1.4 Temporary migrants outside Europe 
Regarding transit countries (e.g. Ukraine and Turkey), the main EURA-NET 
finding is that they lack the legal instruments and practical measures to deal 
with the high number of migrants who reside in the country but whose 
intention is to move onward towards more attractive destinations in Europe. 
Consequently, many end up in very difficult in-between situations where 
they are stuck without rights for long periods. 
The Philippines, China, India and Thailand send a lot of migrants and 
for these countries, it is important to try to protect the migrants and their 
rights at all stages of migration. At the same time, these four Asian countries 
are also increasingly popular destinations for temporary European migrants, 
including students, highly skilled experts and lifestyle migrants. European 
companies are promoting businesses in Asia to an ever-greater extent, 
especially in China and India. This means growing numbers of intra-
company transfers between the countries. China is also active in trying to 
attract foreign students and skilled experts to work there, and Thailand has 
a special (renewable) one-year visa for retirees that is popular among 
Europeans. Therefore, although the numbers of temporary European 
migrants in Asia are a lot lower than vice versa, those numbers are rising. 
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2. TEMPORARY LABOUR MIGRATION:  
A FLAWED SYSTEM IN NEED OF REFORM 
GRAZIANO BATTISTELLA 
emporary labour migration has always been a choice that some 
migrants have taken and a policy that countries have adopted. In 
recent history, some of the specific programmes adopted for 
temporary labour migration were later abandoned. The immediate examples 
that come to mind are the Bracero programme in the US (abandoned in 1964) 
and the ‘guestworker programme’ in Western Europe, abandoned in 1973–
74. The conclusions of such programmes led to the idea that temporary 
labour migration was not the way to go.  
While Western Europe was discontinuing the guestworker 
programme, the Gulf countries were reinventing it as a systematic way of 
providing a labour force to growing economies, and later, other countries in 
Asia went in the same direction (Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan and South 
Korea), although with specific and significant differences. The Gulf countries 
have ensured temporary status (two to three years, renewable after returning 
to the country of origin) through the sponsorship system (kafala), whereby 
the foreign workers’ visas and employment are tied to the sponsor.  
Singapore and Malaysia have utilised a combination of the percentage 
of foreign workers per occupation and a levy on the hiring of foreign workers 
to control the number of temporary migrants. Taiwan has fixed the 
maximum length of stay to a non-renewable permit of two to three years and 
progressively relaxed the single-entry policy to twelve years. South Korea 
has imposed a maximum of two renewals of the employment permit (each 
permit lasting four years and ten months). In all of the temporary labour 
migration systems adopted in Asia, there is a heavy involvement of private 
mediators (called by different terms in countries of origin and destination). 
The lone exception is South Korea, which opted for government-to-
government agreements, implemented through renewable memoranda of 
understanding (MoUs) with origin countries. 
In the meantime, traditional countries of immigration (the US, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand) have adopted different forms of temporary 
T 
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work arrangements (sometimes targeting highly skilled workers, other times 
focusing on agricultural workers), some of which include conversion into 
permanent residence status. Western European countries also continue to 
resort to small-scale, often seasonal programmes targeting temporary 
workers, project-tied workers, trainees, border commuters and others. The 
agricultural sector often requires seasonal workers. The transition of 
southern European countries from being origin to destination countries of 
migrants was eventually regulated by deciding on an annual admission of 
temporary workers. 
Contrary to impressions, therefore, temporary labour migration has 
never been abandoned. It is prevalent in Asia, and it is utilised in different 
ways in other major areas of destination. Common to all programmes is the 
short-term visa and contract; but other than this, temporary migration 
programmes in Asia and in other regions present substantial differences. In 
Asia, return to the country of origin at the end of the contract is mandatory 
but in many Western countries contracts can be renewed while remaining in 
the country of destination. Temporary migration in Europe can lead to a 
long-term status, while this is not allowed in Asia; family reunification is 
allowed in Asia only for workers whose salary is sufficiently high to ensure 
that they can support the family. 
In addition to its continuity, temporary labour migration has been 
specifically recommended, albeit with some caution, by some scholars and 
various institutions, among them the Global Commission on International 
Migration, the UN High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development, and 
the Global Forum on Migration and Development. The reasons behind such 
recommendations derive from the view that temporary labour migration 
maximises the benefits for countries of destination, countries of origin and 
the migrants themselves. 
In countries of destination, temporary migrants increase the flexibility 
of the labour market, fill the labour shortages in some industries and 
strengthen the competitiveness of certain industries. These and other 
economic benefits are strongly based on the savings that labour migration 
produces: savings in the education and training of personnel, savings in 
social welfare benefits for the equivalent local population, and most of all, 
savings in the social costs of workers who do not settle and are without 
family members in the territory. 
For countries of origin, temporary labour migration lowers 
unemployment rates, increases remittances and their development impact, 
and potentially leads to skills and knowledge transfer with the return of 
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migrants. The social costs of temporary migration are considered relatively 
small because the absence of migrants is only for a limited time. Moreover, 
social costs normally surface in the long term and until then, what can 
happen years from now is anybody’s conjecture. 
Finally, migrants benefit from temporary migration by way of 
increased earnings from gainful employment abroad. While social costs may 
be attendant to the migratory experience, periodic family visitations and 
ultimately the return of the migrant to his or her place of origin lower the 
costs of permanent displacement in another country and another culture. 
If temporary labour migration is such a ‘win–win–win’ experience, 
why are the recommendations to implement it always accompanied by 
cautious remarks? The reason is that policies on temporary labour migration 
are often flawed. Are the flaws specific to temporary programmes or are they 
inherent in the system for temporary labour migration? Based on the Asian 
approaches to temporary labour migration, the contention is that the flaws 
are inherent in the system. 
The temporariness of labour migration is fictitious. It originates from a 
permanent demand for labour, met through temporary workers whose 
migration experience is extended for many years, but always under a 
temporary status. A long time ago, scholars had concluded that nothing is 
more permanent than temporary migration. The increase in the number of 
rehires among Filipino migrants or the increase in the number of years that 
migrants are allowed to return and work in Taiwan is indicative of the fact 
that both employers and workers favour a medium- to long-term migration 
experience over a short-term and temporary one, and this should be 
recognised and be accorded an appropriate status. 
Temporary labour migration is accompanied by substandard living 
and working conditions. Migrants are individual workers lodged often in 
common quarters (bed spaces) or barracks or labour camps, with limited 
opportunities for social life and interaction. Domestic workers live in the 
homes of employers who impose many restrictions. The objective of 
ensuring that migrants do not remain because the local societies are not 
willing or ready to incorporate cultural minorities reduces migrants to 
labour providers and denies them their humanity. 
Migrants are denied some fundamental rights. The right to association 
and to collective bargaining is often not granted. Beginning with the 
recruitment process and ending with the sponsorship system in the Gulf 
countries, migrants have little negotiating power. Since migration is 
normally dictated by necessity and migrants often encumber debts to pay for 
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the migration costs, their possibility to negotiate better conditions is 
practically non-existent. In some countries, not only are migrants not 
allowed to join or form trade unions, but they are also discouraged from 
associating or establishing links with each other. In spite of some reforms, 
the sponsorship system in the Gulf countries requires the sponsor’s 
agreement for the migrant to return to the country of origin, blocking the 
possibility for migrants to sever the contractual relationship. 
Under the temporary migration system migrants do not accumulate 
social benefits. The limited duration of stay does not allow them to claim 
such benefits. 
Temporary migration can lead to irregular migration. It has happened 
in the past and it continues to happen because temporary migration is based 
on unrealistic and incoherent premises. Migrants can be victims of 
irregularities committed by recruiters, sponsors and employers or they can 
resort to irregular migration as the perceived alternative to the restrictions 
of temporary migration. 
Finally, temporary migration is flawed because the win–win–win 
scenario depicted above takes place on an uneven playing field. Not only are 
migrants the ones winning less, but they are also the ones paying the price 
for the winning of others. Although this inequity is typical of any labour 
relationship, it is excessively emphasised in the system for temporary labour 
migration, at least in the form experienced in Asia. 
Indicating the flaws of temporary migration in Asia does not mean that 
all programmes for temporary labour migration have similar shortcomings. 
Improvements in the recruitment process, in ensuring adequate living and 
working conditions, and in facilitating the reintegration of migrants continue 
to be the object of bilateral and multilateral dialogues between countries of 
origin and destination. The persistence of flaws within temporary labour 
programmes indicates that patchy solutions will not solve the problem. The 
crucial element for rectifying the weaknesses in migration policies consists 
of increasing the agency of migrants.  
Migration viewed as a choice rather than a necessity is a recognised 
principle for reducing the level of constraints and abuse associated with 
working in a foreign country. Thus, policies that offer the opportunity for 
migrants to decide, if they want, on a long-term stay instead of a fixed 
temporary status, enhance the degree of protection and the fruition of rights 
for migrants. The reluctance of countries to provide such a possibility 
assumes that most migrants would remain and this would diminish the 
benefits of temporary programmes and increase the economic, and most of 
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all, the cultural costs for countries of destination unwilling to accept and 
address growing cultural diversity.  
While it is not proven that most temporary migrants would stay for a 
long-term period (although this is often demanded by the labour market), it 
is also unavoidable that cultural and ethnic diversity must be accepted in an 
ever-more globalised world. To resist such a trend by exacting a heavy cost 
on migrants raises questions and erodes the sustainability and ethics of 
temporary migration programmes. 
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3. TEMPORARY LABOUR MIGRATION 
PROGRAMMES IN ASIA 
GABRIELA MARTI 
emporary labour migration programmes (TLMPs) are widespread in 
Asia, notably in the field of low-skilled work, such as domestic, 
construction and agricultural work. Labour migration in these sectors 
takes place based on fixed, short-term contracts of two to three years (see e.g. 
Wickramasekara, 2002, p. 14). ‘Temporary’ is therefore frequently equivalent 
to ‘low-skilled’, but the focus on ‘temporariness’ masks the fact that workers 
with lower skills are afforded fewer rights (Dauvergne and Marsden, 2014, 
p. 231). Indeed, TLMPs are commonly associated with severe restrictions on 
labour rights and civil rights generally (Rosewarne, 2010b, p. 27). Moreover, 
persons migrating under TLMPs in Asia regularly do not have access to 
permanent residency and citizenship, even if they have worked and lived in 
the country of destination for several years, or even decades, continually 
renewing their contracts. They can thus become ‘permanently temporary’ 
migrants. 
TLMPs are usually defended by instrumentalist arguments and on the 
grounds that they create a “win–win–win” situation – with “wins” for the 
countries of destination, the countries of origin, and the migrants themselves 
(see e.g. IOM, 2008, p. 93). TLMPs allow countries of destination to address 
labour shortages in specific sectors that cannot be filled with local workers. 
The intake of low-skilled, temporary migrant workers can be increased and 
decreased as required by the economy (Kaur, 2010, p. 10). Furthermore, 
TLMPs allow states to admit workers on a temporary basis, without adding 
new members to the political community (Sager, 2014, p. 199). In this 
manner, major host states in Asia have been able to avoid the issue of 
integrating large numbers of immigrants into the community (Piper, 2010, p. 
399). In the countries of origin, TLMPs are said to contribute to development 
and poverty reduction by generating foreign exchange revenue through the 
remittances transferred by overseas workers, and to easing domestic 
unemployment. In this context, it is argued that the temporariness of 
migration is essential, since the temporary duration of migrants’ stay abroad 
T 
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and the prospect of returning to their home countries after the conclusion of 
their contracts ensures a steady stream of remittances. Indeed, the amount 
of remittances transferred is said to decrease the longer the migrants stay in 
the host country (see e.g. de Bruyn and Wets, 2006, pp. 12–13; Rodriguez, 
1996, p. 431). Finally, TLMPs are held to benefit the migrants themselves, by 
enabling them to contribute to their own and their families’ welfare and 
development (IOM, 2008, p. 92). 
By contributing to the development of countries of the Global South, 
and by alleviating the poverty of migrants and their families, TLMPs are 
often said to contribute to global justice. It is argued that global justice, or 
development, is best served when large numbers of migrants from 
developing countries are admitted to work – even if only temporarily – in 
wealthy economies (see Lenard, 2014, p. 159). These labour migration 
programmes are thus temporary and – in the case of low-skilled migrant 
workers – regularly close off the route to permanent residency and 
citizenship in the host country. They usually offer limited rights compared 
with those of highly skilled migrant workers or permanent residents and 
citizens. This is often defended by arguing that it constitutes a trade-off 
between rights and numbers (Ruhs and Martin, 2008, pp. 254–55). If migrants 
were accorded more rights and a path to permanency, it is argued, the costs 
of these workers for employers and the host states would increase, making 
them less likely to be hired. This is against the interest of migrant workers, it 
is said, who would prefer to migrate and take on jobs abroad even under the 
prevailing substandard conditions, and even if they are granted fewer rights 
than other (local and highly skilled foreign) workers. 
However, even though the remittances of overseas workers have 
contributed significantly to the gross domestic product of several countries 
of the Global South, it is unclear to what degree TLMPs actually contribute 
to sustainable development in the countries of origin in the longer term. 
Several commentators have argued that the link between migration and 
development (the “migration–remittances–development nexus”) is tenuous 
(see e.g. Rosewarne, 2010b, p. 3). Remittances do not seem to have generated 
the momentum for development envisaged in the migration–remittances–
development nexus (Rosewarne, 2010b, p. 32).  
Despite their tenuous connection to development, TLMPs are praised 
by international financial institutions and international organisations, as 
well as governments of countries of origin and destination, as a solution for 
the trade imbalances and the high levels of unemployment in the countries 
of the Global South. At the same time, little attention is accorded to the costs 
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associated with migration for migrants and their families, or to the 
improvement and protection of their – usually very limited – rights. Based 
on a neoliberal rhetoric of ‘self-reliance’, low-skilled migrants from 
developing countries – many of whom are women – are expected to bear the 
responsibility of contributing to the development of the Global South, and of 
correcting the failures of global economic programmes (Rosewarne, 2012, 
pp. 80–81). Notably, migrants are expected to shoulder this responsibility 
without adequate rights and working conditions, and usually by forfeiting 
access to permanent residency and citizenship in the host countries. This is 
one way in which TLMPs can be said to be deficient. Yet, the popularity of 
TLMPs lies precisely in the fact that people are hired for a specific type of 
job, and that no new members are added to the political community (Sager, 
2014, p. 199). In the migration–remittances–development discourse, 
therefore, labour migration – like other commodities – is presented simply 
as a means to generate export revenue for the Global South (Rosewarne, 
2010a, p. 99). 
A further shortcoming of TLMPs is that they are based on a “myth of 
temporariness” (Lenard, 2014, p. 164). Many ‘temporary’ migrant workers 
engage in circular migration, repeatedly completing a short-term contract, 
returning to their home country, and re-migrating. In this manner, they often 
spend years, or even decades, in a particular destination country. In the 
sector of domestic work in particular, many employers seem to have an 
interest in continuously employing the same domestic worker for an 
extended period, since these workers frequently perform care work, such as 
looking after children or elderly persons (Piper, 2010, p. 403).  
Nevertheless, host states regularly insist on the ‘temporariness’ of the 
migrant workers’ stay, and do not allow low-skilled temporary migrant 
workers to acquire residency and citizenship, even if they have worked and 
lived in the respective country for a very long time. In Singapore and Hong 
Kong, for instance, migrant domestic workers (MDWs) are excluded from 
applying for permanent residency and, eventually, citizenship (Singapore) 
or the right of abode (Hong Kong). TLMPs, and the restrictions they impose 
on migrants, are designed to prevent low-skilled migrant workers from 
integrating into the host society, and to ensure that they will return to their 
home country after the completion of their contracts (Lenard and Straehle, 
2010, p. 284). The fact that the path to permanency is closed off, for MDWs 
in Singapore and Hong Kong, deprives them of any meaningful political 
leverage in the host society. 
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It seems that just TLMPs should offer a route to permanency (that is, 
permanent residency and, eventually, citizenship) to migrant workers (see 
also Lenard and Straehle, 2010, p. 293). It appears profoundly unjust that 
migrant workers should work and reside in a state for an extended period, 
providing essential services to the community, and that they should not be 
allowed to participate, in time, as full members of the host society (see 
Lenard, 2014, p. 168). If temporary labour migrants were granted a path to 
permanent residency and citizenship, this would mean the end of several 
TLMPs in their current form in Asia, such as the programmes for MDWs in 
Singapore and Hong Kong. Still, this author does not believe that it is realistic 
to expect that the major host jurisdictions in Asia will allow MDWs (and 
other low-skilled temporary migrant workers) to settle permanently anytime 
soon, as they do not have an interest in changing the status quo. Indeed, the 
Court of Final Appeal of Hong Kong decided on 25 March 2013 that MDWs 
are not permitted to apply for the right of abode (Vallejos and Domingo v 
Commissioner of Registration). 
At the very minimum, though, and even if they do not grant access to 
permanent residency and citizenship to MDWs, the host jurisdictions in Asia 
should protect the fundamental human and labour rights of temporary 
migrant workers like MDWs, as enshrined in international conventions such 
as the International Labour Organization (ILO) Domestic Workers 
Convention and the UN Migrant Workers Convention. Once they are living 
and working in the destination state, temporary migrant workers should be 
accorded the same employment rights as permanent residents and citizens. 
The TLMPs for MDWs in Singapore and Hong Kong, however, are very far 
from adhering to this standard (particularly the programme in Singapore). 
Even adhering to minimum standards of justice and human rights would 
mean drastically changing the systems currently in place in Singapore and 
Hong Kong. 
MDWs in Singapore are excluded from the scope of the Employment 
Act, the main piece of labour legislation of the country, leaving them with 
practically no protection under employment law. In addition, there is no 
mandatory, standard employment contract for the employment of MDWs in 
Singapore. In fact, it seems that some MDWs are employed without signing 
a written contract at all. MDWs in Singapore also do not have a minimum 
wage, resulting in very low wages. MDWs’ contracts can be terminated 
without giving notice, and they are completely excluded from social security. 
MDWs are not permitted to become pregnant, nor are they permitted to 
marry Singaporean citizens or permanent residents, without the prior 
approval of the Controller of Work Permits (this applies even after the 
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expiration of their work permit). They are required to undergo a six-monthly 
medical examination, including a pregnancy test and an HIV test, and they 
are immediately deported if they fail the examination. These regulations 
constitute a severe restriction of MDWs’ reproductive and marriage rights. 
Moreover, the above-mentioned regulations do not comply with 
international (human rights and labour) standards, and should be amended. 
In particular, it appears crucial that MDWs are included under the scope of 
the Employment Act, like other workers. Finally, MDWs in Singapore cannot 
form their own unions or other advocacy-oriented migrants’ organisations. 
Their right to associate is therefore severely restricted. The issue of freedom 
of association in Singapore is also problematic for local workers (and other 
migrant workers), since trade unions are not independent of the 
government, and civil society in general is suppressed. In Hong Kong, 
although MDWs can join and form unions, they cannot bargain collectively 
(this is the case for most MDWs worldwide). 
In both Singapore and Hong Kong, MDWs are mandatorily required 
to live with their employers. This significantly increases their risk of abuse 
and exploitation, and makes them highly dependent on their employers. The 
live-in requirement should be abolished, that is, MDWs should have the 
possibility to opt for live-out arrangements. In Hong Kong, MDWs are, in 
principle, not permitted to change employers for the duration of their 
contract. In Singapore, MDWs may be ‘transferred’ to another employer, but 
only with the consent of the current employer. The restriction on changing 
employers renders MDWs highly dependent on their employers, and 
potentially ‘traps’ them in an abusive work relationship. In both Hong Kong 
and Singapore, MDWs are not allowed to change occupations – they are 
hired to perform work only as a domestic worker, and only for a specified 
employer. MDWs are also not entitled to family reunification, in either 
Singapore or Hong Kong.  
Furthermore, MDWs in Hong Kong must leave the host jurisdiction 
within two weeks at the latest, if their contract is terminated by their 
employers, for whatever reason (the ‘two-week rule’). The timeframe of two 
weeks is clearly insufficient for MDWs to find a new employer and for the 
immigration department to process an application for change of employer. 
It is also insufficient to process and resolve a complaint filed with the 
authorities by an MDW for abuses and violations of (employment and other) 
rights. MDWs’ access to justice is thus severely compromised by the two-
week rule. MDWs in Singapore must leave the country once their work 
permit has been cancelled. For non-Malaysian MDWs, the MDW’s departure 
date must be within two weeks after cancellation of the work permit, and the 
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employer must ensure that the MDW leaves as scheduled. In practice, 
however, MDWs often have to leave the country within a few hours after 
their employment contract has been terminated. All these regulations and 
practices are highly restrictive and controlling. Several of them do not 
comply with international standards, and should be amended. 
A further issue is the role of private intermediaries in TLMPs. In Asia, 
the recruitment of temporary migrant workers, notably of domestic workers, 
relies heavily on private intermediaries, such as recruitment and 
employment agencies and brokers. MDWs from the Philippines and 
Indonesia commonly use the services of private recruitment agencies, which 
usually charge them very high fees. The MDWs’ debts to the recruitment 
companies are repaid via salary deductions over the first few months of their 
employment relationship (usually the first six to ten months of their 
employment). During this time, they normally only receive a small 
allowance, while the rest of their salary is deducted to repay their debts to 
the agency. The indebtedness of MDWs at the beginning of their 
employment relationship makes them highly dependent on their employers 
and vulnerable to abuse, since they may constantly fear being terminated 
prematurely and, consequently, being repatriated. 
In terms of possible suggestions for reforming the system of temporary 
labour migration in its current dominant form in Asia, it is argued here that 
a multi-pronged approach is necessary. At the level of the host jurisdictions, 
temporary migrant workers should have decent working and living 
conditions, and their human and employment rights should be guaranteed 
and protected. In principle, these rights should be equivalent to those 
applicable to permanent residents and citizens. If the host jurisdictions fail 
to protect the rights of temporary migrant workers once they are working 
and residing in the jurisdiction, they fall short of their responsibilities as 
hosts of migrant workers they have called to fill specific labour shortages in 
their economies.  
It appears unjust to let temporary migrant workers, who are providing 
important services to the host community, work under inadequate 
conditions and with restricted rights, and to repatriate them after the 
completion of their contracts, without adequately rewarding them (see 
Lenard and Straehle, 2010, p. 285). Unfortunately, in most major Asian host 
jurisdictions, there is little political will to effectively protect the rights of 
temporary migrant workers, and organisations such as the ILO and the 
International Organization for Migration, as well as the Association of 
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Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN tread carefully where state sovereignty 
over migration is at issue (Kneebone, 2010, p. 392). 
Moreover, the longer ‘temporary’ migrants have lived and worked in 
the host jurisdiction, the stronger the moral claim becomes to grant them 
access to political rights. It seems unjust to have people reside and work in a 
particular state for an extended period, subject to its laws and institutions, 
without granting them the right to participate in shaping these institutions 
(see Lenard and Straehle, 2011, p. 217). Yet as noted earlier, it does not seem 
likely that the major host jurisdictions in Asia will grant MDWs access to 
permanent residency and citizenship (including the corresponding political 
rights) anytime soon. 
At the level of the countries of origin, measures are required to protect 
their citizens working overseas. The Philippines in particular has put in place 
several laws, policies and programmes for the protection of overseas Filipino 
workers. Nevertheless, these measures usually only have a limited impact, 
due to problems in implementation, and because the legal system of the host 
state has the most direct effect on temporary migrant workers’ living and 
working conditions. States of origin have limited power to change the 
conditions in the host jurisdictions, and they are often dependent, to a 
considerable degree, on the goodwill of the host jurisdictions for the 
adequate treatment of their citizens abroad.  
Nevertheless, it appears possible that if a number of major countries of 
origin in Asia, such as the Philippines and Indonesia, were to work together 
more, as a block of countries they could exert greater pressure on major host 
jurisdictions in the region to change the legal situation and the welfare of 
their citizens working in those jurisdictions. Since these countries are 
competing with each other for jobs overseas, however, they normally do not 
collaborate to negotiate better terms and conditions with the host 
jurisdictions. 
Therefore, promoting the economic development of the countries of 
origin in Asia appears crucial, in order to increase the bargaining power of 
migrant workers. If large-scale unemployment and a lack of alternative 
options in the countries of origin persist, temporary migrant workers will 
continue to have less bargaining power and fewer rights, and they will 
continue to be vulnerable to exploitation and abuse. Only if the citizens of 
the (current) developing countries have the possibility to find decent work 
in their home countries will migration genuinely be a choice, and will they 
not be forced to migrate in the first place, if they do not wish to. Clause 12 of 
the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of 
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Migrant Workers of 2007 states that labour-sending states should “[e]nsure 
access to employment and livelihood opportunities for their citizens as 
sustainable alternatives to migration of workers”. That notwithstanding, 
addressing the inequities in the global distribution of wealth and 
opportunities should be a shared responsibility of the international 
community (see also Rosewarne, 2012, p. 80). 
That low-skilled, temporary migrant workers (among them many 
women migrant workers) – who are lauded as ‘new national heroes’ in the 
Philippines, and as ‘foreign exchange heroes’ in Indonesia – should bear the 
responsibility of reducing poverty and developing the Global South by way 
of their remittances (while the responsibilities of the state and the market 
remain unchanged), seems profoundly unjust. These workers do not receive 
adequate rights, protections and rewards that would correspond with this 
responsibility, and they and their families pay the main emotional and social 
price due to family separation during the migrant workers’ absence. Indeed, 
it appears that states and private actors, such as recruitment agencies, often 
wish to extract the economic benefits of migration, without undertaking 
sufficient efforts to provide even minimum rights and protections to 
temporary migrant workers. 
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4. A MIGRATION-CYCLE APPROACH TO 
TEMPORARY LABOUR MIGRATION POLICIES: 
LOOKING BEYOND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF 
DESTINATION COUNTRIES  
MARIE-JOSÉ L. TAYAH 
4.1 Introduction 
International debates provide simplified accounts of migration (Pécoud, 
2015, p. 9). They are grounded in clear and dichotomic typologies, such as 
sending/receiving, forced/voluntary, temporary/permanent, skilled/ 
unskilled and regular/irregular migration (ibid., p. 86). These narratives 
obscure the complexity of migration processes, and therefore deny policy-
makers the opportunity of designing comprehensive strategies that address 
the multifaceted nature and many nuances of migration (ibid., p. 93).  
Debates on temporary labour migration are not immune to this over-
simplification. Research that examines the ‘in-betweenness’ of temporary 
migration is nonetheless beginning to emerge. For example, Carrera and 
Korpela (2016) have challenged the unidirectionality of research on 
temporary labour migration – traditionally focused on south–north mobility 
– by examining the impact of temporary migration schemes in Asian and 
European countries as countries of destination (i.e. Asia as a destination for 
European temporary migrants and Europe as a destination for Asian 
temporary migrants). 
This chapter points to three additional nuances that could be 
considered in examining the in-betweenness of temporary migration. 
Scholars often single out countries of destination for designing temporary 
schemes that result in permanent migration under conditions of irregularity. 
This chapter analyses the shortcomings of temporary schemes in relation to 
the migration policies of countries of origin, transit and destination. This is 
done from the prism of research on migration for domestic work, which, in 
many parts of the world, is governed by temporary programmes.  
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4.2 Temporary migration gone awry: The responsibility of 
countries of origin, transit and destination 
Promoting fair foreign employment policies in countries of origin 
Countries of origin with an employment-driven emigration policy 
encourage the temporary migration of their nationals. Temporariness is 
likely to lead to higher remittance transfers than migration policies that 
encourage permanent settlement (Dustmann and Mestres, 2008). Further, 
immigrants with return plans place a higher proportion of their savings in 
the home country, and the shares of assets and housing value accumulated 
in the home country are also larger (Dustmann and Mestres, 2011).  
Countries of origin react to restrictions on temporary migration at the 
destination in one of two ways: i) they legitimise and further the 
restrictiveness of these arrangements by competing among themselves over 
access to the labour markets at destination; or ii) they impose bans on the 
deployment of their nationals to these countries. Bans are intended to 
prevent constituents’ uproar over the abuses that tend to result from these 
restrictive arrangements and to encourage nationals’ integration into higher 
paying jobs on the home front (such as in the growing garment sector of 
India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka) or in alternative countries of destination 
(usually in higher income countries in East Asia). Both these measures have 
proved ineffective (see the rationales in the following two subsections).  
Preventing competition between countries of origin  
To maximise the development potential of migration, countries of origin 
with employment-driven emigration policies compete among themselves 
over access to the labour markets in countries of destination. Competition 
legitimises the temporary schemes and furthers the restrictiveness of these 
arrangements, pushing wages and working conditions downwards for all 
workers, including nationals, in a particular sector.  
For example, when a number of Asian countries (like Indonesia) 
imposed bans on the deployment of their citizens for work in the domestic 
work sector of the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) until 
certain protections were extended to their workers, GCC countries turned to 
countries in East (Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania) and South Africa 
(Madagascar) for cheaper sources of labour. The 2015 Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) between Saudi Arabia and Uganda is a case in point. 
This MoU was intended to facilitate the access of a million college-level 
educated men and women to work in Saudi Arabia’s domestic work sector 
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over a period of five years without questioning the broader protection gaps 
for migrants in this country. The MoU was soon followed by a ban due to 
the abuses reported by Ugandan workers in the Kingdom.  
Taking note of the growing mobility patterns between Africa and the 
GCC, the International Labour Organization (ILO) initiated an interregional 
tripartite dialogue on migrant domestic workers (in May 2016), bringing 
together constituents from Africa, the Arab states and Asia. One of the 
recommendations of this dialogue was to place migrant domestic workers 
on the agenda of existing interregional consultative processes spanning the 
Asia–GCC migration corridor and to extend participation in these fora to 
African countries of origin for migrant domestic workers. Existing fora 
include the Colombo process (since 2003), an intergovernmental regional 
consultative process on overseas employment for Asian labour-sending 
countries, and the Abu Dhabi Dialogue (since 2008), an interregional 
consultative process on temporary labour migration between the 
governments of destination countries in the GCC and origin countries in 
South and Southeast Asia.  
The second recommendation of the tripartite dialogue was to establish 
an interregional network (Africa, Arab states and Asia) of experts, civil 
society organisations and trade unions with the objective of building a 
common position across regions on migration for domestic work. Existing 
MoUs on labour migration between trade unions in Asia and the 
GCC/Levant could, for example, be revised to include signatories from 
African trade unions. This includes the 2015 MoU between the Arab Trade 
Union Confederation, Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ Trade Union 
Council and the South Asian Regional Trade Union Council. The MoU 
promotes ratification of the Migration for Employment Convention 
(Revised), 1949 (No. 97), Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) 
Convention, 1975 (No. 143), Private Employment Agencies Convention, 1997 
(No. 181), Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189) and the 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families, 1990. The MoU also calls on trade 
unions in the corridor to establish information centres for migrant workers 
and to examine and address their occupational health and safety concerns, 
among other things. 
Finding alternative protection measures to deployment bans  
When countries of origin choose to sanction the abuses that result from 
restrictive temporary schemes at destination, they do so in the form of bans 
32  MARIE-JOSÉ L. TAYAH 
on the deployment of their nationals, particularly women, for work abroad. 
Bans can be total (i.e. extending to all citizens) or partial (i.e. pertaining to 
age, sector, skill level, gender or a combination of these).  
Nepal, for example, announced a ban on women under the age of 30 
from migrating to the Arab states for domestic work in 2012 before 
expanding the age ban in 2014 to all women seeking low-skilled employment 
abroad. The ban did not stop migration. Instead, migration was undertaken 
irregularly via neighbouring India and Bangladesh. Moreover, migrant 
women did not attend pre-departure orientation sessions, a valuable source 
of information for ensuring their safe migration, and as a result of exiting 
without their government’s pre-approval, were excluded from the benefits 
of private insurance and financial compensation in the case of accident or 
death at the destination. Needless to say, the ban strengthened unlicensed 
migration agents operating out of villages, who are associated with 
deception, fraud and trafficking of women (Shrestha and Taylor-Nicholson, 
2015).  
The same scenario is applicable to migrants from other countries like 
Ethiopia and Madagascar, where bans on the deployment of citizens are also 
in effect. The government of Ethiopia imposed a total ban on the deployment 
of Ethiopian low-skilled workers in 2013. The government of Madagascar 
also issued a temporary deployment ban to Lebanon in 2010 and another to 
the Gulf countries in 2013. Instead, Ethiopians now rely on informal brokers 
who operate over land via Somalia, Djibouti and Somaliland, and over sea 
to Yemen and then to Saudi Arabia (Fernandez, 2011, p. 444; De Regt, 2007). 
Private employment agencies in Madagascar arrange travel through a transit 
country, such as Kenya, and from there the women continue their onward 
journey to Beirut. In the course of their circuitous routes, migrants are at 
increased risk of human trafficking and exploitation.  
Deployment bans are ineffective in the absence of decent work 
opportunities in the countries of origin. Poverty and the loss of livelihoods 
compel women to migrate through irregular channels with the help of 
unregistered and unlicensed brokers who are accountable to no one. On 
arrival, migrants are admitted by countries of destination irrespective of the 
bans. There, they fall outside the protection of national laws as well as those 
of their home country. Repatriation is also complicated by their inability to 
pay the penalties accumulated as a result of their working without permits 
and circumventing official exit channels in the country of origin (Tayah and 
Atnafu, 2016).  
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Alternatives to bans include promoting the ratification of migrant 
worker conventions and treaties, negotiating enforceable employment 
contracts that protect the rights of migrant workers in receiving countries, 
strengthening the capacity of labour attachés to monitor the living and 
working conditions of migrant workers, and improving access to justice for 
workers. Added to this list are policies promoting women’s empowerment 
in sending countries, such as access to rights and entitlements, freedom from 
gender-based violence, and access to education and programmes that 
enhance employability (Bosc, 2016).  
Taking heed of de facto temporary labour migration in transit  
An often-overlooked arrangement for the temporary employment of 
migrants occurs in transit countries. This is a de facto temporary 
arrangement, a form of nested temporariness in the context of a longer 
migration journey to a destination where de jure temporary schemes (such as 
the kafala system in the Arab states) apply. 
Migrants pass through transit countries to finance their travel to more 
attractive countries of destination, for lack of appropriate documentation, 
and for their inability to meet the requirements of the intended country of 
destination (Hugo, 2014, p. 2). Deployment bans are another reason why 
migrants transit through neighbouring countries, especially where open 
border policies are in effect between the origin and transit countries.  
While their intention might be to transit briefly, migrants are in many 
cases compelled to stay in the transit countries for months or even years, 
taking on employment in the informal sector. A study examining the transit 
migration of 30 Ethiopian women found that the latter engaged in informal 
employment in transit countries as domestic workers, saleswomen, cleaners 
and sex workers – sometimes in the form of food-for-work in place of wages 
– for periods extending between 6 and 24 months before continuing their 
journey (Tayah and Atnafu, 2016). 
Given the employment dimension of transit migration, it is important 
to engage transit countries in dialogues bringing together countries of origin 
and destination on labour migration. Trade unions in transit countries are 
central to these dialogues. In their collaboration with trade unions in 
countries of origin and destination they can ensure that migrants have access 
to information about their migration journey and can provide them with 
legal recourse. With support from the ILO, a declaration was signed by trade 
unions and domestic workers’ organisations from South Africa, Lesotho and 
Zimbabwe in 2014. The declaration commits signatories to support strategies 
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promoting the human and labour rights of migrant domestic workers along 
the Zimbabwe–Lesotho–South Africa migration corridor.  
Promoting migration policies that take into consideration labour market 
needs at the destination 
Destination countries admit domestic workers on a temporary basis to meet 
care demands while avoiding potential economic and societal problems 
connected with long-term integration. Nonetheless, the absence of decent 
work opportunities in the countries of origin and the growing demand for 
domestic and household care workers in destination countries result in 
permanent migration under conditions of irregularity.  
Working families across the world are facing difficulties in combining 
paid work with family responsibilities. There were 1.27 billion women in the 
labour market in 2015 having to combine family and care responsibilities.1 
At the same time, rapid population ageing, increasing life expectancy and 
lower fertility rates are putting a strain on traditional care arrangements. The 
UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs estimates that there will be 
20 young people for every 100 adults by 2050 (UNDESA, 2015a). Further, 
tight fiscal policies and social policy budgets have weakened public care 
services and delegated the financial and actual responsibility of care 
arrangements to private households (Tayah, 2016).  
Given these labour market, demographic and policy transformations, 
it is important to design migration policies at the destination that take into 
account long-term care needs and on this basis, decide whether to prioritise 
temporary labour migration or migration channels that lead to permanent 
settlement (Tayah, 2016). Belgium, for example, has made the admission of 
migrant domestic workers conditional on labour market tests (Gallotti, 
2015).  
4.3 Conclusion  
There are inherent risks in temporary migration schemes. Designing and 
implementing fair migration policies requires cooperation between all the 
countries concerned (origin, transit and destination), more specifically,  
i) concerted effort among different countries of origin, including 
between the social partners in these countries, is important to avoid 
                                                     
1 See the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Women’s Economic 
Empowerment (2016) (www.WomensEconomicEmpowerment.org). 
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a race to the bottom in the working and living conditions of workers 
from different nationalities; 
ii) transit countries must take heed of the employment dimension of 
migration, which is largely informal, adding to the vulnerability of 
migrants; and,  
iii) countries of destination must ensure that admission and post-
admission policies respond to established labour market needs, while 
respecting the principle of equal treatment between migrants and 
national workers. 
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5. VARIOUS SHADES OF TEMPORARINESS 
AS A NEW POLICY CHALLENGE  
AGNIESZKA WEINAR 
hen stuck in the world of policy analysis, we tend to be bound by 
ascribed definition. Temporary migration seems to be an 
unproblematic category, designated to describe low-skilled 
migrant workers moving with temporary work contracts to do menial jobs. 
Yet in this author’s opinion, this is one of the greatest shortcomings of 
contemporary migration policy-making. Temporariness is a stable feature of 
many migration patterns and each presents policy-makers with a different 
set of challenges. 
Let us think about the simplest way of telling a temporary worker from 
a non-temporary one: their entry rights. Only a handful of countries in the 
world offer permanent residence before setting foot on their territory (so-
called countries of immigration, like Canada or Australia). Pretty much 
everywhere else everyone is a temporary migrant. This concerns family 
members reunified with their sponsors (crossing the border almost 
exclusively on temporary visas); asylum seekers; first-time jobholders 
coming to work for an employer simply because they were hired from 
abroad; seasonal workers in agriculture coming under a bilateral scheme; 
intra-corporate transferees; trainees and researchers; and also students. With 
time, they might hope to change their status to permanent, depending on the 
specific legal framework applied to each particular situation. However, 
upfront they are all temporary migrants. 
The biggest policy challenge of our times is the exponential growth of 
temporary flows in comparison with permanent flows, even in the countries 
that traditionally favoured permanent immigration. For example, the yearly 
intake of temporary immigrants in Canada is now double of that of 
permanent immigrants. This worldwide trend suggests that destination 
countries are more and more interested in receiving workers rather than 
citizens. In other words, immigration is now becoming a labour market 
instrument rather than a nation-building instrument. What is interesting is 
W 
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that even the highly skilled, an object of the global talent race, tend to be 
admitted as temporary workers first. 
The precarious position of the temporary worker is not evenly 
distributed. A manager or a technician moving around the globe within the 
same organisation is well covered by social security and takes fewer risks, 
but these examples are less and less common. A recent study of French 
expatriates prepared for the French government1 shows, inter alia, that many 
of the mobile French are no longer well-paid ex-pats, but rather young 
people looking for better opportunities elsewhere, having precarious 
employment situations in France and abroad. In the same vein, the myth of 
the well-paid highly skilled researcher might already be old: many PhDs 
move around the globe looking for a chance of stable employment, building 
their careers on a series of temporary placements, their social rights and 
pension rights scattered around the world, with limited ways of retaining 
them. 
Temporary workers coming to work under bilateral agreements have 
the best chance of having their rights safeguarded, depending on the 
monitoring that the two governments put in place. The issues of portability 
of social rights and pension rights should be included in such agreements. 
For example, the much-criticised Canadian Temporary Workers 
Program has some strands that work pretty well: where there is Canadian 
governmental monitoring of implementation, abuse can lead to prosecuting 
the abusers.2 Still, the social and pension rights of temporary workers 
coming in this stream are the same as other temporary workers who come 
individually, i.e. they depend on a provincial policy of granting access to 
such rights. They also depend on the existence (or not) of the bilateral 
agreements on the portability of social security rights. Also, the abuse 
happens only in a couple of sectors traditionally prone to abuse (e.g. 
                                                     
1 See H. Conway-Mouret, Retour en France des Français de l’étranger, Editeur: Premier 
ministre, France, 2015 (http://www.gouvernement.fr/sites/default/files/document/ 
document/2015/07/rapport_helene_conway-mouret.pdf). 
2 See S. Noakes, “Migrant workers get little protection from workplace abuse: A sexual 
abuse case highlights the difficulty of enforcing labour standards for workers on visas”, 
CBC News, 2 July 2015 (http://www.cbc.ca/beta/news/business/migrant-workers-get-
little-protection-from-workplace-abuse-1.3132292). 
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agriculture). The lower the skill level, the more abuse there is.3 Out of 94,109 
workers admitted in 2014 under the Temporary Foreign Worker Program 
scheme, 42% were highly skilled. Only 10% were admitted for low-skilled 
jobs in agriculture. 
In comparison, German–Polish agreements on contractual workers 
from the period before Poland’s accession to the EU worked quite well, 
assuring that the rights of the workers were met and that the pension and 
social rights of the workers were paid back to the Polish social security 
system.4 That was possible because of the detailed bilateral agreements 
covering these issues and monitoring from both ends.5 
However, where there are no bilateral agreements, the situation can 
deteriorate quickly. The supposedly privileged intra-EU mobility is one 
example. Polish workers in the UK and Italy after the accession often fell 
prey to unscrupulous recruitment agencies and employers.6 The shady 
practices and de facto slavery were possible in Europe in the context of free 
labour mobility, not safeguarded by any bilateral agreement or monitoring 
system. Again, this happened in specific sectors of the economy, most often 
in agriculture. 
There should be a way of using temporary workforce in certain sectors 
in which there is low interest from the host population. In addition, because 
many temporary workers do not necessarily want to emigrate for life with 
their families, emigration is a decision that brings about a completely new 
set of issues, which are more complex. In any case, the practices around these 
programmes should be strictly monitored and never left for the free market 
                                                     
3 See Macdonald-Laurier Institute, “Straight Talk with Linda Nazareth”, Ottawa, 
Ontario, May 2014 (http://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/files/pdf/NazarethStraight 
Talk-05-14-V2.pdf). 
4 See B. Samoraj, Polityka Społeczna No. 1, January 2003 (http://ips.uw.edu.pl/ 
pliki/pracownicy/bsamoraj/PS%201,%202003.pdf). 
5 See “German and Polish unions cooperate over seasonal workers in agriculture”, 
European Industrial Relations Observatory online, October 2003 
(http://www.ilo.org/dyn/migpractice/docs/96/ 
Dribbusch.pdf). 
6 See F. Lawrence, “Polish workers lost in a strange land find work does not pay in the 
UK”, The Guardian, 11 January 2005 (http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2005/ 
jan/11/immigration.foodanddrink); see also P. Kiefer, “Poles Seeking Jobs Found 
Forced Labor in Italy”, New York Times, 23 July 2006 (http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2006/07/23/world/europe/23italy.html?_r=0). 
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to settle. Regarding low-skilled workers and economic sectors where 
corruption and abuse have traditionally been present, this is of utmost 
importance. 
There are also other ways of dealing with the needs of traditionally 
shady sectors of the economy. For example, in Australia each year well over 
150,000 Work and Travel participants, mainly youth from other OECD 
countries, spend several obligatory months working on Australian farms.7 
The issue of social or pension rights is not really discussed, maybe because 
we are talking about young people coming to work for only a year and for 
fun. 
Mid-skilled and high skilled temporary workers represent another set 
of challenges. Many of them use the temporary programmes to escape 
deskilling: still working in their field, at their skill level, but agreeing to 
precarious employment in return. There is no simple recipe to assure their 
rights are covered. While in cases where bilateral agreements exist, they 
might be able to collect their pension rights across the countries (for example, 
in the EU), in other cases, they will not acquire them anywhere and hence 
lose them. This is a new phenomenon, and not well recognised by policy-
makers. Yet, it will require new solutions and more international 
cooperation. 
 
                                                     
7 See OECD, International Migration Outlook 2016, Paris: OECD Publishing, 2016. 
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6. QUESTIONING TEMPORARY MIGRATION 
SCHEMES IN THE EU 
ELSPETH GUILD 
here are two main systems regulating access of non-EU nationals to 
the labour markets of EU states, which operate side by side. The first, 
and best known, is the system of free movement of workers that 
applies only to nationals of the 28 Member States (with certain limitations 
still applicable to Croatian nationals) and their family members of any 
nationality who can join them. This system is based on the principle of equal 
treatment with nationals of the state in all areas related to work. An EU 
citizen is entitled to move to another Member State to seek employment for 
up to six months at a time. If the person gains employment, be it part-time 
(the Court of Justice of the European Union has held that even seven hours 
a week can be sufficient for a person to claim the status of a worker) and 
temporary, not only is he or she entitled to equal treatment in wages and 
conditions of work, access to all work-related benefits and trade union 
membership and participation on the same basis as nationals of the state, but 
also no limitation can be placed on his or her permit of residence in the state.  
Under this system, according to the EU’s statistical agency, about 3–
4% of the 508 million citizens of the EU live in a Member State other than 
that of their underlying nationality.1 How many of these citizens are 
temporary migrants is less clear, as many EU migrant workers who get 
temporary jobs in a host Member State return to their home Member State or 
move on to another Member State when the job ends. The largest age group 
of EU migrant workers is between 15 and 34 and the largest sectors in which 
they work traditionally have a high turnover – manufacturing, construction, 
accommodation and food being among them. It is likely that there is 
substantial intra-state mobility in these sectors. 
                                                     
1 See Eurostat, People in the EU: Who are we and how do we live?, Statistical Yearbook 2015, 
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2015 (http://ec.europa.eu/ 
eurostat/documents/3217494/7089681/KS-04-15-567-EN-N.pdf/8b2459fe-0e4e-4bb7-
bca7-7522999c3bfd). 
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Temporality is not a legal characteristic of the EU’s system for the free 
movement of workers. As long as EU citizens are working, be it full time or 
part time, they are very strongly protected against expulsion by the host 
state. When they are involuntarily unemployed they continue to enjoy this 
protection. Nonetheless, extra protection against expulsion and greater 
access to social welfare benefits that are not linked to employment are 
available to EU citizens after five years of residence when they acquire 
permanent residence. Even greater protection against expulsion accrues after 
ten years of residence. 
The second system of labour migration in the EU applies to third-
country nationals, that is, anyone who is not a citizen of one of the 28 
Member States. This system is characterised by great fragmentation in terms 
of both the territory to which labour migration is permitted (the 28 Member 
States are divided up into their 28 different territories and the migrant 
worker is limited to work in only one of them) and the basis of the type of 
employment the migrant workers are admitted to carry out. Unlike EU 
migrant workers who are entitled to take any job and on the basis of that 
employment to enjoy full equal treatment with national workers, third-
country national workers are admitted only to take employment in certain 
sectors and do not enjoy equal treatment with nationals of the state or with 
EU migrant workers. The EU has so far adopted 15 measures on regular 
migration for third-country nationals into the EU (see the annex to this 
chapter). Denmark does not participate in any of these measures and Ireland 
and the UK have opted into a small minority of them. 
As was the case in respect of EU migrant workers, one of the first 
measures to be adopted provides for the coordination of social security 
contributions for third-country national migrant workers made in more than 
one Member State. The system provides for the aggregation of contributions 
made in different Member States, the principle of non-discrimination and the 
right to export social benefits accruing from one Member State to another. 
However, this system of coordination of social security is not accompanied 
by a right to work in more than one Member State. Only those third-country 
nationals who acquire long-term residence status under Directive 
2003/109/EC gain an opportunity to move and work in a second Member 
State from that where they gained the status. 
The main entry systems2 are first, Directive 2009/50/EC on the 
conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes 
                                                     
2 For these purposes, the provisions on students and researchers are not included. 
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of highly qualified employment (the Blue Card), which can lead to long-term 
residence status. The rights Blue Card holders enjoy are limited to equal 
treatment with nationals as regards working conditions, social security, 
pensions, recognition of diplomas, education and vocational training. Only 
after two years can they change employment to another highly skilled job, 
so they remain tied to one employer until then. This is the only entry system 
that leads to permanent residence. 
The second entry system is Directive 2014/36/EU on admission of 
seasonal workers, which Member States have been required to apply since 
September 2016. It is a paradigmatic temporary worker system. Seasonal 
work is defined as tied to the seasons and the maximum limit of stay is 
between five and nine months per calendar year of residence for a seasonal 
worker. The entry visa is issued only on evidence of sufficient resources not 
to be a burden on the social assistance system of the state, comprehensive 
sickness insurance and adequate accommodation. The directive facilitates 
readmission under the scheme within five years for those who have fulfilled 
the conditions of a previous period of work in the EU. There is the possibility 
of changing employers for the seasonal worker. As regards rights, the 
directive requires equal treatment with own nationals in the following areas: 
 terms of employment, covering the minimum working age and 
working conditions (including pay and dismissal, working hours, 
leave and holidays), as well as health and safety requirements at the 
workplace; 
 the right to strike and take industrial action, in accordance with the 
host Member State’s national law and practice, and freedom of 
association, affiliation and membership of an organisation 
representing workers or of any organisation whose members are 
engaged in a specific occupation, including the rights and benefits 
conferred by such organisations (such as the right to negotiate and 
conclude collective agreements), without prejudice to the national 
provisions on public policy and public security; 
 back payments to be made by the employers, concerning any 
outstanding remuneration to the third-country national; 
 coordination of social security (with the possible exclusion of family 
benefits and unemployment benefits); 
 access to goods and services and the supply of goods and services 
made available to the public, except housing, without prejudice to the 
freedom of contract in accordance with Union and national law; 
QUESTIONING TEMPORARY MIGRATION SCHEMES IN THE EU  45 
 advice services on seasonal work afforded by employment offices; 
 education and vocational training (directly linked to the specific 
employment activity, and excluding study and maintenance grants 
and loans or other grants and loans); 
 recognition of diplomas, certificates and other professional 
qualifications in accordance with the relevant national procedures; and 
 tax benefits, in so far as the seasonal worker is deemed to be resident 
for tax purposes in the Member State concerned (which can be limited 
in its application to cases where the registered or usual place of 
residence of the family members of the seasonal worker for whom he 
or she claims benefits lies in the territory of the Member State 
concerned). 
This may seem like a very elaborate system for workers who are only coming 
to do seasonal work for up to nine months but the framework of rights was 
exceedingly important for some of the institutional lawmakers, in particular 
the European Parliament, which was anxious about the issue of exploitation. 
The third measure on access for labour migration that the EU has 
adopted for third-country nationals is Directive 2014/66/EU on admission 
of intra-corporate transferees. These workers, like the seasonal workers, are 
temporary and are not intended to qualify for permanent residence. It 
applies to intra-corporate transfer as managers, specialists or trainee 
employees. Those admitted under this category have the right to equal 
treatment with nationals of the state in the following areas: 
 freedom of association, affiliation and membership of an organisation 
representing workers or employers or of any organisation whose 
members are engaged in a specific occupation, including the rights and 
benefits conferred by such organisations, without prejudice to the 
national provisions on public policy and public security; 
 recognition of diplomas, certificates and other professional 
qualifications in accordance with the relevant national procedures; 
 social security coordination; 
 access to goods and services and the supply of goods and services 
made available to the public, except procedures for obtaining housing 
as provided for by national law; and 
 the possibility of bringing some family members to the host state with 
them. 
What is surprising here is the absence of equal treatment in wages and 
working conditions. Instead the directive requires that all conditions in the 
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law, regulations or administrative provisions and/or universally applicable 
collective agreements related to posted workers in a similar situation in the 
relevant occupational branches are met during the intra-corporate transfer 
with regard to terms and conditions of employment other than 
remuneration. As regards remuneration itself, it requires that the 
remuneration granted to the third-country national during the entire intra-
corporate transfer is not less favourable than the remuneration granted to 
nationals of the Member State where the work is carried out occupying 
comparable positions in accordance with applicable laws or collective 
agreements or practices in the Member State where the host entity is 
established. 
The benefits of temporary migration schemes, which some academics 
and policy-makers praise, have not, at least for the meantime, found much 
favour with EU lawmakers. One of the main preoccupations of the policy-
makers has been the issue of equal treatment with national workers in 
similar jobs. EU lawmakers have been much influenced by the concerns 
among civil society organisations, such as trade unions, that migrant 
workers must not be used to undercut the wages and working conditions of 
those already in the labour force of the Member States. Thus, in all of the 
directives there has been inclusion of provisions that safeguard the 
relationship of equality in this area. On the other hand, EU lawmakers have 
been less concerned about limiting the period during which a third-country 
national can work in the EU. 
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Annex. EU measures on regular migration 
Regulation (EC) No. 1030/2002 of 13 June 2002 laying down a uniform 
format for residence permits for third-country nationals, OJ L 157/1, 
15.6.2002 [UK opts in], amended by Regulation (EU) No. 330/2008, OJ L 
115/1, 23.4.2010. 
Regulation (EC) No. 859/2003 on extending the provisions of Regulation 
(EEC) No 1408/71 and Regulation (EEC) No. 574/72 to nationals of third 
countries who are not already covered by those provisions solely on the 
ground of their nationality, OJ L 124/1, 20.5.2003 [UK, Ireland opt in]. 
Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family 
reunification, OJ L 251/12, 3.10.2003; see also the challenge to the validity of 
parts of the Directive decided in favour of the Council in Case C-540/03 
European Parliament v Council [2006] ECR I-5769. 
Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status 
of third-country nationals who are long-term residents, OJ L 16/44, 
23.1.2004. 
Council Directive 2004/114/EC of 13 December 2004 on the conditions of 
admission of third-country nationals for the purposes of studies, pupil 
exchange, unremunerated training or voluntary service, OJ L 375/12, 
23.12.2004. 
Council Directive 2005/71/EC of 12 October 2005 on a specific procedure for 
admitting third-country nationals for the purposes of scientific research, OJ 
L 289/15, 3.11.2005. 
Council Recommendation of 12 October 2005 to facilitate the admission of 
third-country nationals to carry out scientific research in the European 
Community, OJ L 289/26, 3.11.2005. 
Council Decision of 5 October 2006 on the establishment of a mutual 
information mechanism concerning Member States’ measures in the areas of 
asylum and immigration, OJ L 283/40, 14.10.2006 [UK, Ireland opt in]. 
Council Decision of 25 June 2007 establishing the European Fund for the 
Integration of third-country nationals for the period 2007 to 2013 as part of 
the general programme ‘Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows’, OJ 
L 168/18, 28.6.2007 [UK, Ireland opt in]. 
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Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions of entry and 
residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified 
employment (‘Blue Card’ Directive), OJ L 155/17, 18.6.2009. 
Regulation (EU) No. 1231/2010 extending Regulation (EC) No. 883/2004 on 
social security for EU citizens to third-country nationals who move within 
the EU), OJ L 344/1, 29.12.2010 [Ireland opts in]. 
Directive 2011/51/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 
May 2011 on long-term resident status for refugees and persons with 
subsidiary protection, OJ L 132/1, 19.5.2011. 
Directive 2011/98/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
December 2011 on a single application procedure for a single permit for 
third-country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member State 
and common set of rights for workers, OJ L 343/1, 23.12.2011. 
Directive 2014/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
February 2014 on conditions of entry and stay of third-country nationals for 
the purposes of employment as seasonal workers, OJ L 94/375, 28.3.2014 
[deadline 30 September 2016]. 
Directive 2014/66 EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 
May 2014 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals 
in the framework of an intra-corporate transfer, OJ L 157/1, 27.5.2014 
[deadline 29 November 2016]. 
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7. EQUAL TREATMENT RIGHTS IN EU LAW ON 
LABOUR MIGRATION: A HUMAN RIGHTS 
PRINCIPLE APPLIED AS A POLICY TOOL 
BJARNEY FRIDRIKSDOTTIR 
7.1 Introduction  
In four EU directives on labour migration that were adopted between 2009 
and 2014, based on a sectorial approach to labour migration set forth in the 
EU’s Policy Plan on Legal Migration,1 access to the territory and labour 
market, the right to equal treatment with nationals and the right to family 
reunification are granted to a different extent to the groups of migrants that 
fall under the scope of each directive.  
The subject that will be explored here is how this approach to labour 
migration management chosen by the EU addresses the four aspects listed 
above in the Blue Card Directive,2 the Single Permit Directive,3 the Seasonal 
Workers Directive4 and the Intra-Corporate Transfer Directive.5 In 
                                                     
1 See European Commission, Communication on a Policy Plan on Legal Migration, 
COM(2005) 669, 21.12.2005, 4. 
2 See Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions for entry and 
residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment, OJ 
L 155/17, 18.6.2009. 
3 See Directive 2011/98/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
December 2011 on a single application procedure for a single permit for third-country 
nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member State and on a common set of 
rights for third-country workers legally residing in a Member State, OJ L 343/1, 
23.12.2011. 
4 See Directive 2014/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
February 2014 on the conditions of entry and stay of third-country nationals for the 
purpose of employment as seasonal workers, OJ L 94, 28.3.2014. 
5 See Directive 2014/66/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 
2014 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals in the framework 
of an intra-corporate transfer, OJ L 157/1, 27.5.2014. 
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particular, it will do so having regard to the objectives of each of the 
directives and their compatibility with international and European human 
rights law and with international labour law standards.  
7.2 Various objectives of the EU directives on labour migration  
When the different objectives of the four directives are examined, it emerges 
that there is a clear difference between the EU´s approach to highly qualified 
labour migrants and other labour migrants, especially the lower skilled. 
The Blue Card Directive, addressing highly qualified third-country 
nationals, set out to improve the EU´s ability to attract and, where necessary, 
retain highly qualified third-country workers “to increase the contribution 
of legal immigration to enhancing the competitiveness of the EU economy”.6 
To achieve this, the Commission proposed to “create a common fast-track 
and flexible procedure for the admission of highly qualified third-country 
immigrants, as well as attractive residence conditions for them and their 
family members, including certain facilitations for those who would wish to 
move to a second Member State for highly qualified employment”.7 
Among the objectives of the Intra-Corporate Transfer Directive, also 
addressing highly qualified third-country nationals, were to provide for a 
transparent legal framework (with a set of common conditions for their 
admission into the EU), to create more attractive conditions for their stay and 
for the stay of their families, to facilitate their (intra-EU) mobility and to 
guarantee fair competition, including a secure legal status for them.8 In 
contrast to these, the objective of the Seasonal Workers Directive is to 
“contribute to the effective management of migration flows for the specific 
category of seasonal temporary migration and to ensuring decent working 
                                                     
6 See European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on the conditions of entry 
and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified 
employment, COM(2007) 637, Brussels, 23.10.2007, p. 2.  
7 Ibid.  
8 See European Commission, Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment 
accompanying the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals in the 
framework of an intra-corporate transfer, SEC(2010) 884, Brussels, 15.7.2010, p. 15.  
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conditions for seasonal workers, by setting out fair and transparent rules for 
admission and stay and by defining the rights of seasonal workers”.9 
Additionally, it aims at providing “incentives and safeguards to 
prevent overstaying or temporary stay from becoming permanent”.10 The 
Single Permit Directive, which is a general framework directive for labour 
migration, has a twofold objective. The first is to set up a single application 
procedure for third-country nationals seeking to enter the territory of a 
Member State for work, and establish that if granted the permit to stay and 
work, the permit should be issued in a single act.11 The second is to “grant 
rights to third-country nationals legally working in the territory of a Member 
State by defining fields, in particular related to employment, where equal 
treatment with nationals of Member States should be provided”.12 
7.3 Access to the territory and labour market 
These differences in objectives have resulted in the formulation of different 
statuses for the various groups of labour migrants based on type, their level 
of qualifications and how economically desirable they are considered to be 
for the EU labour market. This is reflected in access to the territory and the 
labour market, as is evident in the following overview of the parameters on 
them as set forth in each of the directives.  
The standard validity of the EU Blue Card is to be set by Member States 
at between one and four years, or if the work contract is shorter than one 
year, the period of the work contract and an additional three months (Art. 
7(2) Blue Card Directive). Access to the labour market is restricted for the 
first two years to employment that meets the criteria for admission outlined 
in the directive and changes of employer are subject to prior authorisation. 
After the two years, the Member States are free, but not obliged, to grant the 
EU Blue Card holder equal treatment with nationals in access to highly 
qualified employment (Arts 12(1) and (2)). The directive foresees the 
attainment of a long-term residence status and provides for conditions for 
                                                     
9 See Directive 2014/36/EU, op. cit., Recital 7. 
10 Ibid. 
11 See European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on a single application 
procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in the 
territory of a Member State and a common set of rights for third-country workers legally 
residing in a Member State, COM(2007) 638, Brussels, 23.10.2007, p. 6. 
12 Ibid.  
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intra-EU mobility after the first eighteen months of legal residence (Arts 16, 
17 and 18).  
The Intra-Corporate Transfer Directive only permits applications from 
third-country nationals who are resident outside EU territory (Art. 11(2)). 
The duration of the permit shall be at least one year or the duration of the 
contract, whichever is shorter and can be extended to a maximum of three 
years for managers and specialists or one year for trainee employees (Art. 
13(2)). After this maximum period of three years or one year, the respective 
holder shall leave the territory of the Member State unless he or she is 
granted a residence permit on another basis Art. 12(1)).  
The directive provides for the possibility to grant, upon application, 
the same person another permit of the same maximum duration, the only 
requirement being that the Member State may require a period of up to six 
months maximum between the end of one transfer and the beginning of the 
next (Art. 12(2)). What is noteworthy is that there is no minimum period 
provided; in fact, the applicant for a new permit could only be required to 
stay away for the time it takes to consider the application, and there is no 
maximum given for the number of renewals of a permit for the same person. 
On the basis of the permit, the holder has the right to exercise the specific 
employment activity authorised under the permit (Art. 17(c)). The directive 
provides for the possibility of both short-term and long-term intra-EU 
mobility to work in one or several other Member States for the same 
undertaking or group of undertakings for which the intra-corporate transfer 
permit was issued (Arts 20, 21 and 22).  
The scope of the Seasonal Workers Directive solely extends to third-
country nationals who reside outside the territory of the Member States (Art. 
2(1)) and seasonal workers are obliged to keep their residence in a third 
country while ‘staying’ in an EU Member State for work (Art. 3(b)). It 
provides that the duration of the authorisation shall be between five and nine 
months in any twelve-month period and that at the end of the duration of 
the authorisation, the seasonal worker is obliged to leave the territory of the 
Member State unless he or she has been granted a residence permit for other 
purposes (Art. 14(1)).  
The Single Permit Directive does not regulate access to the territory or 
access to the labour market, which is done by the national law of each 
Member State. The directive only provides that once an applicant has 
fulfilled the conditions of national law, he or she should be granted the single 
permit. The directive does not prescribe any minimum or maximum length 
of time for the duration of the single permit. The permit is issued in 
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accordance with national law, and the length of time is determined by the 
national law of each Member State. As regards access to the labour market, 
once the permit has been granted, the holder has the right to exercise the 
specific employment activity authorised under the single permit in 
accordance with national law (Art. 11(c) Single Permit Directive). As there 
are no time limits on this restriction in the directive, it is regulated by 
national law and the restrictions on labour market access are likely to vary 
accordingly. 
7.4 The right to equal treatment with nationals 
The material scope of the provisions addressing the right to equal treatment 
with nationals in the four directives cover the following areas: working 
conditions, terms of employment and freedom of association, social security, 
statutory pensions, goods and services, education and vocational training, 
tax benefits and the recognition of diplomas and qualifications. All the 
directives derogate from the principle of equal treatment with nationals and 
give EU Member States the discretion to restrict the right to equal treatment 
in several ways. The extent of the permissible derogations varies among the 
directives.  
The way in which the right to equal treatment concerning social 
security is constructed in the directives is largely similar and all but the Blue 
Card Directive explicitly permit Member States to exclude family benefits.13 
As regards terms and conditions of employment, the Blue Card, the Single 
Permit and the Seasonal Workers Directives all provide for equal treatment 
with nationals in working conditions and terms of employment.14 The Intra-
Corporate Transfer Directive, however, only provides for equal treatment 
with nationals in remuneration (Art. 5(4)(b)). With respect to terms and 
conditions of employment, intra-corporate transferees are granted equal 
treatment based on Art. 3 of the Posted Workers Directive, with persons 
covered by that directive in the Member State where the work is carried out 
(Art. 18(1), Intra-Corporate Transfer Directive). All four directives provide 
for equal treatment with nationals concerning freedom of association and 
                                                     
13 See Art. 12(2)(b) Single Permit Directive; Art. 23(2)(a) Seasonal Workers Directive; and 
Art. 18(3) Intra-Corporate Transfer Directive. 
14 See Art. 14(1)(a) Blue Card Directive; Art. 12(1)(a) Single Permit Directive; and Art. 
23(1)(a) Seasonal Workers Directive. 
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membership of organisations representing workers or employers, including 
also the benefits conferred by such organisations.15  
All four directives provide for equal treatment with nationals as 
regards access to goods and services, although all of them give Member 
States the discretion to restrict equal treatment, and the permitted 
derogations are different. The Blue Card Directive provides for the 
possibility to restrict access to procedures to obtain housing (Art. 14(2)), 
while for single permit-holders equal treatment can be limited to those who 
are in employment and access to housing can be restricted fully (Art. 12(2)(d) 
Single Permit Directive). In the Seasonal Workers Directive, access to goods 
and services explicitly excludes access to housing (Art. 23(2)(e)) and for intra-
corporate transferees, access to procedures for obtaining housing is excluded 
from the provision (Art. 18(2)(e) Intra-Corporate Transfer Directive). The 
Seasonal Workers Directive provides for access to advisory services, but this 
is restricted to advice on seasonal work offered by employment offices (Art. 
23(1)(f)), whereas EU Blue Card holders are also entitled to counselling 
services at employment offices (Art. 14(1)(g) Blue Card Directive). For single 
permit-holders and intra-corporate transferees, there are no restrictions on 
the right to equal treatment regarding advisory services offered by public 
employment offices.  
Unlike the Intra-Corporate Transfer Directive, the Blue Card, Single 
Permit and Seasonal Workers Directives include provisions on equal 
treatment pertaining to education and vocational training,16 but give 
discretion to the Member States to restrict access to it. The access of seasonal 
workers can be limited to education and vocational training directly linked 
to their specific employment activity, and any grants or loans related to it 
can be excluded (Art. 23(2)(b) Seasonal Workers Directive). For EU Blue Card 
holders, equal treatment may be restricted for any types of loans or grants in 
relation to secondary and higher education and vocational training (Art. 
14(2) Blue Card Directive), and access to university and post-secondary 
education may be subject to specific prerequisites in accordance with 
national law (Art. 14(2)(a)). In the case of single permit-holders, access can 
be restricted to those who are in employment, or who have been employed 
and who are registered as unemployed, by excluding third-country workers 
                                                     
15 See Art. 14(1)(b) Blue Card Directive; Art. 12(1)(b) Single Permit Directive; Art. 23(1)(b), 
Seasonal Workers Directive; and Art. 18(2)(a) Intra-Corporate Transfer Directive.  
16 See Art. 14(1)(c) Blue Card Directive; Art. 12(1)(c) Single Permit Directive; and Art. 
23(1)(g) Seasonal Workers Directive.  
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who have been admitted for the purpose of study; excluding any grants or 
loans related to it; and by laying down specific prerequisites (including 
language proficiency and the payment of tuition fees) in accordance with 
national law, with respect to access to university and post-secondary 
education and to vocational training that is not directly linked to the specific 
employment activity (Art. 12(2)(a), Single Permit Directive). Only single 
permit-holders and seasonal workers are entitled to tax benefits provided 
that they are resident for tax purposes in the Member State in which they are 
working.17  
7.5 The right to equal treatment in international and European 
human rights law and in international labour law 
During negotiations on the directives, international and European human 
rights law and international labour standards were rarely brought up and in 
the few cases in which they were, they have since been used selectively. An 
example of that is the discussion on social insurance contributions paid at 
work that lead to an entitlement to receive unemployment benefits, which 
are rights the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has ruled as being 
protected by Art. 1 of Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR). This judgment was taken into consideration in the 
negotiations for the Single Permit Directive18 but not in those for the Seasonal 
Workers Directive, which permits Member States to exclude unemployment 
benefits from the branches of social security (Art. 23(2)(a)). 
The personal scope of international and European human rights 
instruments and those on labour law – such as the International Covenants 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR), along with the ECHR – includes all those present in the 
territory of a state. They apply to ‘everyone’ regardless of nationality or 
administrative status, unless non-nationals are explicitly excluded from 
certain provisions, like those addressing political participation and freedom 
of movement. Although nationality is not one of the suspect grounds listed 
in the non-discrimination clauses of these instruments, the UN monitoring 
committees overseeing implementation of the ICESCR and ICCPR have 
                                                     
17 See Art. 12(1)(f) Single Permit Directive; and Art. 23(1)(i) Seasonal Workers Directive. 
18 See Council of the European Union, Note for the Presidency to the Strategic Committee 
on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum, 15 July 2010, document number: 12156/10, 4.  
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declared that the prohibition of discrimination includes discrimination 
based on nationality.19 The same is true for international labour law, which 
applies to non-nationals unless otherwise stated (ILO, 2006, para. 9(a)). An 
example of case law on the ECHR on discrimination pertaining to nationality 
is Gaygusuz v Austria,20 where the Court found that differences in treatment 
based on nationality violated Art. 14 of the Convention and that “very 
weighty reasons” have to be provided to make discrimination based on 
nationality acceptable under the Convention. In relation to administrative 
status, in Niedzwiecki v Germany21 the Court found that refusing to grant 
migrants family benefits based on the migrants not holding a “stable 
residence permit” is a violation of Art. 14 in conjunction with Art. 8. The 
personal scope of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights includes third-country 
nationals, unless they are explicitly excluded, as is the case with a few 
provisions of both. As EU law on labour migration is based on Art. 79 TFEU, 
third-country nationals working in an EU Member State are entitled to equal 
treatment with nationals according to both the Treaty and the Charter, while 
EU law on labour migration falls within the scope of the TFEU.22 
7.6 The right to family reunification  
The right to family reunification is only addressed in two of the directives 
under discussion here. These are the Blue Card and the Intra-Corporate 
Transfer Directives, which grant family reunification with derogations from 
Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification in several 
important respects. First, it shall not depend on the holder of an EU Blue 
Card or intra-corporate transferee having the prospect of obtaining 
permanent residence or having a minimum period of residence.23 Second, 
integration requirements may not be applied until after family reunification 
                                                     
19 See for example, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General 
Comment No. 20, Non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights (2009), 
para. 30; see also Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 15, The Position of 
Aliens under the Covenant (1986), para. 2. 
20 ECtHR, Gaygusuz v Austria (No. 17371/90), 16 September 1996.  
21 ECtHR, Niedzwiecki v Germany (No. 58453/00), 25 October 2005. 
22 See for example, Groenendijk (2012), p. 135; and Guild and Peers (2006), p. 112. 
23 See Art. 15(2) Blue Card Directive and Art. 19(2) Intra-Corporate Transfer Directive. 
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has been granted.24 Third, the time limit given for granting the permits is 
shorter, limited to 90 days in the Intra-Corporate Transfer Directive and 6 
months in the Blue Card Directive.25 Additionally, in the case of the family 
members of EU Blue Card holders, no time limit shall be applied for their 
access to the labour market (Art. 15(6) Blue Card Directive); likewise, the 
Intra-Corporate Transfer Directive provides for the access of family 
members to the labour market but without a time limit (Art. 19(6)). The 
rationale for the derogation in both cases is that it is “considered necessary 
to set out an attractive scheme” for these groups of workers and that this 
approach “follows a different logic from the Family Reunification Directive, 
which is a tool to foster integration of third-country nationals who could 
reasonably become permanent residents”.26 The Single Permit Directive is 
silent on family reunification – there is no reference to it in the directive and 
the preamble of the Seasonal Workers Directive states that it does not 
provide for family reunification.27 
This approach of employing the right to family reunification as a policy 
tool to attract highly skilled migrants could be found to be discriminatory. It 
bears a resemblance to the UK’s approach of offering students and workers 
the right to family reunification as part of actively seeking to attract them, 
while denying it to refugees, which it did not actively want to attract. In Hodi 
and Abdi v the United Kingdom, the ECtHR found that this policy violated Art. 
14 in conjunction with Art. 8, while there was no reasonable justification 
found for the preferential treatment28 of granting family reunification to 
students and workers and not to refugees.  
7.7 Conclusions 
In EU law on labour migration, the right to equal treatment with nationals is 
granted to third-country nationals to a different degree, depending on the 
economic and labour market objectives of the EU with respect to each group 
of migrants. 
                                                     
24 See Art. 15(3) Blue Card Directive and Art. 19(3) Intra-Corporate Transfer Directive. 
25 See Art. 15(4) Blue Card Directive and Art. 19(4) Intra-Corporate Transfer Directive. 
26 See European Commission, COM(2007) 637, op. cit., 11. 
27 See Directive 2014/36/EU, op. cit., Recital 46.  
28 ECtHR, Hode and Abdi v The United Kingdom (No. 22341/09), 6 November 2012, para. 
53. 
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This fundamental human rights principle is used as a policy tool in a 
way that results in the grant of preferential treatment. EU law on labour 
migration contravenes the principle of equal treatment based on nationality 
and administrative status as set forth in international and European human 
rights law and in international labour law, by dividing migrants into types 
and granting them the right to equal treatment based on their different 
administrative statuses. In comparative terms, the level of discrimination 
between the different groups of third-country nationals and nationals of the 
Member State where they reside and work, increases the less qualified and 
less economically desirable a group of migrants is considered to be for the 
competitiveness of the EU economy and the future demography of the EU.  
Through the EU’s sectorial approach and by not adhering to 
international and European standards on the prohibition of discrimination 
based on nationality, EU Member States have adopted legislative 
instruments that differentiate between groups of migrants who are classified 
according to a hierarchical system that institutionalises discrimination, 
based on nationality and ‘status’, against third-country nationals compared 
with nationals of the Member State where they reside and work. Moreover, 
through this approach the EU Member States are violating their human 
rights obligations at the international and European levels. 
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8. FAIR ALLOCATION OF RISKS: A CHALLENGE 
FOR LABOUR MIGRATION SYSTEMS 
PETRA HERZFELD OLSSON 
8.1 Introduction 
Recruiting labour from abroad always involves risks for the three main 
stakeholders involved, the labour migrant, the employer and the state. The 
labour migrant decides to leave one country for another. That in itself could 
be a sacrifice.1 However, the move implies that the labour migrant has 
valued the expected gains higher than the sacrifice. In most cases these 
expected gains are the expected income. The risks associated with this 
decision are loss of employment and/or less income. For the employer, a 
major risk is that the labour migrant cannot carry out the planned tasks. For 
the state, the fears relate to overstays or that the labour migrant will become 
a net economic burden (or both) (Kolb, 2010, p. 83). 
The allocation of the risks involved between these three actors is one 
important factor for establishing a labour migration scheme that will 
produce decent working conditions. This aspect will be examined in this 
chapter. The focus will be on the allocation of risks between the labour 
migrant and the employer. Examples will be taken from two EU directives 
on labour migration, the Seasonal Workers Directive (2014/36/EU) and the 
Directive on Highly Qualified Employment (the EU Blue Card Directive, 
2009/50/EC) and the Swedish labour migration system.2 Admission 
requirements related to working conditions will illustrate the argument. The 
chapter will show how attempts to inculcate idea that labour migrants must 
not work under working conditions inferior to national workers can lead to 
                                                     
1 See the introduction in Howe and Owens (2016) p. 21. 
2 See Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions of entry and 
residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of highly qualified employment, OJ 
L 155/17, 18.6.2009; see also Directive 2014/36/EU of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 26 February 2014 on the conditions of entry and stay of third-country 
nationals for the purpose of employment as seasonal workers, OJ L 94/375, 28.3.2014.  
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quite unfair consequences and produce the opposite results if not dealt with 
in a careful way.  
8.2 Conditions of entry  
To be granted a residence and work permit in the systems discussed, the 
labour migrant must fulfil certain conditions. This section will focus on the 
requirements related to a specific level of working conditions. All systems 
require that the labour migrant has received a concrete offer of employment 
from an employer. In Swedish law, this offer of employment must include a 
wage, insurance and other terms of employment not worse than those 
provided for in the relevant collective agreements or provided for by 
customs in the occupation or industry. This requirement applies to all labour 
migrants from third countries.3  
In the two EU directives under examination, the conditions are framed 
a bit differently. The EU Blue Card Directive prescribes that the wage level 
offered in the work contract or binding employment offer must not be 
inferior to a relevant salary threshold, which shall be at least 1.5 times the 
average gross annual salary in the Member State concerned (Art. 5(3)). When 
implementing this provision, the Member States may require that all 
conditions in the applicable law, collective agreements or practices in the 
relevant occupational branches for highly qualified employment are met 
(Art. 5(4)).  
For seasonal workers, another option has been chosen. The valid work 
contract or binding job offer must, according to the Directive on Seasonal 
Workers, among other things specify the remuneration, the working hours 
per week or month, the amount of any paid leave and where applicable, 
other relevant working conditions (Art. 6(1)(a)). The conditions referred to 
shall comply with applicable law, collective agreements and practices in the 
Member State (Art. 6(2)).  
The requirements discussed have similar aims. The Swedish 
government argued that the system must not facilitate attempts by 
unprincipled employers to find employees and offer them employment 
conditions that are worse than those applying to current residents in 
Sweden.4 The salary threshold in the EU Blue Card Directive was motivated 
                                                     
3 See ch. 6, sec. 2, Alien’s Act (SFS 2005:716). 
4 See the Legislative Bill 2007/08:147, p. 27.  
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by the need to ensure that the threshold used would not be too low for a 
national or highly qualified EU worker to fill the vacancy, while 
corresponding to his or her qualifications.5 The main argument behind these 
conditions seems to be concern that labour migrants would outcompete the 
national workforce through lower wage demands.  
Other perspectives were highlighted when conditions related to 
working conditions for the seasonal workers were presented. The 
remuneration requirement was considered necessary to allow the competent 
authorities to assess whether the proposed remuneration is comparable to 
that paid for the respective activity in the Member State concerned. This was 
deemed vital in order to avoid an unfair advantage for the employer and 
exploitative working conditions for the seasonal worker. The working hours 
requirement had a somewhat different aim. It should ensure that employers 
have only requested third-country seasonal workers in cases of real 
economic need (and have sufficient employment capacity) and would serve 
as a guarantee of a certain, fixed level of remuneration for the seasonal 
workers. The requirements related to other relevant working conditions, 
such as insurance, were there to enable efficient control by the competent 
authorities before admission.6 
The arguments in the three systems are apparently structured around 
the concepts of unfair competition and avoidance of exploitation, but the 
emphasis differs between systems and categories.  
8.3 The risks involved  
Failure to adhere to the requirements – Consequences for the labour 
migrant 
To ensure that the required level of working conditions is upheld, a 
particular strategy has been adopted. If the required level of working 
conditions in the three systems has not been upheld, the labour migrant will 
or can lose the authorisation to work and remain in the country. According 
                                                     
5 See European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on the conditions of entry 
and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified 
employment, COM(2007) 637, Brussels, 23.10.2007, p. 9. 
6 See European Commission, Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on the conditions of entry and residence of third country nationals for the 
purposed of seasonal employment, COM(2010) 379 final, Brussels, 13.7.2010, p. 9.  
62  PETRA HELZFELD OLSSON 
to Swedish law, the Migration Agency must withdraw the residence permit 
for the labour migrant if it turns out that the requirements related to the level 
of working conditions have not been fulfilled.7 If the labour migrant is in 
Sweden when the residence permit is revoked, a corresponding decision on 
expulsion shall be adopted.8 According to the EU Blue Card Directive, the 
Member States must withdraw the EU Blue Card if the holder did not meet 
or no longer meets the conditions for entry and residence laid down in the 
directive (Art. 9(1)b).  
The requirement on salary thresholds is part of that package. In the 
Seasonal Workers Directive, the consequences of failure to adhere to the 
working conditions required are framed a bit differently. The Member States 
may withdraw the authorisation for the purpose of seasonal work where the 
entry provisions on working conditions were not or are no longer complied 
with (Art. 9(3)(a)). But, very importantly, any decision to withdraw the 
authorisation must take account of the specific circumstances of the case, 
including the interests of the seasonal worker, and respect the principle of 
proportionality (Art. 9(5)). 
It is clear that an employer’s failure to uphold the level of working 
conditions prescribed in the entry conditions will lead to very severe 
consequences for EU Blue Card holders in the EU and for all labour migrants 
in Sweden. Yet, for workers covered by the Seasonal Workers Directive, a 
failure to adhere to the working conditions does not have to imply a 
withdrawal of the labour migrant’s permit to work and stay in the Member 
State. It depends on whether a withdrawal is required in a national context. 
However, if such a consequence is prescribed in national law, a 
proportionality test must be conducted before a decision to withdraw the 
permit can be taken.  
Failure to adhere to the requirements – Consequences for the employer 
A failure to adhere to the required working conditions entails a high level of 
risk for the labour migrant in the Swedish and EU Blue Card regimes. The 
expected income will not be earned and the labour migrant may have to 
leave the country. This consequence in itself can hardly encourage the labour 
                                                     
7 See ch. 7 sec. 7(e), Alien’s Act (SFS 2005:716). The labour migrant may, if certain 
circumstances are met, stay in Sweden for four months to look for a new job. The 
expulsion will be executed after that period if no job has been found.  
8 See ch. 8 sec. 16, Alien’s Act (SFS 2005:716).  
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migrant to try to enforce the required working conditions. If a failure is 
detected by the authorities, the labour migrant risks being expelled.9 This 
situation can also be exploited by unscrupulous employers. Thus, it is crucial 
that other mechanisms are in force that encourage the employer to fulfil the 
prescribed working conditions. This subsection will discuss the extent to 
which the labour migration schemes analysed include such mechanisms.  
According to Swedish law, a failure to uphold the level of working 
conditions prescribed has no immediate consequences for the employer. No 
sanctions apply. But it could affect the employer’s future possibilities to 
employ labour migrants. When the Swedish Migration Agency decides 
whether to approve an application for a work permit, it can argue that the 
offer is not serious and therefore the application should be denied.10 
For work in specific sectors most prone to abuse, targeted checks on 
the employers are conducted. These sectors are berry-picking, cleaning, 
hotels and restaurants, construction, retail, farming and forestry, auto 
repairs, services and work through temporary agencies.11 Previous failures 
to comply with the required conditions could close the door for those 
employers wanting to continue to employ labour migrants from third 
countries. This aspect could be categorised as a factor that could encourage 
the targeted employers to uphold the required working conditions. 
For employers of EU Blue Card holders, there are no sanctions 
prescribed by the EU directive. There is no specific provision at all on 
sanctions in that directive.12  
For seasonal workers, a different approach has been adopted. Art. 17 
is devoted to the topic of sanctions against employers. The Member States 
are obliged to provide for sanctions against employers who have not fulfilled 
their obligations under the directive. Such sanctions shall include the 
exclusion of employers who are in serious breach of their obligations under 
the directive from employing seasonal workers. The sanctions shall be 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive (Art. 17(1)).  
                                                     
9 Problems related to the interaction of labour law and migration law have been 
highlighted by a number of authors, such as B. Anderson, J. Fudge, M. Freedland, C. 
Costello, J. Howe, R. Owens and B. Ryan, just to mention a few.  
10 See Legislative Inquiry SOU 2016:91, p. 64. 
11 See the Swedish Migration Agency website (www.migrationsverket.se/English/ 
Private-individuals/Working-in-Sweden/Employed.html). 
12 The EU principles on equivalence and effectiveness for national implementation of EU 
law of course apply. See for example, Hofmann (2014), p. 198. 
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Moreover, if the authorisation for the purpose of seasonal work is 
withdrawn pursuant to, among other things, failure to adhere to the 
admission requirements on working conditions, the employer shall be liable 
to pay compensation to the seasonal worker in accordance with procedures 
under national law. Any liability shall cover any outstanding obligations the 
employer would have to respect if the authorisation for the purpose of 
seasonal work had not been withdrawn (Art. 17(2)). According to Art. 17(3), 
the Member States may also adopt subcontracting liability procedures for 
seasonal workers.  
It seems that the Seasonal Workers Directive provides for quite 
effective mechanisms. They could potentially both encourage the employer 
to adhere to the required level of working conditions and limit the risks for 
the labour migrants if failures occur.  
8.4 The allocation of risks and the combined effects of the 
mechanisms discussed 
In the systems discussed it is emphasised that a certain level of working 
conditions must be upheld in the EU and in Sweden. To sharpen this 
requirement in Swedish law, a mandatory provision was introduced to 
withdraw the residence permit when failure to uphold this level is 
detected.13 Since then, a number of residence permits have been withdrawn 
on this basis.14 The extent to which any similar development has occurred in 
relation to EU Blue Cards in the EU is not known. In Sweden, this is a non-
issue, as so few EU Blue Cards have been issued.  
The systems nonetheless illustrate that in principle all the risks 
connected to upholding the admission requirements related to working 
conditions are borne by the labour migrant. The employer will evidently lose 
an employee, but that is all. For some employers, the possibility to employ 
labour migrants in the future could be restricted in the Swedish system. It is 
quite obvious that the actor who is the primus motor in the systems, the 
employer, bears the least risk. This is particularly the case in sectors where 
there are no labour shortages. Frequently the argument is raised that highly 
skilled workers are in a different bargaining position from low-skilled 
workers. That is probably often the case, but is not evident in all cases (Howe 
and Owens, 2016, p. 11). The risk of losing a residence permit for a fault 
                                                     
13 See Legislative proposal 2013/2014:227, p. 10.  
14 See the Legislative inquiry SOU 2016:91, p. 84; see also Centrum för rättvisa (2016).  
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committed by an employer can hardly be perceived as attractive for any 
worker. Such a system does not really encourage an employee to try to 
enforce his or her rights. The risks involved are too high and the likelihood 
of earning at least some of what was expected could be considered better 
than earning nothing at all.  
One idea could therefore be to reconsider the allocation of risks 
connected to failures to uphold a particular level of working conditions. It is 
important to keep in mind that the labour migration regimes discussed to a 
very large extent focus on the interests of the employer. It is the employer’s 
needs that should be fulfilled. The labour migrant’s presence on EU territory 
is to a great degree in the hands of these employers.  
From these perspectives, the solution in the Seasonal Workers 
Directive is an important step forward, for a number of reasons:  
 First, it does not prescribe mandatory withdrawal if the required level 
of working conditions is not upheld.  
 Second, the required proportionality test will lead to a fair balance 
between the interests involved in those cases where withdrawal is 
discussed.  
 Third, and also very importantly, any failure to fulfil the obligations 
under the directive should lead to sanctions against employers – 
sanctions that must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. It is 
likely that the sanction provision has the potential to enforce the level 
of working conditions required. And this is in particular the case when 
the labour migrant does not risk a withdrawal of the authorisation to 
work in the EU. The mandatory application of the proportionality 
principle in cases where a withdrawal is applicable is also of utmost 
importance. According to Swedish law, quite minor errors can lead to 
expulsion because no proportionality principle applies. Fourth, 
according to the Seasonal Workers Directive, if the withdrawal takes 
place, the employer will be obliged to economically compensate the 
employee for the unfulfilled expected wages. The allocation of the risks 
involved in this system is very different from the others. The 
prescribed interaction between withdrawal and sanctions seems to be 
a very promising example of a system that theoretically could lead to 
the prescribed level of working conditions being upheld. This system 
could therefore act as a role model for labour migration systems.  
During 2017, revisions of both the Swedish system and the EU Blue 
Card are on the agenda. Could it be possible to see any traces of an ambition 
to use the Seasonal Workers Directive as such a role model?  
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8.5 The way forward 
The Swedish government recently launched an inquiry with the task of 
considering measures that would strengthen the position of the labour 
migrant on the Swedish labour market. One specific task was to look at 
introducing sanctions against employers failing to fulfil the prescribed level 
of working conditions.15 The inquiry proposed to criminalise employers that 
intentionally do not fulfil the requirements on working conditions in the 
Alien’s Act.16 The sentence would be a maximum of one year of 
imprisonment or fines. The inquiry also considered financial sanctions 
similar to those in Art. 17(2) of the Seasonal Workers Directive. However, 
that was turned down with the argument that it could be difficult for the 
employer to foresee its financial situation and the precise needs the company 
would have when the labour migrant enters Sweden.17 The government has 
not yet decided how to proceed on these issues.  
In the Commission’s proposal for a revised EU Blue Card Directive, 
the question of sanctions is only dealt with in relation to cross-border 
movements (Art. 22). The admission requirements related to working 
conditions have been strengthened (Art. 1(3)) and a proportionality test 
before deciding on withdrawals has been added (Art. 7(4)). These two 
provisions are important steps forward. It is nonetheless a pity that there has 
been no further advance on the route taken by the Seasonal Workers 
Directive. Maybe the European Parliament can push for corresponding 
provisions on sanctions and withdrawals in this directive. Taking into 
account that this directive addresses groups that are considered greatly 
wanted on EU territory, the potential costs for employers are not likely to be 
very high. Still, such sanctions could alleviate a labour migrant’s doubts in 
choosing an EU country. 
  
                                                     
15 See Instructions for the committee, Kommittédirektiv 2015:74, p. 7. 
16 See SOU 2016:91, p. 73.  
17 Ibid., p. 115.  
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9. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ICT DIRECTIVE: 
A PRACTITIONER’S PERSPECTIVE 
JELLE KROES 
9.1 Introduction 
Although the EU Directive on Intra-Corporate Transfer (2014/66/EU) has 
met with enthusiasm in the Netherlands on a general level, it has also raised 
concerns. On 27 January 2017 in Brussels I shared a few remarks about the 
state of play of the Dutch implementation of the ICT Directive, and the 
concerns raised by several Netherlands-based multinational companies. 
These concerns, as it turned out, largely carried among immigration 
stakeholders: legal practitioners, (semi-)government institutions, bilateral 
trade organisations and so on. The dominant concern was the obligatory 
character of the ICT permit scheme in relation to its limited renewability. In 
this chapter I will reflect on the Dutch implementation, the way the industry 
has responded and the counter-reaction of the immigration authorities.1 
9.2 Transposition of the ICT Directive in the Netherlands 
The transposition of the ICT Directive in the Netherlands was quick and 
sudden: the three final legal texts were publicised on 25 and 28 November 
2016 and entered into force on 29 November 2016. The draft implementation 
instruments had not been put forward for consultation with relevant 
stakeholders (companies, immigration advisers). Apparently, the 
government was of the opinion that the directive was easy to transpose and 
should raise no major issues. By way of service, the Dutch Immigration and 
Naturalisation authorities (IND) during the month of November 2016 
organised a series of information meetings for stakeholders about the new 
rules. 
                                                     
1 This chapter draws upon the Alien’s Decree (Vreemdelingenbesluit), the Alien’s 
Provision (022451521 Voorschrift vreemdelingen) and the Implementation Guidelines 
to the Employment of Foreigners Act (Regeling uitvoeringsegeling Wav). 
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At these meetings, however, the IND did struggle to answer a certain 
number of questions, particularly those related to the (non-)renewability of 
the ICT permit. The Netherlands applies a six-month waiting term before a 
new ICT permit can be applied for after a previous one has reached its 
maximum duration, and the question was raised about whether an ICT 
permit holder would be able to switch to a national permit scheme after three 
years, without observing the waiting period. The IND gave no conclusive 
answer to this question, which led to some confusion among stakeholders. 
9.3 Confusion among stakeholders 
The analysis, in fact, seems simple. Art. 2 of the directive clearly stipulates 
that the directive applies (also) to ICT permit-holders (in addition to third-
country nationals who fall under the material scope of the directive). Hence, 
the obligation to leave the territory of the Member States applies to them, as 
well as the obligation to observe the waiting period. The only way to be 
eligible for a national permit immediately (i.e. without moving out of the EU 
and observing the waiting period), is to make them fall out of the material 
scope of the ICT Directive. To that end, the employee would have to be 
placed on a local contract and payroll. 
The IND seemed unhappy with that outcome and suggested that a 
national permit was a possibility, regardless of whether the contract and the 
payroll were transferred to the Netherlands. Since it did not substantiate its 
position with legal arguments, stakeholders got confused, and a certain 
amount of anxiety started to build up. Would transferees effectively be able 
to continue their stay immediately after the maximum three years of the ICT 
permit, or not? 
9.4 Corporations’ favourite pet: The scheme for highly skilled 
migrants 
By way of background, it is useful to note that the national permit for a 
highly skilled migrant (HSM) (the Kennismigrantenvergunning) is granted 
for five years, and is renewable without limitation. Its application process is 
simple and fast (two weeks) and it offers favourable associated rights (e.g. 
full access to the labour market for spouses). Although there is a national ICT 
scheme, employers had the option to choose an HSM permit even if the 
contract and payroll remained in the country of origin. In practice, therefore, 
the HSM scheme was used on a large scale by companies for both local hires 
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and for their intra-company transferees. But the ICT Directive changed all 
that. Since it is transposed over whatever national scheme applies, 
companies worried about not being able to continue with their tested and 
proven mobility programmes, and that the directive would effectively limit 
the existing options. 
This resulted in questions that we received at our practice about how 
to legitimately avoid the application of the directive. These questions came 
primarily from major multinational corporations and from bilateral 
chambers of commerce/trade organisations (e.g. the Japanese External 
Trade Organisation). The concerns were to a certain extent connected to the 
social security policies that some corporations have in place. For example, a 
Japanese multinational may prefer to maintain its staff on a Japanese payroll 
when they are seconded abroad, in order to achieve a better arrangement for 
the burdens of social premiums in comparison with the employees being 
transferred to a local Dutch contract and payroll. Such beneficial solutions 
are based on bilateral treaties and although they are generally limited in 
time, the limitation is often longer than the three years of the ICT permit. As 
in the case of Japan, postings could last for a maximum of four years before 
losing the social security premium benefit, and most postings therefore were 
for four years, at the end of which the company would have to make a 
decision on whether to recall the transferee, or put him or her on a local 
contract and payroll. Under the ICT permit, this decision should be made 
within three years, as the only way to continue staying is to make sure the 
case falls out of the scope of the ICT Directive in order for the national HSM 
scheme to become available, or at least some were of this opinion. 
However, placing employees on a Dutch payroll simply for the 
purpose of renewing their legal stay and work authorisation was perceived 
as highly undesirable by some companies due to the reasons just explained, 
and by others for even more fundamental reasons, e.g. companies that have 
a human resource policy to centralise all of their payroll in one specific 
country for all of their staff, regardless of the country of the world in which 
they are effectively stationed. 
9.5 Legislation by frequently asked questions 
Since November 2016, the IND has published two new documents: the ICT 
Directive frequently asked questions (FAQs) in the Dutch language, dated 8 
December 2016, and the ICT Directive FAQs in the English language dated 
16 February 2017. These texts have no formal legal status, and there is no 
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precedent for this form of communication in the field of immigration law. It 
seems nevertheless that the IND has chosen this format by way of guidelines 
for the day-to-day implementation of the ICT Directive scheme. The FAQs 
are posted on the IND website and there is no formal process for their 
drafting or amendment. The official immigration guidelines, the 
Immigration Circular (Vreemdelingencirculaire), do not contain the same 
level of detail as the FAQs.  
9.6 A national permit after expiration of the ICT permit? 
When the English version (the ‘English FAQs’) was published in February 
2017, it contained more questions and answers than the Dutch version (the 
‘Dutch FAQs’) of December 2016, and some of the answers were different. 
The Dutch FAQs contained the following wording:  
The idea behind the ICT Directive is that after the stay in the 
Netherlands the employee returns to the foreign employer or goes 
to another EU based undertaking of the organisation. 
Yet in the English FAQs, a sentence had been added to this:  
However, the employee can apply for a national residence permit 
after the maximum period of residence.  
This suggests that the waiting period must not in all cases be observed, 
which is affirmed explicitly by the following question and answer: 
Q: May the holder of an ICT residence permit get a highly skilled migrant 
permit after three years of residence, even if he keeps his labour contract 
with the employer outside the EU? 
A: When the maximum period of residence on the grounds of the 
ICT Directive (this is 3 years for a manager or specialist and 1 year 
for a trainee-employee) has passed, the employee no longer falls 
within the scope of the Directive now that he has residence in the 
Netherlands at the moment of submitting the application. If he 
meets the conditions of the Highly Skilled Migrants’ Scheme and 
the Dutch undertaking where he works is recognised as a sponsor, 
he can apply for a highly skilled migrant residence permit. 
The Dutch FAQs were amended on the same date and now contain the same 
wording. 
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9.7 The government’s position 
So the IND has finally taken the ‘official’ standpoint that even when the 
contract and payroll remain abroad, the ICT permit holder can apply for a 
national permit immediately after expiration of the ICT permit. This position 
has been endorsed by the Ministry of Security and Justice, or more likely, the 
latter has decided that this should be the official interpretation of the 
directive.  
Although the directive leaves no room for this interpretation, in my 
view, one might argue that as long as it is a requirement that the ICT permit 
must first be held for its full duration, the spirit and purpose of the directive 
are not directly jeopardised by this approach. What is less easy to 
understand, is why the Dutch government chose to use the option of a 
waiting term – of six months no less – if it did not aspire to implement it. It 
would have reached essentially the exact same result, but in a more 
consistent way. 
9.8 World Trade Organization/General Agreement on Trade in 
Services 
The ICT Directive allows for the application of immigration schemes 
included in pre-existing bilateral agreements. Here again, the Dutch 
government has taken a quite liberal approach. Its interpretation of the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) Mode 4 obligations is such 
that these should prevail, even when a transfer is in the scope of the ICT 
Directive. The GATS Mode 4 obligations cover the same types of transferees, 
but an important difference is that the GATS obligations (at least in the way 
they have been transposed into Dutch law) can effectively be renewed, if the 
transfer for some reason is prolonged. No six-month waiting period applies. 
More importantly, the prevalence of the GATS scheme applies to all 
transferees coming from a WTO member country; it is not required that they 
fall into the scope of the GATS Mode 4 definitions.  
This approach has been incorporated into the Implementation 
Guidelines of the Employment of Foreigners Act, a ministerial decree. 
Whether it is compliant with the exemption clause in the ICT Directive 
remains to be seen. For the time being, the GATS ICT scheme is an outcome 
for those companies who are not recognised sponsors. For recognised 
sponsors, the permit under the ICT Directive is processed in two weeks; 
otherwise, the 90 days apply. The GATS ICT scheme is a work permit 
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scheme, operated not by the IND but by the Central Labour Office (UWV), 
which applies a three-week target processing time, and is thus much faster. 
In urgent cases, the GATS ICT permit will form a useful alternative to the 
ICT Directive.  
9.9 Chief executive officer/major shareholder: Important news 
Another question that came up in our practice was whether the ICT Directive 
would cover the transfer of a chief executive officer or other executive, who 
at the same time was a major shareholder of the legal entity that holds the 
undertaking established outside the territory of the Member States. The 
FAQs address this as follows: 
Q: Within the framework of the highly skilled migrant regulation a 
managing director may not possess more than 25% of the shares. Does this 
also apply to managers within the scope of the ICT Directive? 
A: No, this condition does not apply. 
In the Netherlands, this is an important point, as the permit scheme for 
entrepreneurs is functioning very poorly. Practitioners are generally looking 
for alternatives in the form of sponsored employee-oriented schemes. 
However, 25% (or more) shareholders are not supposed to use those 
schemes. The ICT Directive seems to solve this issue and somewhat close the 
gap between entrepreneurs/business owners and employees. The FAQs do 
not make clear whether there is a certain maximum. Will a 100% shareholder 
be able to transfer him- or herself, too? 
9.10 The European Commission 
It remains to be seen what the position of the Commission will be, basically 
on all of the issues discussed above. But at present the Commission is 
probably more interested in ensuring the transposition of the ICT Directive 
in the Member States where this has yet to take place. 
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10. LABOUR MIGRATION TO EUROPE:  
WHAT ROLE FOR EU REGULATION? 
MIKKEL BARSLUND AND MATTHIAS BUSSE 
10.1 Introduction 
In recent years the focus in the EU has been on controlling irregular 
migration flows of third-country nationals. Less public attention has been 
given to the issue of shaping managed migration, in particular labour 
immigration from third countries. This chapter delves into the role of the EU 
in facilitating labour migration to EU Member States. Immigration policy for 
third-country nationals is fundamentally a Member State competence.1 
Hence, EU policies in this area necessarily trade Member States’ ability to 
control the entry of third-country nationals for the gain from positive 
externalities of EU regulation. Moreover, immigration policy is a particularly 
salient issue; thus, the added value of EU intervention needs to be clear-cut 
and significant.  
At the EU level, two instruments are of central importance when it 
comes to highly skilled labour migration: the Blue Card Directive 
(2009/50/EC) and the Students and Researchers Directive (2016/801/EU). 
In 2013, the Commission proposed to combine and recast the Students and 
Researchers Directives. The proposal with amendments was finally adopted 
in the spring of 2016. One of the main improvements is the right to a nine-
month job-search period after graduation within the host country. Minor 
improvements for the mobility of students and researchers were achieved 
by, for example, lowering the administrative burden of applying for a visa 
in a Member State different from the country of graduation. Subsequently, 
in June 2016, the Commission proposed a revision of the EU Blue Card 
                                                     
1 In the case of irregular migration and individuals seeking protection – i.e. asylum 
seekers – Member States are subject to principles laid out by the Common European 
Asylum System and adherence to international treaties, hereunder the Geneva 
Convention.  
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scheme aimed at making the EU a more attractive destination for highly 
skilled individuals.  
This chapter concentrates on these two directives, with the main 
emphasis on the Blue Card Directive. Both directives are especially 
important for attracting highly skilled and talented individuals to the EU 
labour markets and are the main tools for policy action at the EU level. 
However, it is important to keep in mind that the labour force of Member 
States is complemented by third-country nationals in a number of other ways 
through asylum, family unification and various national schemes to attract 
skilled foreigners. In fact, only a small percentage of third-country national 
migration comes through the current Blue Card scheme and related national 
schemes, as well as through the Students and Researchers Directive. 
We argue that the current proposal for a recast of the Blue Card 
Directive is well measured and ensures proper, though small, added value 
of EU regulation on this issue. Consequently, this means limiting EU 
regulation to highly skilled individuals only, as is currently proposed. The 
reason for this is, as we argue, that European labour markets are fragmented 
and distinct – not only as to current performance in terms of unemployment 
rates but also when it comes to shortage professions. Furthermore, 
population ageing, an often-repeated argument for increasing labour 
migration, will occur at different speeds and intensities in Member States.2 
This implies that Member States are best placed to design their own flexible 
mechanisms to cope with perceived labour market needs. Overall 
coordination of labour market needs at the EU level adds little value. From 
a public finance perspective, the pure cost–benefit analysis when it comes to 
low-skilled migration is also far from clear-cut.3 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: the next section 
describes the most important features of the Blue Card Directive. 
Subsequently, we show how diverse the EU is in terms of labour market 
performance and future challenges with respect to population ageing. We 
then dive into the core purpose of the Blue Card scheme of attracting talented 
individuals, and illustrate that the EU is not only competing with the US (and 
                                                     
2 We do not find the direct link between population ageing and immigration convincing, 
but it is nevertheless an oft-repeated argument in the debate on labour migration. 
3 Another argument for increasing low-skilled migration from third countries is that it 
fosters economic development in poor countries. It goes beyond this chapter to consider 
its merits. We focus on added value for EU Member States. 
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in the near future the UK), but also emerging countries for the best and 
brightest.  
10.2 The Blue Card Directive4 
The 2009 Blue Card Directive was meant as a cornerstone in the strategy to 
make the EU more attractive to highly skilled workers from third countries. 
Indeed, the directive itself mentions the provisions as a tool for “becoming 
the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the 
world”.5 The central idea behind a Blue Card is that highly qualified and 
talented individuals increasingly consider global possibilities and 
opportunities. The market for human capital with skills in high demand is 
ever-more global.  
To benefit from the current scheme a Blue Card applicant has to prove 
a valid work contract that meets the national salary threshold of at least 1.5 
times the national average.6 The applicant has to hold an accredited 
university degree.7 For the holder, the Blue Card provides not only a work 
permit but also a set of additional rights, among them the right to switch jobs 
within the EU without much administrative burden, if certain prerequisites 
are met. 
Nevertheless, the current version of the Blue Card Directive has not 
delivered on its promise. Germany is de facto the only country giving Blue 
Cards based on the directive in any meaningful numbers, with 14,600 out of 
the total 17,100 Blue Cards issued in 2015.8 The directive allows Member 
States to apply national rules, which do not necessarily confer any rights of 
movement within the EU (Eisele, 2013; Wiesbrock, 2010). Member States 
have significant discretion in defining the criteria for issuing the Blue Card 
                                                     
4 This section builds on Barslund and Busse (2016). 
5 See Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions of entry and 
residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment, OJ 
L 155/17, 18.6.2009 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri= 
celex%3A32009L0050) 
6 The threshold can be lower – in several countries, sectors that are nationally identified 
as having shortages offer a lower threshold. 
7 In some countries, a similar length of relevant work experience may also suffice. 
8 See European Commission, Executive Summary accompanying the Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on the conditions of entry and 
residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly skilled employment, 
SWD/2016/0194 final – 2016/0176 (COD), Brussels, 2016. 
LABOUR MIGRATION TO EUROPE: WHAT ROLE FOR EU REGULATION?  77 
(earnings threshold, education, quotas, etc.). These factors have led to a low 
uptake in most Member States, with the exception of Germany and 
Luxembourg.  
10.3 The diversity of European labour markets 
As opposed to the single market for goods and services, a European single 
labour market has yet to materialise. This is clearly exemplified by the stark 
and deep-rooted heterogeneity of national labour markets as well as low 
intra-EU labour mobility (Barslund and Busse, 2016). This poses a challenge 
for a common EU immigration approach, since labour market needs differ 
and these should be reflected in appropriate national-specific entry criteria. 
The more homogenous the need for a type of foreign worker, the stronger is 
the argument for a European approach and firm embedding of rights to free 
movement for third-country nationals. 
Still, key labour market indicators point to the profound and 
persistence heterogeneity of EU labour markets: the unemployment rate gap 
between the worst and best EU performers spans up to 19.5 percentage 
points, with a large dispersion around the EU average (Figure 10.1).  
Figure 10.1 Unemployment rates (2016) 
 
Data source: Eurostat. 
The unemployment rates of the low-qualified9 display even larger gaps 
across the EU. Another dividing characteristic is the share of the long-term 
                                                     
9 That is, an ISCED level of educational attainment below ISCED 3. 
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unemployed in total unemployment. In Sweden, very few jobseekers 
become unemployed long term (19%), while in Slovakia and Greece around 
two-thirds of all unemployed individuals have been unable to find a job over 
the past 12 months – evidence of clear structural differences among Member 
States. 
Differences in labour market outcomes are not the only distinguishing 
feature. Educational attainment across the EU remains diverse as well. In 
Italy only around 15% of the workforce holds a tertiary qualification while 
in Ireland more than twice as many do (37%). Even for the younger 
generation10 this gap has not shrunk: among those aged 25–34 the share for 
Italy is 25%, while many of the northern and Eastern European Member 
States achieve rates above 40% (Figure 10.2). 
Figure 10.2 Share of individuals aged 25-34 with tertiary education (2015) 
 
Data source: Eurostat. 
The OECD’s PIAAC11 survey further shows that the (implied) skill 
intensities of the EU27 economies differ substantially and thus the labour 
demand in terms of skilled professions are not homogenous, thereby 
pointing to different recruitment and human capital creation needs. 
Moreover, the integration of the European economies has led to 
specialisation, which has further amplified long-standing differences in the 
sectoral breakdowns among the Member States. This can also be observed 
on the labour markets, in particular with regard to vacancies by sector. In the 
                                                     
10 This is defined as the age group 25–34, since it is the first age group that will have 
completed graduate programmes. 
11 PIAAC refers to the Programme for the International Assessment of Adult 
Competencies. 
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Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, nearly a third of all vacancies stem 
from the industrial sector (excluding construction), whereas in many other 
countries industrial demand is less than 10%. In Greece and Cyprus, 30% of 
vacancies are found in ‘accommodation and restaurants’, and in the former 
another 30% come from the wholesale sector. The Slovenian economy has a 
higher than average demand for construction workers (19%), while 
vacancies in financial services are only of macro importance for Luxembourg 
(9%). These discrepancies exemplify the heterogeneous labour demand 
according to profession as well as skill level. 
The evidence points towards very weakly integrated labour markets 
in terms of both structural features and mobility across borders. This fact has 
to be borne in mind when discussing a European policy approach to labour 
immigration. This means there is little value in coordination at the EU level 
as needs differ considerably. The Blue Card can be regarded as an exception, 
since all EU Member States are seeking highly qualified and talented 
workers who already have a job offer. They are unlikely to pose an economic 
burden for any of the Member States (even when moving from one Member 
State to another over time). In light of the common interest in foreign talent, 
the Blue Card is seen as a tool to improve the EU’s attractiveness to highly 
qualified and talented workers vis-à-vis its global competitors. 
10.4 The EU in the world battle for talent  
The advent of the knowledge-driven economy and the mounting 
demographic challenges the EU faces have led governments to implement 
policies to retain the domestic highly qualified while at the same time attract 
foreign talent. Given that demographic challenges are felt in most advanced 
economies, the struggle for internationally mobile, highly qualified workers 
has been coined the ‘battle for talent’. 
For talent from the emerging economies, the EU is still among the most 
attractive places in the world but it is by no means at the top. The US in 
particular has established itself as the leader in the battle for talent with 
smaller economies such as Canada and Switzerland at par. The World 
Economic Forum’s Competitiveness Index12 contains a survey-based sub-
indicator estimating the ‘ability to attract talent’ (Figure 10.3).  
                                                     
12 See World Economic Forum, “Global Competitiveness Index”, 2017 
(http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-index/#topic=data). 
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Figure 10.3 Ability to attract talent 
 
Data source: World Economic Forum. 
The weighted EU27 average reaches only a score of 3.4, which remains 
far behind its direct competitors with a score of almost 6.0. In fact, of the 
major EU countries only the UK manages to breach the top 10 and is in a 
position to effectively compete with the US. Post-Brexit, the competitiveness 
of the EU will further deteriorate and the past years have not shown a 
substantial increase in attractiveness. More worrisome still is that new 
competitors are entering the stage. Foremost, China has become a new player 
in the talent game that competes especially on the Asian labour market but 
also beyond. 
Why is the EU27 falling behind when its potential in terms affluence is 
(in many Member States) not far behind the US? The language barrier is one 
of the deterring factors for foreign talent; furthermore, the US is seen as 
providing more opportunities in terms of the business environment and 
lower taxation. The excellent reputation the US enjoys has many more facets, 
among them the low administrative burden for visa applications for highly 
skilled workers. The US Green Card is highly coveted and is widely known. 
The EU’s current Blue Card system has not been able to match the Green 
Card, which is reflected in the low usage and awareness, and has not had 
much impact on the EU’s position in the battle for talent. When launched in 
2009, the explicit goals were “to make the EU a more attractive destination 
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for foreign highly skilled workers and contribute to strengthening its 
knowledge economy”.13 
In 2014 only 38,774 highly skilled third-country nationals14 entered the 
EU while the US, whose population is only 62% of the EU’s, attracted ca. 
200,000 highly skilled workers.15 The EU is either not seeking to attract as 
many highly skilled workers or is not able to recruit as many as desired via 
the national or the Blue Card schemes. 
Another viable strategy for the EU to ensure a sufficient supply of 
foreign talent focuses on drawing and retaining promising students from 
abroad. In the US over a million international students enrolled in 2015, 
which represents around 5% of all students.16 Retaining foreign students 
after graduating from a domestic university is a useful move to fare better in 
the talent game. For this to succeed, two ingredients are necessary: i) 
attractive universities and ii) opportunities (visa)/support for students to 
find a job upon graduation. 
The EU has many universities with good reputations, however, once 
again the US is the global leader and the EU is very reliant on the elite 
universities in the UK. The Times Higher Education ranking in 2017 shows that 
the US holds the pole position with 25 out of the top 50 universities.17 The 
UK is only European country with a university in the top 10 and excluding 
the UK18 the EU only boasts 5 universities in the top 50. Nevertheless, the EU 
possess numerous universities in the top 500, which illustrates the good 
average quality of EU universities as opposed to a just few outstanding 
                                                     
13 See European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and 
the Council on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the 
purposes of highly skilled employment, COM(2016) 378 final – 2016/0176 (COD), 
Brussels, 7.6.2016. 
14 In the same year the EU issued merely 13,852 Blue Cards (nearly 90% of those by 
Germany) and many were provided to third-country nationals already residing in the 
EU. See European Commission, SWD/2016/0194 final (2016), op. cit. 
15 See European Commission, COM(2016) 378 final (2016), op. cit. 
16 See the National Center for Education Statistics (2016) and Institute of International 
Education (2016). 
17 See Times Higher Education, “World University Rankings 2016-2017” 
(www.timeshighereducation.com/world-university-rankings/2017/world-
ranking#!/page/0/length/25/sort_by/rank/sort_order/asc/cols/stats). 
18 The UK alone has 7 in the top 50 (more than rest of the EU) and Oxford is ranked first. 
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universities (as is currently the case for China – see Morehouse and Busse, 
2014). 
Improving the reputation of European universities will be key in the 
future to attract talent early but this is a Member State competence and the 
role for the EU is limited. One added value stems from granting graduates 
access to intra-EU mobility and an automatic, EU-wide, valid jobseekers visa. 
These are two rights of international students that could boost the 
attractiveness of the EU as a whole. The Directive on Students and 
Researchers is a first step in this direction in helping to develop an attractive 
package for foreign students.  
10.5 What role for the EU?  
The EU is involved in many policy areas, some where it has been granted 
exclusive competence and others where competences are shared with 
Member States. The notion behind this separation of tasks is that the EU 
institutions should play a decisive role only where Member State policies 
create externalities for other Member States and where a strong ‘economies 
of scale’ argument exists. Migration policy is a Member State competence, 
though some aspects, such as attracting highly qualified foreigners, are also 
dealt with at the EU level. 
The Students and Researchers Directive and the Blue Card Directive 
are two such EU endeavours in what previously had been a Member State 
domain. EU added value rests on a common interest in attracting foreign 
talent and the additional global attractiveness of a European approach. The 
latter stems from the fact that coordination bringing rights at the European 
level – especially rights related to EU mobility – makes each country more 
attractive for third-country nationals than similar national schemes would. 
This effect is particularly large for small countries, which may otherwise 
struggle to attract talented individuals to what are from a global perspective 
small local labour markets.  
For low- and medium-qualified third-country nationals, the 
attractiveness of EU countries lies primarily, but not exclusively, in the 
potential for a higher standard of living. Stated in economic terms, there is 
not much global competition for these segments of the labour force. Hence, 
there is much less scope for EU coordination to enhance attractiveness to 
them. For these reasons, we see little added value in expanding the scope of 
the proposed recast of the Blue Card Directive to the low- and medium-
qualified.  
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In addition, there may be an important political trade-off between the 
inclusiveness of the Blue Card (i.e. accessibility for third-country nationals) 
and the rights conferred to holders. From an economic perspective, a strong 
set of rights (in particular mobility rights) for highly skilled people is 
preferable to a set of more limited rights granted to a broader set of 
educational levels. Reducing mobility rights for the highly qualified severely 
limits the attractiveness of a European Blue Card, and thus the number of 
people applying; not granting similar European rights to low-skilled 
workers hardly affects Member States’ ability to attract individuals from this 
segment of the labour market.  
The proposed changes to the Blue Card Directive seek to ensure that 
Member States make full use of the Blue Card, to enhance its added value to 
holders and to make it more accessible. In detail, the Commission plans to 
replace national schemes with the Blue Card so that it no longer competes 
with them. Additionally, the Blue Card processing time is to be reduced, 
equivalent work experience is to be anchored as an alternative to formal 
qualifications, the intra-EU labour mobility of third-country nationals is to 
be facilitated, long-term residence is to be made easier to obtain, refugees are 
to be able to gain access to the Blue Card procedure if they meet the general 
criteria and family reunification is to be eased. These measures will improve 
the attractiveness of the Blue Card. Finally yet importantly, the Blue Card is 
to be made more accessible by lowering the minimum salary threshold in 
order to qualify for the Blue Card scheme (from a fixed 1.5 times the national 
average to a flexible band of 1.0–1.4 times the average) and lower thresholds 
are to be introduced for recent graduates and workers in sectors with labour 
shortages – which the Member States can determine individually. 
The proposed revision of the Blue Card Directive and the latest 
Students and Researchers Directive have focused on aspects of highly skilled 
immigration where the EU has added value to offer: facilitating the labour 
mobility of third-country nationals. The Blue Card proposal, if adopted in its 
current form, is well designed and would amplify the benefits of a European 
approach to the international talent game. The key to its success is 
implementation by the domestic administrations combined with raising 
awareness of the revised Blue Card and its benefits for international talent. 
Otherwise, the Blue Card will not have a substantial impact on the 
attractiveness of the EU. 
Realistically, even with the proposed changes, the economic gains are 
relatively small. The European Commission estimates the economic gains 
from the new Blue Card scheme to range between €1.4 and 6.2 billion 
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annually.19 However, for this to materialise, the Blue Card will have to 
become substantially more popular than domestic schemes have managed 
in the past, which should be regarded as a very optimistic scenario. An ex 
post impact assessment on the net – i.e. new Blue Card holders corrected for 
the lower uptake of national schemes – should be carefully conducted in 
order to evaluate the added value in the medium term. 
10.6 Conclusion 
A well-functioning Blue Card scheme covering highly qualified and highly 
skilled individuals should yield benefits to the Union overall and render 
individual Member States more attractive to foreign talent. Hence, the 
suggested revision of the Blue Card Directive is well measured and likely to 
provide a positive impetus. 
Given the fragmented nature of national labour markets in terms of 
unemployment, occupations with skill shortages and different demographic 
challenges, there is no need for EU regulation on access for low- and 
medium-skilled individuals. In fact, broadening the scope of the suggested 
revision would have been counter-productive, as the rights conferred to 
holders of the Blue Card would likely have been substantially watered down 
in negotiations with the European Parliament and Council.  
Lowering the threshold and eliminating competition with national 
schemes should substantially increase the uptake and attractiveness of the 
Blue Card. Moreover, by enhancing the labour mobility of third-country 
nationals the EU is addressing the key added value of a European approach.  
  
                                                     
19 See European Commission, “Delivering the European Agenda on Migration: 
Commission presents Action Plan on Integration and reforms ‘Blue Card’ scheme for 
highly skilled workers from outside the EU”, Press Release, Brussels, 2016 
(http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2041_en.htm). 
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11. LEGAL MIGRATION IN THE EU’S EXTERNAL 
POLICY: AN OBJECTIVE OR A BARGAINING 
CHIP?  
AGNIESZKA WEINAR 
11.1 Introduction 
The year 2016 changed the geopolitics of international relations for the EU. 
Brexit, Russia’s assertiveness in Syria and the US elections put the EU in a 
place it has not been for the last 70 years. And all this came just after 2015, 
which reshaped the internal landscape of migration policy-making. 
Consequently, as regards the external dimension of EU migration policy, the 
challenges only began to mount. In an unstable environment, the established 
ways of doing things will not suffice.  
The EU’s internal crisis caused by the significant immigration flows of 
2015 revealed the importance of public support for migration policies. EU 
policy-makers diagnosed the perceived inability of the EU to control its 
borders as an obstacle to such support. It has never been clear what the real 
objectives of EU migration policy are, but today they seem much more 
apparent: they are all about border management. Indeed, cooperation with 
the countries of origin and transit is supposed to engage other countries in 
the control of EU borders. This is a building block of an array of EU 
instruments, such as Mobility Partnerships or migration and mobility 
dialogues. What is thus the place of legal migration in this conundrum? After 
all, for years the EU has stressed the importance of ‘orderly migration flows’ 
for an ‘ageing workforce’ and EU labour markets. 
Legal migration seems to be less of an objective than a bargaining chip 
in negotiations to obtain cooperation on border management. Such an 
approach has been more successful in some parts of the world than in others, 
and probably for reasons not related to the packages actually negotiated. 
Unfortunately, legal migration seems to be an afterthought of EU 
cooperation on migration. There is little in sight that would suggest this can 
change. In the following sections, this chapter considers two factors that 
shape cooperation on legal migration with the non-EU countries post-2016: 
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the EU’s negotiating power and the place of legal migration in the negotiated 
deals.  
11.2 Negotiations: The EU’s upper and lower hands 
The EU’s negotiating power lies in its soft power (Diez and Pace, 2011). This 
soft power has been used to build the European migration architecture since 
at least 1989, after the fall of the Iron Curtain. For nearly 30 years this 
architecture was designed in the form of concentric circles: at the core was 
the EU territory (whatever it looked like at any given moment), then circles 
of cooperation with the partner countries along its borders, then with 
partners farther afield. The building blocks of today’s migration 
management approach were conceptualised then: safe third country, safe 
third country of origin and readmission agreements, but also programmes 
for temporary low-skilled workers from partner countries. The Germany–
Poland agreement from the early 1990s looked a lot like the current EU–
Turkey deal. 
The EU has been able to exercise its power in negotiating migration 
management deals. The use of methods differed according to the proximity 
to the core.  
The Western Balkans and Eastern Europe enjoy a special status in the 
EU external policy as countries with a so-called ‘European prospect’ (for the 
moment excluded for European Neighbourhood Policy countries). They also 
identify strongly with Europe as a geographical and cultural space. 
European integration has many motors on the European continent beyond 
the EU: the Council of Europe, OECD, Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe and many other European organisations that are 
geographically relevant. In this space, the EU has been perceived as a 
normative power (Diez, 2005) offering valuable lessons in what it means to 
be European. It has used an effective mix of political and economic incentives 
to steer reforms and policy alignment (Diez and Pace, 2011; Börzel and Risse, 
2009). This includes policy dissemination in the field of migration 
management. Cooperating on readmission or border management has been 
largely seen as ‘what Europe wants’, a small price to pay for getting closer to 
‘Europe’ and becoming ‘European’. The ambition of many of the countries 
in the neighbourhood and in the Balkans has also been to remove themselves 
from Russia’s orbit. Visa facilitation or liberalisation has been a sweetener, 
which in the presence of all other instruments and in the geopolitical context 
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probably has not been a decisive factor in cooperating with the EU (Gawrich 
et al., 2010; Celata and Coletti, 2016).  
The approach exercised towards the southern neighbours or sub-
Saharan Africa has been different. The colonial ties have played a greater role 
than the EU, and have also meant more financial support or investment 
traceable to individual Member States than to the EU. This cooperation has 
always been reliant on asymmetric economic and political power, with no 
underpinning EU perspective (Van Hüllen, 2012; Del Sarto, 2016). Thus, the 
cooperation has been more challenging, requiring more negotiating skill and 
more bargaining chips. The changes brought by the subsequent versions of 
the Global Approach to Migration (and Mobility) (GAMM) have been 
incremental, but very slow. Even today, after the frenzy of EU activity on 
cooperation with the post-2011 Arab states, the progress on actual 
implementation of many cooperation tools (such as Mobility Partnerships) 
has been modest (Fakhoury, 2016; Seeberg, 2016; Den Hertog, 2016). The 
reluctance of the partners to cooperate on EU border management has only 
met with the reluctance of the EU to offer substantial legal migration and 
economic incentives. 
In 2016, the fluctuations in the EU’s negotiating power became clear: 
first, the recovery of the eurozone economy had been slow; second, the 
political support of a hard power (the US) began to look unstable and the EU 
found itself alone in the face of assertive Russian and Turkish stances. Today, 
the questioning of the liberal world order, which was the context that made 
the soft power approach possible, signals a possible end to the established 
ways of doing things.  
In Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans, it is an assertive Russia 
that may influence any prospective cooperation with the EU, even on 
migration (Romanova, 2016). It is impossible to foresee the extent of 
sovereignty that will be retained by the countries in the Eastern 
Neighbourhood in the coming years. The underpinning European ideals 
hang by a thread: since 2014, the enchantment with the EU as a pursuer of 
democratic values has diminished in Eastern Europe. The way the EU deals 
with Russia over the coming months will be crucial for the future of any 
cooperation in the region.  
In other places in the world, the EU’s soft power and normative stance 
is challenged by a more prominent presence of China, an authoritarian 
Turkey and the unknown course of the US. The aftermath of the Arab Spring 
has complicated the EU’s position: autocrats and those running failing states 
have little patience for norm-taking. They are more interested in economic 
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and trade support. In sub-Saharan Africa, China can easily outbid the EU 
without asking for investment in migration management or about 
uncomfortable human rights records. 
11.3 The paradox of the great bargain 
The EU has not been very successful in attaching the strings of labour 
migration or economic investment to cooperation on migration 
management. Both are aspects of national economic policies and thus cannot 
be kept hostage by EU-level border management negotiations. The spread of 
understanding of this principle has been slow among both the EU 
institutions and the EU’s partners. 
Legal migration in the EU context covers a variety of movements; their 
purposes differ as well as their duration. The EU mandate on legal migration 
(and mobility) covers such different issues as short-term visas and the 
integration of third-country nationals in EU Member States (Weinar, 2011). 
For the partners on the other side of the table, legal migration largely means 
open channels for labour migration (temporary or permanent) to the EU. 
Taking a rational approach, they expect that creating legal channels will have 
a positive effect on limiting the pool of candidates for illegal migration. This, 
however, is one field where the EU and its Member States have been 
reluctant to build a solid offer (Reslow, 2012). Also, the mobility element, i.e. 
visa-free entry to the Schengen zone, sometimes seems to be misunderstood 
as a way to get workers safely to the EU labour market. Any negotiation of 
legal migration instruments with non-EU partners are therefore preceded by 
lengthy conceptual adjustments.  
Western Balkan and Eastern European countries have been socialised 
quite quickly to these political realities and can tap into the EU mobility 
frameworks (in addition to visa policies, there are many youth mobility 
programmes, student mobility frameworks, and exchanges of professional 
and trades people). They also benefit from their geographical proximity and 
social networks that support labour migration. ‘Working tourists’ from the 
Balkans and Eastern Europe have complemented the existing labour 
migration programmes of a majority of the Member States that privilege 
these countries. In comparison, only a handful have been interested in 
offering legal migration channels to African countries (both North African 
and sub-Saharan).  
Legal labour migration is what the EU needs regardless of cooperation 
with third countries. Moreover, at a majority of skill levels, it needs 
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immigrants from countries other than those with which it wants to strike a 
deal on illegal migration. The EU cannot get a deal with a sub-Saharan 
African country to attract thousands of specialised IT workers. First, it would 
be an unacceptable brain drain; second, the working environment and skills 
needed at the destination can be so different from the country of origin that 
there is a risk of failed labour market integration and actual brain waste (a 
typical problem in, for example, Canada and Australia). We see it quite 
clearly now in Germany, where Syrian specialists undergo intensive (and 
expensive) training to even let them start working, for instance in a 
marketing section of a German company. Retraining is good, but it is costly.  
The winning strategy for any country of destination is to assure that 
the levels of skill and experience of a migrant correspond closely to the 
available post and working environment. Realistically, from the point of 
view of the EU, such pairing is possible only with some countries of the 
world, and it is helped by existing professional and economic ties, not a deal 
on illegal migration.  
What remains as a bargaining chip is low-skilled migration, the type 
of migration Europeans usually do not want, but which they also need. The 
EU has pushed hard for the Member States to open up such possibilities in 
the past (e.g. giving small quotas for certain nationalities for temporary 
seasonal work). There are two issues with this approach: 
 First, the negotiating partners are less and less interested in small offers 
on labour migration, such as employment of 100 circular migrants in 
agriculture per year. They seek to obtain open labour access for their 
nationals. The expectations from both sides will not match easily.  
 Second, since the eurozone crisis, the job market for low-skilled jobs 
has become volatile. Moreover, these jobs are most vulnerable to 
mechanisation and technological change (Boesl and Bode, 2016; Smith 
and Anderson, 2014; Song, 2016). Demand for workers in these sectors 
will decrease dramatically by 2025. So this is a bargaining chip that will 
lose its value sooner rather than later, while the need for medium- and 
highly skilled workers will persist. 
How do the countries in the neighbourhood and beyond position 
themselves in such a context? Obviously, European partners, in both the 
Western Balkans and in Eastern Europe, have been helped to build their 
human capital according to the common European norms. The Bologna 
process, common recognition framework, twinning projects and building of 
the European Research Area have all contributed to common 
understandings and definitions of skills. Intensive investment by EU 
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industries employs and at the same time develops the human capital of the 
local workforce (Bartlett, 2013; Bhattacharya and Wolde, 2010). The 
differences persist, but they are less dramatic than in the case of countries 
that have not had this level of intense exchange. No wonder Polish 
employers worry about the EU visa-free policy towards Ukraine: they see it 
as opening the door to other EU markets to jobseekers from Ukraine, a 
situation in which Poland and other Central and Eastern European Member 
States will lose their competitive edge.  
The southern neighbourhood has quite a different story to tell. Less 
EU-wide FDI has created fewer professional networks that could boost 
labour migration, not to mention the issues with access to EU territory. In 
addition, far fewer countries have active recruitment policies focusing on 
this part of the world. Also, the economic ties (FDI) are less developed (apart 
from FDI coming from only a handful of EU Member States, with France 
playing the major role). Where the Balkans and Eastern Europe are literally 
pinned to the EU-wide value chain, the southern Mediterranean is linked to 
a less encompassing one. This all has an impact on creating a qualified pool 
of potential immigrants who could ideally fit the labour market needs in the 
EU. 
11.4 Labour markets are not for negotiation 
In a post-2016 world, the EU must reconsider its approach. First, we should 
admit that the immigrant workers we want are not necessarily those who 
will come as a result of any deal with a country of transit or origin. This can 
explain why the labour migration offers have not been a real success story in 
the EU’s external dimension. This is in sharp contrast to policies of 
individual Member States that have quite aggressively sought the skills they 
need. Indeed, legal labour migration that is beneficial for the labour markets 
is a policy the EU can pursue unilaterally, by opening migration channels by 
sector, thus supporting its Member States. This type of migration should not 
be bundled into any offer tied to cooperation on illegal migration, because 
the countries from which undocumented migrants flow are not ones that 
abound in the needed skills.  
Second, the EU could use its trade policy more creatively, especially 
with countries farther afield. Trade policy is not migration policy but it can 
work wonders in creating a safe space for legal migration (and pushing for 
stricter cooperation on migration control), as we can see from the history of 
the European Communities.  
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Third, the changing world order has brought a new understanding to 
the EU that some hard power needs to be exercised after all. In the face of 
the adverse reality, as much as we Europeans do not like it, the EU normative 
power needs some more euros to pave the way and some metal teeth. 
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12. IMPLEMENTING MOBILITY PARTNERSHIPS: 
DELIVERING WHAT? 
LEONHARD DEN HERTOG  
AND FANNY TITTEL-MOSSER 
12.1 Introduction 
EU Mobility Partnerships (MPs) are non-binding instruments concluded 
between the EU, interested Member States and a third country. They are 
considered to be the “main strategic, comprehensive and long-term 
cooperation framework for migration management with third countries”.1 
Widely presented in the literature as soft law instruments,2 MPs are 
composed of a joint declaration and a list of projects in an annex meant to 
implement the MP. The annex is regarded as a living document evolving 
over time based on the interests of the different parties. 
Since the first MPs with Cape Verde and Moldova in 2008, the EU has 
concluded seven further MPs, focusing initially on countries in the ‘eastern 
neighbourhood’. Following the Arab Spring developments in 2011, the 
Commission revitalised the MPs as an instrument for the southern 
Mediterranean countries as well, leading to MPs concluded with Morocco in 
2013 and with Tunisia in 2014.3 
Now is thus an appropriate moment to assess the implementation of 
these MPs. In this chapter, we consider the central question of ‘what’ they 
are concretely delivering so far. What kinds of projects are funded and 
implemented and what has been the contribution so far to the main element 
                                                     
1 See Council of the European Union, The Stockholm Programme – An open and secure 
Europe serving and protecting the citizens, 17024/09, Brussels, 2.12.2009, p. 61. 
2 See Carrera and Hernández i Sagrera (2009), p. 28; Carrera and Hernández i Sagrera 
(2011), pp. 97–115; Koutrakos (2011), pp. 164–65; and Van Vooren (2012), pp. 209–10. 
3 For an overview of concluded MPs, see European Commission, “Global Approach to 
Migration and Mobility” (https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/ 
international-affairs/global-approach-to-migration_en). In more detail, see Carrera et al. 
(2012). 
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of ‘mobility’? For the purposes of this chapter, we will examine the MPs 
concluded with Cape Verde, Morocco and Moldova.  
These cases are selected as they present a relevant geographical variety 
across the east and the south. They also represent long-standing and well-
developed MPs, thus guaranteeing a minimum level of available information 
on implementation. In particular, Cape Verde and Moldova represented 
‘pilot’ MPs, thus meriting an evaluation at this point. Of course, in light of 
the foreseen length of this contribution, this does not constitute an in-depth 
audit or evaluation, but rather an attempt to sketch cross-cutting trends, 
dynamics and challenges. 
12.2 The implementation of Mobility Partnerships: From 
thinking to doing 
The analysis of the MPs with Cape Verde, Morocco and Moldova is based on 
the ‘scoreboards’ of projects that follow from the MP annexes. Except for the 
case of Moldova, these are not public documents, but they have been 
obtained through requests by the authors. To gain an in-depth 
understanding of the implementation of MPs, it is essential to look at the 
specific content of the projects being implemented.  
The number of projects varies widely from one MP country to another. 
The difference between the two pilot MPs is quite striking, with 75 
completed and 25 ongoing projects for Moldova in comparison with 28 
completed and 11 ongoing projects for Cape Verde. The MP with Morocco, 
which was concluded five years after the pilots, totals 10 completed and 62 
ongoing projects.  
Thematic trends in implementation  
MPs’ project topics are directly linked to the four pillars of the EU’s Global 
Approach to Migration (and Mobility, as added in 2011) (GAM(M)) and 
evolve according to existing policy orientations. 
The first pillar of the GAMM4 covers mobility, legal migration and 
integration. The notion of circular migration has been closely related to the 
                                                     
4 See European Commission, The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, 
COM(2011) 743 final, Brussels, 18.11.2011. 
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MP tool.5 Chou and Gibert (2012) argue that circular migration is at the heart 
of MPs. Circular migration was perceived as “an important shift in migration 
patterns” for countries of origin (GCIM, 2005, pp. 1, 31). The core of the 
debate on this issue related to labour and economic migration.6 Circular 
migration was considered to be the perfect approach to guarantee a win–
win–win situation (ibid., no. 16, p. 66). Ideally, receiving countries that 
needed workers would have access to foreign labour markets, thus filling 
their labour shortages thanks to legal labour-migration schemes. It should be 
noted that EU Member States maintain their competence over the volumes 
of labour migration and carefully guard this;7 therefore, MPs represent a way 
to circumvent the lack of EU competences in this matter.  
The issue of ‘legal migration’ in MPs can also be seen as the carrot 
favouring the negotiation of other acts, such as EU readmission agreements. 
Indeed, Member States can propose through MPs a whole set of initiatives, 
including migration, development and possibilities for legal migration, 
partly conceived as a counterbalance to the burden of a readmission 
agreement, especially where it includes a clause on third-country nationals.  
Even though it seems in the annex of the scoreboards that a significant 
number of projects are related to legal migration, an analysis of the content 
of these projects shows otherwise. MPs to date have not led to any real legal 
migration opportunities (Andrade et al., 2015; IOM, 2012, p. 10). Projects 
under the heading of “legal migration” mostly involve initiatives to inform 
migrants about legal migration channels to the EU or the dangers of irregular 
immigration.  
Cape Verde has 13 such projects, and almost half of the total projects 
proposed in the annex relate to legal migration. This goes in line with Cape 
Verdeans’ interests in favouring the mobility of their people and creating 
new channels for legal labour migration. In fact, 10 out of the 13 projects are 
related to “employment, management and facilitation of legal migration and 
integration”. These projects aim at meeting the following two aspirations: 
developing better legal migration opportunities for Cape Verdeans and 
                                                     
5 See European Commission, Circular migration and mobility partnerships between the 
European Union and third countries, COM(2007) 248 final, Brussels, 16 May 2007, 4. 
6 See European Commission, Policy Plan on Legal Migration, COM(2005) 669 final, 
Brussels, 21.12.2005, 1, 4. 
7 See Art. 79(5) TFEU; see also Andrade (2013), pp. 263–81 and Reslow (2012), pp. 223–
24. 
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informing potential migrants of possibilities and risks related to migration. 
Clearly the second aspiration has gotten the most attention.  
In the case of Cape Verde, Portugal and France proposed to promote 
the admission of certain groups of workers under specific legal schemes. In 
one project, Portugal proposes “the signing of a new Protocol on migration 
… extending the scope of the Protocol on temporary migration of Cape 
Verdean workers to work in Portugal”. France proposes to conclude a 
bilateral agreement on concerted management of migratory flows with Cape 
Verde, including opening up its labour market for specific activities. 
Compared with other countries, Moldova has a very high number of 
projects; over half of the implemented and ongoing projects come under this 
theme of mobility, legal migration and reintegration.  
Finally, in Morocco, this category of projects was the second most 
important (in the number of proposed projects, not in terms of the allocated 
budget) at the time of concluding the MP and it became the main category 
within which new projects were proposed later on.  
Concretely, none of these projects aim at developing new 
opportunities for legal migration from Morocco to Europe but instead aim at 
informing potential Moroccan migrants of the legal immigration channels 
and the risks of irregular migration. It is striking that relevant projects on 
legal migration are related to pre-existing deals or discussions at the bilateral 
level; they relegate MPs to ‘centralising’ the different initiatives without 
really offering further access to the EU labour market for third-country 
nationals. 
The second pillar focuses on irregular migration and trafficking in 
human beings. It is under this pillar that most of the projects have been 
implemented and new projects have been added after the conclusion of the 
MPs. This general trend is true for Cape Verde and Morocco. Both MPs make 
a direct reference to “the promotion of an effective readmission and return 
policy”, stressing the central importance of readmission agreements in MPs. 
Negotiating an EU Readmission Agreement (EURA) and a Visa Facilitation 
Agreement are part of the political commitment embedded in the MP. The 
case of Moldova is peculiar, as it had concluded a readmission agreement 
before the conclusion of the MP. Moreover, and linked to this, it has a lower 
share of projects in this category. 
The third pillar, “[p]romoting international protection and enhancing 
the external dimension of asylum policy”, is solely included in the MP with 
Morocco because at the time of concluding the MPs with Cape Verde and 
Moldova, only the GAMM existed. However, two projects related to 
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international protection were added to the scoreboards of Cape Verde and 
Moldova at a later stage. 
The fourth pillar encompasses “maximising the development impact 
of migration and mobility, migrants’ rights and the empowerment of 
migrants”. At first, the MP with Moldova was dedicated to the fight against 
irregular migration. But, with the conclusion of the first collection of projects, 
the focus shifted towards migration and development.8 Cape Verde is 
hoping to follow a similar pattern.9 The number of ‘migration and 
development’ projects quadrupled after the conclusion of the MP, becoming 
the main theme in terms of projects proposed. In the case of Morocco, 
migration and development has an average weight in terms of proposed 
projects (24 out of 115). 
Implementation dynamics  
Relations between the EU and the third country are often viewed as 
embedded in broader international relations, with instruments such as MPs 
putting forward an EU agenda of migration control that interplays with and 
at times influences cooperation on development aid, trade relations and visa 
policies.10 It is also assumed in much of the literature that MPs put more 
pressure on the third country than on participating Member States.11 Reslow 
(2012, pp. 323, 325) highlights the “take it or leave it” approach applied to 
the cases of Moldova, Cape Verde and Senegal, where the same MP text was 
unilaterally proposed by the EU to these third countries with little room for 
negotiation. One could assume that similar power structures persist during 
the implementation of the MP if the EU’s interest remains similar. In this 
case, the projects that are being implemented are largely influenced by the 
EU and Member States, as they are funding them. 
The notion of ‘reversed conditionality’ would nonetheless challenge 
this assumption. Some scholars have observed that conditionality can also 
be “reversed” and tie the EU more significantly to the interests of the third 
country (Cassarino, 2007, p. 179). In other words, the relations between 
different parties to an MP may be more dynamic than what is often assumed 
(Tittel-Mosser, forthcoming). In practice, the application of conditionality by 
                                                     
8 Interview, 26 October 2016, DG for Migration and Home Affairs, Brussels. 
9 Interview, 23 February 2016, Ministério das Relações Exteriores de Cabo Verde, Praia. 
10 See Carrera et al. (2016); Carrera et al. (2012); and Brocza and Paulhart (2015), pp. 1–2. 
11 See Carrera and Hernandez I Sagrera (2009), p. 321; Carrera and Hernández i Sagrera 
(2011); and Limam and Del Sarto (2015). 
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the EU has been limited regarding southern Mediterranean countries 
(Balfour, 2012, p. 16). It seems far from straightforward to actually 
implement such EU conditionality (Qadim, 2015, ch. 3). This can be 
explained by the difficulty for the EU to adopt a strong position towards 
countries with which further strategic cooperation is needed (Cassarino, 
2007, pp. 191–92). The increased reliance of the EU on third countries to 
address irregular migration and cooperation on border control has a price: 
third countries are gaining a strategic position that gives them the possibility 
to pose their own conditions to the EU and Member States.  
What this means concretely for implementation of the MPs is that the 
projects are not static over time, they rather change according to shifting 
interrelationships between the Commission, Member States and the third 
country involved. This translates into the Scoreboard continually changing, 
with different versions circulating. ‘Implementation’ of the MP is thus not a 
rational or linear process, and neither is the annex or Scoreboard a clear 
roadmap towards implementation (Den Hertog, 2016a, pp. 294, 298). 
12.3 The key element of (financial) accountability 
The sections above have given a brief overview of some of the 
implementation trends and dynamics of the MPs so far. It is important to 
recognise, however, that many questions and challenges persist related to 
the actual contribution these instruments make. There remains much work 
to be done, both within the EU institutions to monitor and evaluate the 
implementation of the MPs, and within academic research to gather 
evidence and develop understanding of the implementation trends and 
dynamics. 
It is surprising that many years into the MP endeavour there is no 
comprehensive overview or in-depth evaluation available that can form the 
basis for future engagement with third countries. Especially in light of the 
currently proposed and implemented ‘Compacts’ under the EU’s 
Partnership Framework,12 much could be learned from some of the pitfalls 
encountered in MP implementation.  
As the authors themselves have discovered in their research at the 
Commission, international organisations and in third countries, it is often a 
                                                     
12 See European Commission, Communication on establishing a new Partnership 
Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration, COM(2016) 
385 final, Strasbourg, 7.6.2016. 
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real challenge to obtain the relevant information on what the different 
funded projects under an MP have truly entailed or achieved. The multi-
stakeholder field makes it difficult to piece the different parts of the puzzle 
together, and hard to obtain an overview. There are assorted versions of the 
MP Scoreboards circulating, leading to the question of whether they can 
actually function as a coherent tool to steer or monitor implementation (Den 
Hertog, 2016a, p. 293).  
The European Court of Auditors completed a Special Report in 2016 
relating to the spending on migration under two external funding 
instruments: the (former) European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument and 
the thematic programme on migration and asylum under the Development 
Cooperation Instrument. The Court of Auditors similarly found that an 
overview of the funded actions was lacking, and that a proper evaluation 
was sometimes difficult in light of the limited or unclear information 
available.13  
Certainly, various useful projects have been completed and are 
underway today across the different MPs. For example, in the case of the 
EU–Morocco MP, the EU has funded a significant project (€10 million) with 
the aim of supporting Morocco’s new regularisation and integration policies. 
At the same time, and as mentioned above, the main emphasis remains on 
irregular migration. Across the funds studied by the European Court of 
Auditors, a similar emphasis was found.14 This would challenge the 
‘balanced’ approach set out by the GAMM. More importantly, however, we 
need more information on what exactly is funded and implemented, as the 
different categories and descriptions of projects are often vague or 
overlapping (or both). 
All of this points to the need for more (financial) accountability to 
enable a proper evaluation of MP implementation. In that regard, there is 
first of all an enhanced role to be played by the Commission itself, namely to 
devote more human and financial resources to monitoring and oversight of 
MP implementation, also at the delegation level. Second, the organisations 
implementing the MP projects, primarily international organisations and 
Member States’ agencies, have a crucial role to play as they have detailed 
information about the implementation activities. Third, the European 
                                                     
13 See European Court of Auditors, EU external migration spending in Southern 
Mediterranean and Eastern Neighbourhood countries until 2014, Special Report No. 9/2016, 
Luxembourg, 2016. 
14 Ibid., see figures 4 and 5 of the Special Report. 
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Parliament and the Court of Auditors could more actively monitor or 
commission analysis of MP implementation. 
12.4 Conclusions and the way forward 
This chapter shows that almost ten years into the MP endeavour, the level of 
implementation varies considerably among the different MPs concluded. 
This can partly be explained by the varying degree of political importance 
accorded to cooperation with a particular third country, as well as by the 
context and point in time at which the MP was concluded. Although this 
chapter does not constitute an in-depth comparative study, it is apparent that 
MP implementation shows divergent levels of importance accorded to the 
four thematic priorities of the GAMM.  
Most projects fall under the area of irregular migration, especially for 
the MPs concluded with Morocco and Cape Verde. This is consistent with 
the broader findings of the European Court of Auditors about EU external 
migration spending in the EU neighbourhood countries. This category also 
covers return and readmission – crucial priorities for the EU and its Member 
States in the cooperation with third countries. Projects on international 
protection feature primarily in the MP with Morocco, in line with Morocco’s 
own interests around its new migration policy (Den Hertog, 2016a). For Cape 
Verde and Moldova, this priority has limited salience in the MP projects. 
The migration and development pillar has gained more importance 
over the years of MP implementation. More research would be needed to 
understand better how the link between migration and development is 
framed and applied in these projects. There appears to be a greater tension 
in this EU policy field, where some recent approaches, such as that of the EU 
Trust Fund for Africa, suggest a shift towards development over migration, 
i.e. the ‘root causes’ approach (Den Hertog, 2016b).  
As the instruments we study here are called ‘Mobility’ Partnerships, it 
is surprising that the MPs have not created any serious mobility channels. 
There are a number of projects in this field, but they do not amount to 
creating such channels. It should be noted that Moldova has gone through 
the visa liberalisation dialogue and its citizens are now exempt from visa 
requirements for short-stay visits. We would also highlight that the 
implementation dynamics between the Commission, the Member States and 
third countries are shifting over time and that the implementation process is 
not static or unilaterally imposed or conditioned. This challenges a rational 
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or linear understanding of implementation – rather it is a continual back-
and-forth about priorities, resources and actors.  
There is a persistent need for more (financial) accountability in the MP 
implementation process. Specific project-level as well as overview data are 
often not publicly available and are difficult to obtain. A comprehensive, 
comparative and in-depth evaluation is crucial to understand how this key 
tool of EU external migration policy actually works. This is all the more 
important given the new approaches emerging in EU external migration 
policy that may risk falling into the pitfalls already encountered in the MP 
implementation process.  
In particular, the EU’s new Partnership Framework and its ‘Compacts’ 
with several third countries could benefit from a critical look at ‘what works’ 
and ‘what does not work’ in MP implementation. For example, the proposed 
compacts with African countries focus on return and readmission. The first 
progress reports indicate that cooperation on return and readmission 
remains difficult.15 From the MP implementation process, lessons could be 
learned about the productivity of putting these priorities front and centre 
vis-à-vis third countries.  
Moreover, a thorough evaluation of MP project implementation could 
inform the new funding instruments set up as a result of the ‘refugee crisis’, 
such as that in the EU Trust Fund for Africa in particular. The trend 
witnessed there towards larger projects managed more frequently by 
Member States’ agencies should be evaluated against the success of ‘large 
versus small’ projects, and implementation modalities and actors in the MPs.  
In light of these new instruments, the MPs are losing some of their 
salience as an instrument of EU external migration policy. That 
notwithstanding, in terms of implementation the MPs represent a tangible, 
albeit it varied, instrument in this field. Even though this chapter has 
highlighted that in implementation there is a lack of consistency, the MP 
does remain the instrument embedded in the four pillars of the GAMM. 
  
                                                     
15 See European Commission, Fourth Progress Report on the Partnership Framework 
with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration, COM(2017) 350 final, 
Strasbourg, 13.6.2017. 
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13. EU LEGAL MIGRATION POLICIES TOWARDS 
CHINA, INDIA, THE PHILIPPINES AND 
THAILAND: A STATISTICAL AND 
LEGAL APPRAISAL 
MARCO STEFAN 
13.1 Introduction 
Human mobility has progressively become an integral element of the 
external relations entertained by the EU with different (groups of) third 
countries. At the same time, the content of the external initiatives developed 
by the EU in order to regulate and manage transnational human mobility 
varies across different geographies, depending on substantive elements, 
which include the partners’ physical proximity to the EU, their 
socioeconomic and geopolitical outlooks, and international relations status 
vis-à-vis the Union and its Member States (Carrera et al., 2015). 
Most recently, external cooperation on legal migration (including 
visas, and the facilitation of economic, social and cultural investments of the 
diasporas) has focused on complementing and supporting the EU policy 
response to the increasing numbers of individuals moving from Africa, the 
Middle East and Central Asia, and heading towards Europe through often 
unsafe routes and irregular channels. In particular, the creation of regular 
migration channels is currently described as an essential incentive to be 
offered to a number of ‘priority third countries’ in exchange for their 
commitments in the fight against irregular migration.1 
Human mobility also constitutes a component of the EU’s relations 
with strategic partners and developing countries that are not directly 
associated with the so-called ‘migration and refugee crisis’. Cooperation on 
legal migration with largely populated and rapidly industrialising nations, 
such as China and India, as well as developing countries like the Philippines 
                                                     
1 See European Commission, Communication on establishing a new Partnership 
Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration, COM(2016) 
385 final, Strasbourg, 7.6.2016.  
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and Thailand, appears to be especially crucial from the perspective of 
addressing the mobility needs of third-country nationals (TCNs) and 
European citizens, attracting and retaining skills and talent, and fully 
reaping the benefits that the movement of persons can bring to both 
‘sending’ and ‘receiving’ societies. 
The present chapter reflects on how migration and mobility are 
currently incorporated into the EU’s relations with these Asian countries. 
First, it provides a statistical appraisal of the main migration and mobility 
patterns of Chinese, Indian, Filipino and Thai nationals towards Europe. 
More specifically, official migration statistics2 are used to describe the 
dynamics of these nationals’ mobility across the EU’s external borders, as 
well as the nature of and main reasons for their presence within the Member 
States’ territories. The statistical analysis will then be coupled with an 
assessment of the normative regimes currently regulating the conditions of 
entry and stay of TCNs travelling from China, India, the Philippines and 
Thailand. 
The statistical and legal appraisal will contribute to understanding of 
how inward mobility from major Asian sending countries is currently 
channelled through EU and national immigration laws and policies. 
Moreover, by developing an assessment of the wider framework for EU 
cooperation with the above-mentioned Asian countries, it will also be 
possible to assess the extent to which human mobility is actually fostered in 
the EU–Asia context. 
13.2 Main migration and mobility trends in the EU–Asia context  
The analysis of Eurostat statistics reveals that China, India, the Philippines 
and Thailand do not constitute a significant source of irregular migration to 
Europe. In 2015, the year that marked the peak of the so-called ‘EU migration 
crisis’, only 27,110 Chinese, Indian, Filipino and Thai nationals were found 
to have irregularly entered or stayed in the EU. This figure constitutes less 
than 1.3% of the total 2,136,055 irregular migrants apprehended in the 28 EU 
Member States throughout that year.  
                                                     
2 See Regulation (EC) No. 862/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 
July 2007 on Community statistics on migration and international protection and 
repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No. 311/76 on the compilation of statistics on 
foreign workers, OJ L 199/23, 31.7.2007. 
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Eurostat data also show that while the total number of irregular 
migrants apprehended in the EU saw a constant increase during 2012–15, the 
number of apprehended irregular migrants originating from China, India, 
the Philippines and Thailand remained mostly stable, and began to decrease 
from 2012 onwards (Table 13.1). The fact that these Asian countries have not 
been responsible for the sharp increase in irregular migration recently 
recorded in Europe (Figures 13.1 and 13.2) explains their exclusion from the 
group of ‘priority countries’ with which external cooperation on legal 
migration is currently deemed essential in order to address the most pressing 
issues of EU border control and migration management.3  
Table 13.1 Chinese, Indian, Filipino and Thai irregular migrants apprehended 
(2011–15) 
Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
C
h
in
e
se
 
n
a
ti
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n
a
ls
 Total 11,745 10,020 8,460 8,315 7,920 
< 14 years 285 280 275 335 315 
>14 to 17 years 70 60 80 50 50 
>18 to 34 years 5,965 4,755 4,075 3,785 3,645 
> 35 years  5,415 4,920 4,050 4,135 3,900 
       
In
d
ia
n
 
n
a
ti
o
n
a
ls
 Total 15,125 16,100 15,810 17,225 17,290 
< 14 years 305 350 440 1,010 1,060 
>14 to 17 years 230 210 210 255 245 
>18 to 34 years 10,415 11,380 10,845 11,400 10,645 
> 35 years  4,175 4,160 4,310 4,560 4,835 
       
F
il
ip
in
o
 
n
a
ti
o
n
a
ls
 Total 2,075 2,065 2,430 2,110 1,940 
< 14 years 40 50 50 70 75 
>14 to 17 years 10 10 5 15 20 
>18 to 34 years 885 835 910 675 640 
> 35 years 1,140 1,175 1,465 1,350 1,205 
 
      
T
h
a
i 
n
a
ti
o
n
a
ls
 
Total 630 550 535 685 560 
< 14 years 5 5 5 5 10 
>14 to 17 years 10 5 10 10 5 
>18 to 34 years 295 255 205 260 240 
> 35 years  320 290 315 410 305 
Source: Author’s compilation based on data provided by Eurostat. 
                                                     
3 See European Commission, COM(2016) 385 final (2016), op. cit. 
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Figure 13.1 Main citizenship of third-country nationals found to be irregularly 
present in the EU28 (2014–15) 
 
Data source: Eurostat. 
 
 
Figure 13.2 Main citizenship of third-country nationals found to be irregularly 
present in the EU28 (2012–13) 
 
Data source: Eurostat. 
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On the other hand, the current inclusion of China, India, the 
Philippines and Thailand in the Schengen visa ‘black list’4 suggests that these 
countries are still perceived as a source of irregular migration to the EU 
(Guild and Bigo, 2003, pp. 89–95). As a consequence, their nationals are 
subject to visa obligations and a series of prior checks on the purpose of their 
travel and personal capacity. 
The necessity for Chinese, Indian, Thai and Filipino nationals to 
undergo the documental, procedural and individual requirements set forth 
in the Schengen Visa Code5 (as interpreted and implemented locally by the 
individual Schengen states), entails a series of practical challenges for 
travellers. In China or India, for example, all Member States have consulates 
in the capital and a robust presence in other major cities, but applicants from 
rural areas still have to travel long distances if they wish to lodge a visa 
request. Also, the absence of clear criteria for the identification of the 
competent Member State’s consulate does not facilitate applicants who are 
planning to travel to several Member States on one visa.6 Submitting all of 
the required and supporting documents might prove challenging as well. In 
fact, the requirements often differ from consulate to consulate in the same 
third country, even when the travel purpose is the same. If the visa 
application is lodged for specific purposes, such as study and scientific 
research, additional documental evidence also needs to be produced.7 The 
lack of clearly defined eligibility criteria for Multi Entry Visas (MEVs), as 
well as the absence of a ‘coherent implementation’ of the Visa Code 
provisions on their issuance, are also likely to hamper the ease of travel to 
                                                     
4 See Council Regulation (EC) No. 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 listing the third countries 
whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and 
those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement, OJ L 81, 21.3.2001. 
5 Ibid. 
6 A positive exception is constituted by the indication that when the main Member State 
of destination of a group of Chinese tourists cannot be identified ex ante, it is the embassy 
or consular office of the first entry into the EU that is competent for assessing their visa 
applications. See the Memorandum of Understanding between the European 
Community and the National Tourism Administration of the People’s Republic of China, 
on visa and related issues concerning tourist groups from the People’s Republic of China 
(ADS). 
7 See Council Directive 2004/114/EC of 13 December 2004 on the conditions of admission 
of third-country nationals for the purpose of studies, pupil exchange, unremunerated 
training or voluntary service, OJ L 375, 23.12.2004; and Council Directive 2005/71/EC of 
12 October 2005 on a specific procedure for admitting third-country nationals for the 
purpose of scientific research, OJ L 289, 3.11.2005. 
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the EU. The fact that irregular migration from China, India, the Philippines 
and Thailand barely decreased over the past years might be explained in 
light of the persisting restrictive visa and labour migration policies applying 
to their citizens. 
If the EU’s enduring concerns about irregular migration from the 
countries considered generate obstacles for Asian nationals wishing to travel 
to Europe for reasons including tourism and business, the increasing 
numbers of Schengen visas issued over the last years to TCNs travelling from 
China, India, the Philippines and Thailand clearly reflects a rise in Asian 
demand for mobility. As Eurostat’s statistics show, these Asian countries are 
among those with the highest rates of Schengen visa applications and 
issuance (see Figure 13.3). Between 2013 and 2016, each of these Asian 
countries saw an increase in the number of Schengen visa (type C) 
applications and approvals. 
Figure 13.3 Ranking of third countries with the highest rates of Schengen visa 
applications and issuance (2015) 
 
Note: MEV refers to multi-entry visa. 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Eurostat statistics. 
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In this respect, it is also worth noting that during 2015, the rejection 
rates for Schengen visa applications submitted in these four Asian countries 
varied from a minimum of 2.8% of refused applications in China, to a 
maximum of 6.5% rejected in India. In comparative terms, these rates are 
noticeably lower than those recorded for applications submitted in countries 
from other regions, such as the southern Mediterranean and the Gulf, where 
higher rejection rates seem to be linked to the applicants’ failure to address 
Member States’ concerns about border security (Guild, 2010, pp. 367–84).  
As for the longer-term mobility trajectories of TCNs from China, India, 
the Philippines and Thailand, the collation of official data on the number of 
long-term national visas and residence permits granted to TCNs shows that 
Chinese and Indians are among the top five nationalities to have received a 
first residence permit in the EU during 2014: respectively 169,657, and 
134,881 (see Figure 13.4).  
Figure 13.4 First residence permit by nationality (2015) 
 
Data source: Eurostat. 
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However, a common negative trend emerges from the analysis of 
statistics on the overall number of residence permits granted to Chinese, 
Indian, Filipino and Thai citizens. During the past eight years, significant 
reductions can be observed, in particular with regard to the total number of 
residence permits granted to the Philippines’ nationals (which decreased 
from 50,612 in 2008 to 25,273 in 2015), and Thailand’s citizens (which went 
from 26,969 in 2008 to 18,939 in 2015).  
The number of permits granted to Indian nationals also fell over the 
same period, although in a considerably less consistent fashion (from 154,058 
in 2008, to 135,514 in 2015). The increase in the number of permits issued to 
Chinese nationals is mainly due to the positive trend in entries in the UK for 
education reasons. By contrast, an analysis of disaggregated data related to 
the permits issued to Chinese nationals by the remaining EU Member States 
reveals a reduction in the number of authorisations granted. 
External factors, such as the evolving legal framework and economic 
outlook of the Asian countries involved in the immigration processes, may 
contribute to shaping the immigration trends of Chinese, Indian, Filipino 
and Thai nationals (Niyomsilpa et al., 2014, pp. 35–61). At the same time, the 
substantial disparity between the volume of visas and residence permits 
granted indicates that, under the current EU and national immigration 
policies, authorisations for short-term visits are easier to obtain for Asian 
nationals than grants of more stable stays for reasons such as work, 
education and family reunification (see Table 13.2). 
Table 13.2 Comparative overview: Number of visas and residence permits issued 
(2013–15) 
 2013 2014 2015 
Visas Residence 
permits 
Visas Residence 
permits 
Visas Residence 
permits 
China 1,435,123 165,418 1,742,013 170,427 2,308,591 167,118 
 
India 659,038 200,748 529,367 136,056 487,686 135,514 
 
Philippines 124,071 107,501 117,787 35,058 104,775 27,057 
 
Thailand 246,025 23,595 209,737 18,763 215,932 21,352 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Eurostat and European Commission (DG HOME) 
statistics. 
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With regard to the impact of EU immigration law on the temporary 
mobility of Asian nationals, Eurostat statistics on the implementation of the 
Blue Card Directive show that, out of the 96 third-country nationalities 
concerned by the EU’s mobility scheme for highly skilled migrants in 2012, 
the top countries for the number of migrants attracted were India (699) and 
China (324), followed by the US (313), Russia (271) and Ukraine (149).8 
Despite increasing throughout 2013 and 2014, the numbers of Chinese and 
Indian nationals granted a Blue Card remained altogether low as a share of 
the total number of work permits issued by national authorities during the 
same year.  
13.3 Legal migration through external cooperation: Policy 
frameworks and related challenges 
A series of critical challenges emerge with regard to the substantive features 
of the EU’s external migration policies implemented towards China, India, 
the Philippines and Thailand. 
In the first place, no interregional framework is devoted to migration-
related matters between the EU and Asia. While migration issues were 
discussed on the occasion of the EU policy dialogue with the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),9 an overarching regional forum focusing 
on EU–Asia migration and bringing together EU and Asian countries is still 
lacking. At the bilateral level, the analysis of the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) currently in place between the EU and 
China, India and the Philippines respectively indicates that binding 
international agreements do not currently represent the instruments through 
which cooperation on legal migration is fostered in the EU’s relations with 
its Asian partners. To the contrary, the absence of relevant developments in 
the negotiations on a ‘second-generation’ PCA with China (Zhang, 2014), the 
limited scope of cooperation in the field of human mobility in the new EU–
China Investment Agreement (Ewert, 2016), and the deadlock in EU–India 
                                                     
8 See European Commission, Communication on the implementation of Directive 
2009/50/EC on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the 
purpose of highly qualified employment, COM(2014) 287 final, Brussels, 22.5.2014. 
9 See the EU–ASEAN Policy Dialogue on Human Rights, Brussels, 23 October 2015 
(https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/5980/eu-asean-
policy-dialogue-on-human-rights_fr). 
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discussions on the new Broad-based Trade and Investment Agreement 
suggest that this approach is not set to change in the foreseeable future. 
To date, no Visa Facilitation Agreement (VFA) has been concluded 
between the EU and the Asian countries considered. The possibility to 
conclude a VFA with India is foreseen in the Common Agenda on Migration 
and Mobility (CAMM) that the EU recently signed with that country.10 The 
reference to visa facilitation therein included responds to the partner’s 
repeated requests for a relaxation of the rules governing the entry of Indian 
nationals into Europe, and for the development of further people-to-people 
contacts with the EU. Still, the actual negotiation and conclusion of a VFA 
with India will depend on the acceptance and willingness of India’s 
authorities to cooperate on preventing and combatting irregular migration. 
On the Chinese side, the recent signing of the agreement introducing a visa 
waiver for Chinese and EU diplomats, and the opening of the second phase 
of the Mobility and Migration Dialogue, are referred to as ‘concrete steps’ 
towards visa facilitation, and are expected to constitute an incentive towards 
further negotiation. However, the Union seems to be mainly concerned with 
capitalising on such progress to foster commitments by the Chinese 
authorities on the readmission of their nationals who are found to be 
irregularly present on EU territory. 
Thus, it seems that the main function of the quasi-legal, political and 
diplomatic (non-legally binding) instruments designed to develop external 
cooperation on migration and human mobility with China and India is to 
persuade the strategic partners to interlink cooperation on legal migration 
with the advancement of the EU’s readmission agenda. This is despite the 
fact that these countries do not represent a source of irregular migration to 
the EU, and that the rates of successful return of TCNs from China, India, the 
Philippines and Thailand are higher than those recorded on average for the 
overall population of irregular migrants apprehended on the Member States’ 
territory and issued an order to leave the EU. 
In the absence of visa facilitation agreements concluded at the EU level, 
several visa facilitation schemes have been activated between individual 
Member States and Asian countries, including India, China and the 
Philippines. These relaxed visa schemes target specific categories of 
                                                     
10 See the Joint Declaration on a Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility between 
India and the European Union and Its Member States, 29 March 2016 
(www.mea.gov.in/Images/attach/Migration_and_Mobility_between_India_and_the_
European_Union.pdf). 
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‘legitimate’ Asian travellers, such as Chinese tourists, highly skilled Indian 
workers, and Filipino and Chinese seafarers. These facilitation schemes 
reflect the highly selective approach of legal migration policy towards the 
Asian partners considered. A similar approach emerges with regard to the 
Commission’s latest proposal for the amendment of the Schengen Visa 
Code.11 The proposal envisages the introduction of mandatory criteria for 
granting a multi-entry visa to applicants whose data are already registered 
in the Visa Information System, and who have previously lawfully used at 
least two visas within the past 12-month period. Despite responding to the 
declared objective of facilitating movement for frequent travellers, the 
Commission’s initiative seems to mainly target applicants who already 
benefit from the possibility of travelling to the EU. 
13.4 Conclusions and recommendations  
The promotion of human mobility represents an important factor for the 
EU’s social and economic development (Peschner and Fotakis, 2013, pp. 28–
30). It also constitutes a key objective of the EU’s legal migration policy and 
one of the ‘pillars’ of its external migration policy under the framework of 
the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM). However, when 
looking at the ways in which EU law and policies regulate the movement of 
persons in the EU–Asia context, a series of critical challenges and 
shortcomings emerge. 
Regardless of the limited numbers of irregular migrants apprehended 
in the EU originating from China, India, the Philippines and Thailand, the 
main EU concern is still to prevent irregular migration. While security 
considerations currently affect the Schengen visa regime applying to the 
nationals of these Asian countries, the numbers of Schengen visa 
applications and authorisations issued to Chinese, Indian, Filipino and Thai 
nationals reflect an increasing demand for regular migration to the EU. 
Nevertheless, the ways in which EU and Member State visa and legal 
migration policies are designed and implemented towards the nationals of 
these Asian countries reflect a selective and utilitarian approach.  
Visa facilitation is granted in a highly discretionary way, and only 
targets tourists with high purchasing power and other predefined categories 
of legitimate travellers (i.e. for business and intra-corporate transfers) who 
                                                     
11 See European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council for a Union Code on Visas, COM(2014) 164 final, Brussels, 1.4.2014. 
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are economically valuable for the EU. Very little or no consideration is given 
to the individual motivations for travelling to the EU. Indeed, the striking 
difference between the limited number of residence permits issued to 
applicants from China, India, the Philippines and Thailand, and the volume 
of Schengen visas issued to the nationals of these countries, reveals that 
short-term mobility trajectories are broadly preferred to longer-term 
mobility schemes. 
Also, the promotion of human mobility does not emerge as a priority 
to be pursued through the external cooperation instruments framing EU 
relations with these Asian countries. To the contrary, the EU’s main external 
efforts in the field of migration have been directed at finding the right 
interlocutors who could be persuaded to cooperate with the EU on its 
readmission agenda. Even in the relations with strategic partners such as 
China and India, EU visa facilitation prospects are systematically linked to 
commitments required in the fight against irregular migration, namely in the 
areas of readmission and return. The fact that the EU mainly frames external 
cooperation on migration with these countries in terms of border control and 
(irregular) migration management is confirmed by the scant or no 
consideration currently given to the promotion of EU citizens’ mobility in 
China, India, the Philippines and Thailand. 
The development of deeper and more comprehensive people-to-
people contacts and the creation of new channels for regular migration could 
be envisaged instead, also through the EU’s external action. The objection 
that the EU only has limited legal competence to act is only partially valid. 
In the relations entertained with other (groups of) third countries, human 
mobility issues are dealt with in a set of provisions that are included in 
legally binding international agreements (the Association Agreements 
concluded with Morocco, Tunisia, Georgia and Moldova, etc.), which have 
direct and indirect legal effects.  
Through the development of cooperation on matters including the 
promotion of non-discrimination on the ground of nationality for Chinese, 
Indian, Filipino and Thai workers, the EU could well make use of its legal 
competences and contribute to facilitating the mobility and integration of 
Asian nationals in the Member States. This would also be in line with the 
objectives of the UN’s New York Declaration on Refugees and Migrants of 
September 2016, which highlights the importance of developing regular and 
fair channels (‘legal pathways’) for economic migration at all skill levels. 
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14. MIGRATION IN A GLOBALISED WORLD: 
INDIA’S EXPERIENCE 
NEELAM D. SABHARWAL 
14.1 Introduction 
The movement of people from one place to another, be it within a country or 
internationally, has been part of the growth and evolution of societies. It has 
gained salience in today’s globalising world with the transformation of 
countries into knowledge-based economies, the circulation of knowledge, its 
appropriation and use for production, the internationalisation of capital and 
uneven economic development. Migration according to this perspective is 
determined by the obstacles to development that are associated with such a 
global economic system and its uncertainties and opportunities. The 
improved transportation and communication links have further accelerated 
the movement of people across political boundaries. Human mobility in this 
globalised world is thus about political, economic and cultural contexts and 
social conditions, personal choices for education prospects and professional 
exposure. 
14.2 An alternative perspective 
A distinguishing characteristic of the present wave of migration is the 
mobility of highly skilled human resources from developing countries to 
industrialised countries as a powerful vehicle for boosting growth in both 
countries of origin and destination. This has brought a paradigm shift in 
perceptions of the positive effects of skilled migration and thus the 
phenomenon of migration as a positive and dynamic process (Tejada et al., 
2014). Governments are increasingly recognising migration as a productive 
asset in innovation and development, and the need to adopt appropriate 
policies to facilitate the international mobility of people. 
The discourse on migration has hitherto ignored the benefits of 
educated and skilled workers, student migration, and the financial resources 
for the developed countries. It tends to focus mainly on the gains for the 
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sending countries, through remittances and return migration with enhanced 
skills (‘brain gain’). The stereotype sees migration as a sign of crisis in 
situations of armed conflict, social and political turmoil, and economic 
hardship. Such migrants tend to be seen as intruders cutting into the national 
resources of the destination countries, whereas migrants usually fill 
vacancies where there are recognised skill shortages. Indeed, the post-
Second World War period of rapid economic growth in Western economies 
saw an increased trend in south–north migration. However, according to 
Didar Singh and Irudaya Rajan (2016), 
[d]ata in recent World Migration Reports shows that nearly 60% of 
all global migration takes place within the developed world and 
40% within the developing countries. International migrants do not 
always originate in the poorest countries but from developing 
economies following structural transformation, environmental 
changes, and the resultant displacement creates sections of mobile 
population which [migrate] internally and internationally.  
14.3 Migration as a global phenomenon 
This phenomenon is not faced by the developed world alone. The political, 
ethnic and religious conflicts in various regions have confronted many 
countries with an influx of migrants. Take India’s case, which receives 2.3% 
of the world’s migration (UNDESA, 2013), with an estimated total of 5.4 
million international migrants, ranked at eighth position in the list of 
migrant-receiving countries (UNDESA, 2009). Immigration in India is 
mostly a regional phenomenon from neighbouring countries because of 
contiguous and largely porous borders, and cultural and linguistic affinities 
(Khadria, 2009). Unofficially, the figures may be twice as much going by 
reports of daily issuance of nearly a thousand visas to Bangladeshis alone 
and free movement from Nepal under a bilateral agreement. At the time 
Bangladesh was created in 1971, ten million refugees migrated to West 
Bengal in India. There are still close to two million refugees from Tibet, Sri 
Lanka, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Myanmar residing in India. 
14.4 Salience of migration in development 
It is therefore not surprising that the movement of people across national 
borders is increasingly emerging as a key issue in the conversation on 
development. This was foreshadowed by the well-known economist, Jagdish 
Bhagwati (1999), when he advanced the argument that “if global 
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development was dominated by the movement of goods in the nineteenth 
century and by the movement of capital in the twentieth century, the 
development imperatives of the twenty first century will be dominated by 
the movement of people across national borders”. Yet, while trade and 
capital flows have seen liberalisation, the movement of people has been 
constrained by geopolitical factors. 
14.5 Temporary labour migration: A flawed system in need of 
reform 
What then could be the way ahead? Battistella in his chapter in this book 
draws our attention to the temporary labour migration system as a choice 
that migrants have taken and a policy that countries have adopted. He 
mentions the precedent in the traditional countries of immigration – the US, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand – which developed temporary labour 
migration arrangements, targeting highly skilled workers or agricultural 
workers, sometimes including conversion into permanent residence status. 
Western European countries also experimented with variants of temporary 
labour migration. Belgium, France, Switzerland and the UK began such short 
duration programmes in the mid-20th century followed by Germany, Austria 
and the Netherlands. These continued until the 1970s and comprised many 
small-scale, often seasonal, project-tied workers, trainees and border 
commuters. Some continue while others have been abandoned. The objective 
of these programmes was to ensure a rotation of workers, restrict their rights 
and limit family reunion. By using these arrangements, the countries were 
importing labour and not migrants. 
Temporary labour migration has been recommended by global and 
competent UN institutions as a successful model that maximises the benefits 
for countries of destination, countries of origin and the migrants themselves. 
But this model could not stand scrutiny in Battistella’s analysis in chapter 2 
of case studies and experience of temporary immigrant labour in Asian 
economies. He finds it flawed and has reached the conclusion that the flaws 
are inherent in the system. He argues that the foremost flaw in temporary 
labour migration is that the temporariness of labour migration deprives the 
migrants of some fundamental rights and denies them the opportunity to 
accumulate social benefits. The objective of ensuring that migrants do not 
become permanent residents because the local societies are not willing to 
incorporate cultural minorities reduces migrants to labour providers. 
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14.6 Changing socioeconomic dynamics: Demand for highly 
skilled migrants 
The policies of temporary labour migration with all their flaws may have 
worked as they were designed to recruit low-skilled workers, whereas today 
the demand for immigrants in the EU is for highly skilled workers, due to 
slowing economic growth, the ageing of the population, growing 
competition for skilled resources and the need to regulate migration. 
According to Eurostat (in 2012),1 all Member States of the EU are facing the 
problem of ageing, which is expected to continue for at least another 50 
years. The share of people aged over 65 is expected to increase from 17.1% 
to 30.0% by 2060, when the declining ratio of the working population will 
leave two working people (compared with four in 2008) for every EU citizen 
aged 65 or older (Gupta, 2013). 
14.7 Circular migration: A variant of temporary labour migration 
Recognising the potential benefits of skilled migrants, the EU and its 
Member States have adopted migratory policies to facilitate international 
skilled migration over the last few years. These have included legislative 
measures, Mobility Partnerships and bilateral agreements. The central 
principle is the concept of ‘circular migration’, formulated in 2007. In 
essence, it is a form of temporary migration as opposed to permanent 
settlement of migrants to ensure the rotation of workers and social cohesion 
of developed countries (Khadria, 2011). 
In the absence of a pan-European, harmonised migration policy, the 
term means different things to different EU countries. Some are prepared to 
give circular migration rights to highly skilled migrants, while others feel the 
idea is best suited to seasonal migrants in the agricultural, construction and 
hospitality sectors. A number of experiments have been conducted by 
different Member States, such as Germany’s seasonal workers programme, 
Spain and Colombia’s temporary and circular migration model, the ‘Blue 
Bird’ pilot programme in the Netherlands (2009) to involve semi-skilled 
migrants, the issuance of ‘golden visas’ by the UK and Portugal, Latvia’s 
immigrant investor visa, ‘fast-track citizenship’ in Cyprus and the 
indefinitely delayed ‘instant citizenship’ scheme in Malta. 
                                                     
1 See Eurostat, The EU in the World 2013 – A Statistical Portrait, Luxembourg: Publications 
Office of the European Union, November 2012. 
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The EU-wide Blue Card (which excludes Denmark, Ireland and the 
UK) for entry and residence for highly skilled employment aimed to 
establish common criteria and a fast-track procedure for issuing residence 
and work permits, based on the US Green Card. However, it met with a 
dismal fate, with only 13,852 work permits issued, of which 87% were 
granted by Germany.2 It was originally proposed in 2007 and finally opened 
for application in 2012, only to be withdrawn shortly thereafter. In June this 
year, there were again reports from Brussels of EU plans to revive the Blue 
Card visa system and of voters’ concerns over allowing a greater level of 
immigration. 
14.8 India’s emergence as a major source of workforce 
India has emerged as one of the major sources of the global workforce in the 
21st century. Its experience as a country with the second largest diaspora, 
estimated at around 25 million, has seen a dramatic transition over the last 
two centuries, from forced migration of thousands of Indians as indentured 
labour to the colonies to meet the demand–supply gap in the plantation 
economies of the Caribbean, the Indian Ocean, South and Southeast Asia, 
Africa and the Pacific in late 19th and early 20th centuries, to voluntary 
migration to the metropolitan centres of the Commonwealth in the middle 
of the 20th century. This was followed on the one hand by movement of 
skilled technical professionals and students to the US and Europe, and on 
the other hand by the emigration of low- and semi-skilled Indians to the oil-
rich Gulf countries, in the last three decades of the 20th century. 
Since the turn of the century, India has drawn worldwide attention for 
the migration of knowledge workers and IT professionals to developed 
countries, radically transforming the image of the Indian diaspora in the 
West. The huge success story of the Silicon Valley and profile of Indian 
immigrants in the US, UK, Canada and Australia validates the assumption 
that the mobility of human capital through the migration of a highly skilled 
diaspora and matching migratory policies are interlinked processes best 
addressed by a holistic approach. 
                                                     
2 See Eurostat, “EU Blue Cards by type of decision, occupation and citizenship” 
(http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_resbc1). 
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14.9 Movement of Indians to the EU: A recent phenomenon 
Migration from India to the EU has not been particularly significant except 
to some Member States and in a few sectors. Two-thirds of the EU-based 
Indian diaspora resides in the UK and is one of the best-educated and 
highest-earning groups. More Indians have started looking to mainland 
Europe since the EU and its Member States have introduced policies to 
facilitate inward migration of skilled professionals. Although the movement 
is taking place to both the old and new EU Member States, a relatively 
significant and stable presence of the Indian diaspora is mainly found in 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and Belgium. The signing of a 
bilateral social security agreement with some EU countries has also been an 
encouraging development. Nevertheless, labour mobility restrictions and 
complex procedures for visas and work permits continue to deter easy 
movement to the EU even though India is a priority source country for 
tapping skilled immigrants from among non-EU countries. 
India–EU dialogue to address issues on the movement of people has 
been underway since 2000. A regular, comprehensive and structured 
dialogue on migration issues has been on the agenda of the bilateral summits 
since 2012. Both sides have the shared objective to promote legal migration, 
discourage illegal migration and work together in the area of migration and 
development. In March 2016, at the 13th India–EU summit in Brussels a 
Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility (CAMM), the first of its kind, 
was signed for better organising and promoting regular migration at 
relevant skill levels and fostering well-managed mobility, including 
enhanced issuance of visas. 
The establishment of the CAMM reflects the importance of India as a 
strategic partner of the EU in the field of migration and mobility. As a 
framework of cooperation, the CAMM is the start of a longer-term process 
that will lead to deeper cooperation and solid mutual engagement on 
migration, a key global policy area. Both sides, through a regular dialogue, 
will explore areas of concrete cooperation to exchange and compare 
information and statistics on labour and other regular migration flows and 
to enhance the efficiency and security of respective procedures for entry, 
residence and registration, while building the legal and administrative 
capacity to manage and monitor migration. They will also explore 
possibilities for attracting highly skilled workers, scientists and technologists 
under both circular migration and long-term visas, for enhanced mobility 
and exchange of business persons, students and researchers. 
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India reiterated its commitment to cooperate in facilitating the return 
of irregular migrants on the establishment of nationality by the competent 
authority and to seek to make the process swifter and more efficient. In 
practice, this concerns a negligible number of such migrants, and systems 
have been continually upgraded for verification procedures right down to 
the local level. The decision to merge the Ministry of Overseas Affairs with 
the Ministry of External Affairs in January 2016 is an indication of the high 
degree of importance attributed to issues concerning legal migration and the 
welfare of overseas Indians, and to building a good image of India through 
their skills, industry and ability to assimilate well in host countries. 
14.10 Mismatch of approaches 
Although human mobility and the emigration of skilled professionals from 
developing countries is not a new phenomenon, it is never free of tensions 
due to the mismatch in the approaches of the source countries and the 
immigration policies of the host countries. The migrant expects stability of 
employment and an opportunity to settle down, with a view to improving 
his or her socioeconomic condition. The developed countries, viewing it as a 
short-term strategy to alleviate labour shortages, take a restrictive approach 
and would only like to promote temporary migration, discourage permanent 
residence, avoid disturbing existing patterns of society and project return 
migration as beneficial to the sending side. The uncertainties and 
cumbersome procedures for yearly renewal of work permits allowing only 
up to a maximum of four years end up in skilled migrants moving on to third 
countries. 
Paradoxically, the socioeconomic dynamics in the destination 
countries that require migratory policies to facilitate the entry of such skilled 
workers also compel restrictive, discretionary and shifting policies, 
impeding the objective of rectifying skill shortages. The complexities in 
Europe are compounded by several contradictory forces at play at the same 
time. On one hand are the eurozone’s problems of stagnation and 
unemployment, while on the other hand are developments in neighbouring 
regions that bring waves of refugees and economic migrants and raise fears 
of unmanageable migration pressures on Europe, which are creating the 
opposite reaction. 
A well-considered, long-term migration policy – offering stability to 
the skilled migrants and consistent with Europe’s own philosophy and its 
commitment to human rights – for the free movement of people is needed to 
126  NEELAM D. SABHARWAL 
successfully harness the gains of skilled migrants as carriers of social capital 
and as a factor of production to contribute to innovation, development and 
economic competitiveness in the host countries. 
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15. TRADE AND MIGRATION LINKAGES IN EU 
EXTERNAL MIGRATION POLICIES: RELIEF, 
ROOT-CAUSE REDUCTION OR RIGHTS 
PROTECTION? 
MARION PANIZZON 
15.1 Introduction 
Global regulation of various cross-border issue areas, including climate 
change, cultural diversity and human rights, is challenging because a 
consensus cannot be reached on the core issues, at least not in a first step 
(Cassese, 2016). Issue linkage to other policy categories, or put differently 
“embedding” into a related but more “mature” regulatory area, is one recipe 
for creating the bargaining space for gathering a global alliance before 
addressing, in a subsequent step, the hot topic (Betts, 2011).  
This chapter looks at how the current crisis has transformed the trade 
and migration linkage from a target of perpetual criticism over 
commodifying migrants by undermining their rights (Hafner-Burton, 2005; 
Cholewinski and Taran, 2010) to becoming a humanitarian crisis-
intervention mechanism that maximises compliance with non-refoulement 
guarantees and the right to asylum.  
Since the massive movement of refugees and migrants starting with 
the Arab Spring and culminating in the Syrian displacement crisis, the EU 
has for the first time used its flexibility under its Generalised System of 
Preferences (GSP)1 to lower export tariffs on goods produced in key transit 
                                                     
1 The GSP is one of the areas of flexibility towards developing countries foreseen by the 
GATT as part of the various ‘special and differential treatment’ regimes that the WTO 
codifies in its different agreements (the GATT, the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS) and the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) to help 
developing countries adjust to the WTO multilateral trading system. See WTO, 
“Differential and more favourable treatment reciprocity and fuller participation of 
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countries with refugee labour according to the enabling clause of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).2 It has done so to compensate such 
first-asylum countries outside Europe for their disproportionally high 
intakes of refugees and migrants, despite resettlement efforts by the UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) towards effective burden-
sharing. In the EU Association Agreement with Jordan, the so-called Jordan 
Compact,3 the EU pioneered an advanced use of its GSP to ‘downgrade’ 
Jordan from GSP+ to GSP Everything-but-Arms (EBA) status, which in terms 
of export tariff rates is an ‘upgrade’ as it justifies an even lower tariff 
treatment than the GSP+ scheme, as a qualifying exemption from the Most-
Favored Nation Treatment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Art. I 
GATT). The decision by the Council of the European Union on Jordan4 thus 
compensates, through trade conditionality, for the high intake of Syrian 
refugees, and the European Commission has expanded the scheme together 
with the European Investment Bank, the World Bank and the British 
government, to Ethiopia this year. 
Yet, tying the lowering of tariffs on exports to refugee employment 
might exacerbate the “chilling effect” on human rights, which the former UN 
Special Rapporteur on Human Rights has associated with trade agreements 
(Crépeau and Atak, 2016), as it comes at the cost of substandard labour 
rights.5 In addition, the coupling of trade to refugee employment is linked to 
                                                     
developing countries” (www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/enabling1979_e.htm). 
The GSP only exists for trade in goods, where it is justified by the GATT enabling clause. 
2 See the Decision of 28 November 1979 (L/4903) on Differential and More Favourable 
Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries adopted under 
the GATT. 
3 Ibid. 
4 See Council Decision (EU) 2016/2310 of 17 October 2016 on the position to be taken on 
behalf of the European Union within the Association Council set up by the Euro-
Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European 
Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan, of the other part, as regards the adoption of EU–Jordan Partnership Priorities, 
including the Compact, OJ L 345, 20.12.2016, pp. 50–52. 
5 See European Commission, Proposal for a Council Decision on the position to be 
adopted, on behalf of the European Union, in the Association Committee established by 
the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European 
Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan, of the other part, as regards an amendment to Protocol 3 to that Agreement 
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the further commitment by the first-asylum country to cooperate on 
preventing irregular secondary movement of refugees to the EU. Such a 
linkage might negatively impact on the right to leave (Art. 13(2) of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights), since this commitment might be 
implemented through restrictive residency requirements for Syrian refugees 
and close-knit integrated border management, which risk violating the 
refugees’ right to leave the first-asylum country for onward journeys to their 
country of choice.6 Nonetheless, because of the powerful dynamics it 
triggers, issue linkage thus has the potential to overcome the “fragmented” 
(Chétail, 2016), “piecemeal” approach (Opeskin et al., 2012) dividing 
migration law and policy. 
Drawing on the case of the Jordan Compact, we show how trade 
preferences compensate for refugee employment, but also for cooperation by 
Jordan to prevent secondary movement to the EU, whereas with other source 
countries, the EU GSP+ compensates for cooperating with the EU over 
readmissions of third-country nationals – notably Georgia and Algeria.  
This chapter proposes that EU GSP trade preferences, in addition to 
being tied to standards on the environment, labour and corruption, are also 
tied to refugee protection standards, e.g. non-refoulement, in the cases of 
Ethiopia, Tunisia, Lebanon, Jordan and further countries with high intakes 
from Syria or the Horn of Africa. 
Tying such preferences to respect for international standards of non-
refoulement and the right to asylum might prevent a race to the bottom and 
enhance the protection of Syrian refugees employed in Jordan or Somali 
refugees in Ethiopia from being sent back to unsafe third countries.  
This chapter contributes to understanding about how trade and 
migration linkages have transformed with the refugee and migration crisis, 
and explores the potential for a self-standing chapter of the Global Compact 
on Migration.7 In the spotlight is how the linkage has gone from one of 
                                                     
concerning the definition of the concept of ‘originating products’ and methods of 
administrative cooperation, COM(2016) 403 final, Brussels, 16.6.2016. 
6 See the UN Human Rights Council, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human 
rights of migrants on the impact of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements on the 
human rights of migrants”, A/HRC/32/40, 4 May 2016. 
7 As has been discussed concerning deaths at sea off the coast of West Africa, and 
implying that Senegal’s cooperation with the EU’s externalisation of border control 
might hinder safe and regular journeys and be interpreted as a barrier to the right to 
leave. 
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“commodifying” the human rights of migrant workers as an indirect 
consequence of trade liberalisation (Cholewinski and Taran, 2010; Hafner-
Burton, 2005) to trade offering a ‘humanitarian’ relief mechanism by 
facilitating refugee employment. It closes by suggesting that the EU GSP+ 
and EBA schemes might even become key guarantees against backsliding 
over non-refoulement. 
15.2 The EU as a ‘linkage machine’ 
The EU has been a key driver of issue linkage in both external migration and 
trade policy. For one, the European Commission’s DG for Trade has a track 
record of issue linkage, using the GATT 1994 Enabling Clause to relax tariffs 
and rules of origin with a view to preventing backsliding over three main 
areas of international production standards: environmental (e.g. the Kyoto 
and Cartagena protocols, and the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change), corruption and labour. It either embeds such linkages in EU 
association agreements (AAs) (e.g. with Tunisia and Georgia), or 
incentivises, as of 2016, 14 of its trading partners8 – outside a formal AA or 
trade agreement – to adhere to these various UN conventions, including also 
those on combatting drug trafficking, forced labour and torture (Guatemala, 
Pakistan, Panama and Peru).9  
Second, EU external dimension of migration policy has also been an 
active ‘linkage machine’, conditioning the benefit of visa waivers on 
concluding EU-wide readmission agreements, including on third-country 
nationals (Trauner and Kruse, 2008). In the Eastern Neighbourhood (and in 
the EU–Turkey Statement of 2015), the European Commission has regularly 
offered such a package, but not towards African, Caribbean or Pacific 
countries so far.10 As a norm entrepreneur of linkage techniques, within 
                                                     
8 A working group on trade and migration will be set up to facilitate the negotiations 
towards the global compact on regular, safe and orderly movement to be adopted at the 
Paris intergovernmental conference by the end of 2017. 
9 On 28 January 2016, the Commission published its first bi-annual report to the European 
Parliament and the Council on the effects of the reformed GSP. 
10 Regulation No. 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 
2012 (OJ L 301/1), applicable since 1 January 2014, is the EU’s new GSP regulation. It 
includes a list of products that are globally sufficiently competitive to be exempted from 
EU GSP support. It codifies the EU GSP, which grants developing countries relaxed tariff 
(GSP+) or zero duties (Everything but Arms) on their exports to the EU to enhance 
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justice and home affairs the EU features various ‘package deals’, including 
EU Mobility Partnerships, action plans under the European Neighbourhood 
Policy and AAs, which have been criticised as exacerbating rather than 
alleviating asymmetries (Reslow, 2015), because of their frequently 
“haphazard” connection to often contradictory policies (Collyer, 2016). A 
peak of packaging solutions was triggered by the Syrian displacement crisis, 
which calls for a “multi-policy” angle, rather than a single issue-based 
solution (Carrera et al., 2015, p. 18) as formally endorsed by the Valletta 
summit of 201511 and the ensuing European Agenda on Migration of 2015 
and the Migration Partnership Framework of 201612 and its progress reports. 
The third such report called for “refocusing other policy tools”, i.e. to “take 
advantage of preferential trade agreements” to provide job opportunities for 
Syrian refugees.13 
15.3 Linkages in global migration governance 
Among the many linkages shaping global migration governance, including 
those to education, development and investment (Betts, 2011; Koslowski, 
2008), trade delivers the most long-term livelihood opportunities.14 Trade, 
similar to development aid, creates “opportunities” to lift countries out of 
poverty, disaster and political strife, and eventually reduces migration flows 
(Sutherland Report, 2017).15 Compared with the migration and development 
                                                     
economic growth by facilitating access to the EU’s single market. The GSP+ scheme 
conditions the duty-free, quota-free rate applicable to developing country EU trading 
partners on their commitment to sustainable development and good governance, among 
other international standards. 
11 Art. 13 of the Cotonou Agreement on readmission of EU and African, Caribbean and 
Pacific nationals does not link to any compensatory measure by the EU. 
12 See European Commission, Communication on establishing a new Partnership 
Framework for third countries under the European Agenda on Migration, COM(2016) 
385 final, Strasbourg, 7.6.2016. 
13 Ibid. 
14 See the UN Sustainable Development Goals, 2030 Agenda, item 10.7; EU Agenda on 
Migration of 2015, p. 2, and the (UN) New York Declaration of September 2016, p. 7. 
15 See the Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European 
Council and the Council, Third Progress Report on the Partnership Framework with 
third countries under the European Agenda on Migration, COM(2017) 205 final, 
Brussels, 2.3.2017. 
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nexus,16 trade and migration builds on the notion of reciprocity implicit in 
the premise of a “level playing field” (Hoekman, 1998).  
Flexibility in the WTO’s special and differential treatment under the 
enabling clause of GATT has been drawn upon by EU preferential trade 
agreements to incentivise cooperation on combatting the trafficking of drugs 
and terrorism, and more recently (in Georgia in 2016) have been tied to 
soliciting cooperation on preventing irregular migration and on 
readmissions. Such a “defensive” use of trade conditionality creates a level 
playing field among trading partners on internationally agreed labour, 
environmental and cultural standards, and prevents a race to the bottom 
over “non-trade issue[s]” (Milewicz et al., 2016) that cause a competitive 
disadvantage for the other trading partner.  
The UN’s New York Declaration of 19 September 2016, the Sutherland 
Report of February 2017 and the EU’s Agenda on Migration of 2015, in a 
turnaround from the reluctant narrative of the Global Approach to Migration 
and Mobility (GAMM),17 outline the benefits of linking migration to trade in 
goods and services. Earlier criticism linked to the “commodification” of 
migrants coming out of liberalising the movement of natural persons in the 
WTO have subsided (Guild and Grant, 2016; Martin, 2016). With the crisis 
becoming “protracted”,18 the EU has introduced an even more far-reaching 
linkage, one between trade in goods and refugee employment, bypassing the 
repeated declaration of the WTO/GATS that “migration” ought to remain 
outside WTO jurisdiction (Carzaniga, 2008).19 
                                                     
16 See Crisp (2008), Nyberg-Sørensen et al. (2003), Monsutti (2008) and Chétail (2008). 
17 The GAMM of 2011 emphasised the link between diaspora investment and trade as a 
factor of development and thus delegated to the private sector and local levels the task 
of increasing trade as a way to manage migration. It was encouraged to increase 
‘synergies’ between cultural exchange, trade, skills transfers, business and investment, 
and to support private–public partnerships that enhance efforts by migrant 
entrepreneurs and by small and medium-sized firms in source countries with a view to 
increasing the remittances flow as a contribution to source country development. See 
European Commission, Communication on the Global Approach to Migration, 
COM(2011) 743 final, Brussels, 18.11.2011. 
18 See the Council of the European Union Decision 2016/2310 of 17 October 2016 on 
Jordan, op. cit. 
19 This might change with India’s complaint over the US raising the visa fee for the H1-
B1 visa, an issue considered to potentially fall within the WTO’s jurisdiction. 
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Since the onset of the large movements of refugees and migrants, the 
EU external migration policy has sought more intra-EU solidarity based on 
binding relocation quotas and the reform of the common asylum system. 
Meanwhile, it has bolstered trans-regional support for first-asylum countries 
(Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan and Iraq) for those affected by Arab Spring 
upheavals (Tunisia) and population movement in the Horn of Africa 
(Ethiopia) by deploying “humanitarian, stabilisation and development” 
efforts amounting to €3.6 billion.20 For such economies, enforcing non-
refoulement, while absorbing UNHCR resettlement quotas in addition to 
preventing irregular (secondary) movement to the EU comes at a high cost, 
and the influx of refugees is more than many such economies can digest 
unless new jobs are created. Hence, a new initiative, set out in the Jordan and 
Ethiopia compacts, uses the EU GSP to incentivise employment creation and 
thus marries financial relief with longer-term livelihood creation. 
15.4 Trade, visa waiver and readmission in EU Association 
Agreements with Eastern Partnership countries 
EU agreements with the Eastern Neighbourhood, being Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, compared with the 
Euro-Med (limited to trade in goods), feature second-generation trade 
chapters, including ‘meaningful’ trade in services. These liberalise the 
movement of natural persons in the categories of business sellers, graduate 
trainees, independent professionals, contractual service suppliers and intra-
corporate transferees (Arts. 88-90 EU–Georgia AA; Arts. 92-102 EU–Ukraine 
AA). In addition, entry under the Schengen visa has been liberalised (visa 
waiver) for residents of Georgia and Ukraine (and outside the Eastern 
Partnership countries for Kosovo and Turkey) and moved from Annex I to 
Annex II under Council Regulation (EC) No. 539/2001, which means that if 
persons from these countries qualify for categories of entry liberalised by 
certain EU directives, including on researchers, their entry is facilitated. 
In return, the AAs require eastern countries of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy to cooperate on integrated border management and 
other border securitisation measures, including interagency networking 
with EU migration agencies, the European Asylum Support Office, Frontex 
                                                     
20 See European Commission, Communication on a European Agenda on Migration, 
COM(2015) 240 final, Brussels, 13.5.2015. 
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and Europol, on prevention of irregular movements, and on combatting 
trafficking and smuggling (Art. 14 EU–Georgian AA, 2016). 
Art. 14 of the EU–Moldova AA of July 2016 features a “migration and 
mobility” provision, which is also applicable to the ones with Georgia, 
Ukraine and Moldova. These Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas 
(DCFTAs) use the pan-Euro-Mediterranean preferential rules of origin 
(PEM). The PEM rules mean that products produced in non-originating 
countries, but processed or worked on in the cumulation area formed by 
Euro-Med countries (including the EU and all countries in the European Free 
Trade Association except Switzerland), can label themselves as “originating” 
(Donner Abreu, 2013). 
Similarly, Art. 14 of the EU–Georgia AA commits Georgia to enforcing 
returns and to signing a readmission agreement with the EU to prevent 
irregular overstays of persons whose movement the AA has liberalised, 
including through the visa waiver.21 In the EU–Turkey Statement, which 
exchanges resettlement for the visa-free travel of Turkish citizens into 
Europe, Turkey must fulfil even more requirements, for example 
cooperation on readmissions, data protection and criminal matters.22  
The Japan–Philippines and the Japan–Indonesia free trade agreements 
contain similar return conditionalities, albeit linked to trade as opposed to 
visa policy, where the movement is for the medium-skilled: travel for nurses 
and caregivers (to Japan) is liberalised, in lieu of the Philippines or Indonesia 
signing up to return obligations. Lavenex and Jurje (2014) have shown how 
the EU uses “market power Europe” to pay back Algeria for securing the 
EU’s border.  
In all these DCFTAs, migration management, i.e. cooperation on 
preventing irregular migration and readmission, is linked first and most 
importantly to the visa waiver and not to trade facilitation, even if these 
DCFTAs liberalise the movement of natural persons, which Euro-Med AAs 
notably do not. Nonetheless, this movement of persons is limited to the 
highly skilled, and thus has no direct connection to the categories of persons 
or the migration and mobility clauses that the DCFTAs target. Since Eastern 
Neighbourhood countries have so far not been affected by the refugee crisis 
in the most extreme ways of other EU neighbourhood countries, 
                                                     
21 A similar deal has not been offered to Euro-Med countries, since these remain opposed 
to signing readmission agreements. 
22 See European Commission, Fifth Report on the Progress made in the implementation 
of the EU–Turkey Statement, COM(2017) 204 final, Brussels, 2.3.2017. 
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incentivising adherence to non-refoulement guarantees through trade 
preferences is not at stake. 
 ‘Humanitarian’ trade and … linkages? Everything-but-Arms preference in 
the Jordan Compact 
The Jordan Compact, initiated on 4 February 2016 at the Syria donor 
conference in London, requires the EU to relax the EU’s GSP+ status, which 
would normally apply the pan-European rules of origin to a Euro-Med 
country like Jordan, to an Everything-but-Arms EBA status, normally 
reserved for the least developed countries. This grants Jordan an even more 
preferential export tariff for its goods than it would normally benefit from 
under GSP+ treatment. It does so by modifying Art. 39 of Protocol 3 of the 
EU AA, and applying instead the EU EBA rules of origin, which tolerate up 
to a 70% as opposed to 40% threshold of non-originating materials in 
industrial products of the EU partner country, if it wants to benefit from EU 
tariff preferences (Jordan Strategy Forum, 2016). Jordan’s time-limited 
transformation – from a GSP+ country to a GSP EBA country – comes under 
the condition that Jordan employs, in production places it is free to specify, 
during the first year 15% of Syrian refugees, adding up to 25% from year 
three onwards. The derogation, which is valid until 31 December 2026 with 
a mid-term review foreseen, required both a decision of the Council of the 
EU and a joint decision of the EU–Jordan Association Committee. Jordan was 
not held accountable in the actual Council of the EU and Joint Committee 
Decisions modifying Art. 39 of Protocol 3 of the AA to respect core labour 
standards of the International Labour Organization (ILO) and human rights 
when implementing the refugee employment scheme, an oversight that was 
heavily criticised. However, Jordan was politically encouraged to continue 
to cooperate with the World Bank’s Better Work programme, despite some 
incongruence with ILO conventions on labour standards.23  
The reason behind the preference is to compensate Jordan’s economy, 
which has suffered from the Syrian refugee crisis (Jordan Strategy Forum, 
2016). The EU trade benefits come with strings attached: Jordan obtains a 
further relaxation of rules of origin for products manufactured with at least 
15% of refugee employment, if it cooperates with the EU to prevent 
secondary movement to the EU, and concludes an EU readmission 
                                                     
23 See H. Mellinger and P. van Berlo, “The Jordan Compact: Turning the Syrian Refugee 
Crisis into a Development Opportunity”, Leiden Law Blog, posted on 20 August 2016. 
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agreement in addition to implementing UNHCR resettlement quotas. 
Similar deals using GSP+, but not EBA, were signed with Lebanon (which is 
not a WTO member country) and most recently with Ethiopia.24  
Whereas in principle, the GATT enabling clause of 1979, the 
foundation for the GSP, is to be applied ‘non-reciprocally’, i.e. without 
extracting any counter-concessions from the developing country 
counterpart, it has been common practice for preference-giving countries to 
unilaterally determine which countries and which products are included in 
their scheme. Thus, most EU GSP schemes require the partner country to 
commit to internationally agreed, not EU, standards of production, 
including environmental, labour and human rights-related standards, in 
order to benefit from tariff reductions or relaxed rules of origin on exports to 
the EU.25  
In that sense, it could be well justified to require Jordan or Ethiopia or 
other frontline first-asylum countries to enhance their compliance with non-
refoulement obligations and the right to asylum, so as to prevent refugees on 
their soil being sent back to unsafe third countries. Adding respect for 
international refugee protection to labour, environmental and anti-
corruption standards could take out the chilling effect that such joint 
cooperation on migration management could have on human rights. It 
would also provide more legitimacy for joint border operations, preventing 
secondary movement or implementing readmissions. 
15.5 Tying EU GSP+ in Euro-Med Association Agreements to 
non-refoulement? 
So far, no EU GSP+ scheme has mentioned compliance with international 
standards on refugees and asylum – non-refoulement guarantees – for the 
reason that these are not linked directly to the production processes of goods. 
Where refugee labour is used for goods production, the labour standards, 
                                                     
24 The Ethiopia compact involves the European Investment Bank, the British Department 
for Work and Pensions and the World Bank, in addition to the EU, and is equally 
committed to exchanging job creation with refugee settlement. 
25 A similar enabling clause does not exist for trade in services. For services, the only way 
to prevent backsliding on labour, environmental and now refugee protection standards, 
is to inscribe non-refoulement clauses into the “additional commitments” section of a 
migrant or refugee receiving country’s GATS schedule, or to insert a “blanket reference” 
in the market access column of that schedule, which refers to international standards via 
the detour of national immigration law. See Sieber-Gasser (2016). 
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e.g. the risk of exploitation relating to wages, have a bearing on the price of 
a good but do not reflect the risks or the potential expulsion of a person. 
Restrictive residency permits for Syrian refugees, a lack of access to labour 
standards by female workers and all other types of post-establishment rights 
covered by the ILO conventions could put ‘like products’ produced in the 
EU at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis products manufactured with 
lower labour, environmental and human rights standards of production 
(which are thus cheaper) from Mediterranean countries. 
The EU–Algeria and EU–Tunisia AAs (2014 and 2016) offer access to 
the EU’s GSP+ scheme under condition that both countries adhere to 
internationally recognised labour and environmental protection standards 
when processing goods for exports. But Euro-Med countries like Algeria 
(hosting the Sahrawi refugee camps) or Tunisia and Egypt (hosting large 
Libyan refugee populations) could now additionally be asked to respect non-
refoulement guarantees and the right to asylum when employing refugees. 
This would ensure that refugees are not returned to unsafe third countries, 
where they would face serious risks of torture, the death penalty, inhumane 
detention or encampment in contravention of Art. 33 of the Geneva Refugee 
Convention and the UN Anti-Torture Convention.  
A temporary suspension of the GSP+ scheme by the EU26 could be 
attached to sanctions for failing to respect non-refoulement guarantees by 
forcibly sending back refugees from Syria, Somalia and Eritrea, to countries 
like Nigeria or Senegal and Mauritania, thereby denying rights of entry for 
asylum.  
Speaking against this packaging of non-refoulement, despite 
vulnerability considerations, with GSP+ is that it carries perhaps too a high 
cost for Euro-Med countries to pay, also in light of high unemployment rates. 
And, it would diminish rather than increase “joint ownership” of EU 
Mobility Partnerships or cooperation programmes (Cardwell, 2013, p. 127).27 
                                                     
26 See Human Rights Watch, “Submission on the Lebanon–EU Partnership Priorities and 
the EU–Lebanon Compact”, New York, NY, 2016. 
27 See also the European Agenda on Migration of 2015 (COM(2015) 240 final), op. cit., p. 
15. 
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15.6 Conclusion 
There are several shades of grey to the linkage of trade and migration. Like 
all policy packaging, the more distant the non-trade issue at stake is from the 
regulatory agenda, the more difficult implementation will be. 
The EU has a long-standing practice of using trade conditionalities 
within its EU GSP schemes to extract commitments on non-trade interests, 
such as combatting corruption, compulsory labour or drug trafficking. With 
deaths at sea on the rise and Syrian displacements to Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, 
Turkey and Egypt taking a toll on transit economies, the EU is taking the 
binding of tariff relaxations to non-trade interests to new heights. In its 
compact with Jordan, the Council of the EU agreed to compensate Jordan for 
hosting large refugee populations within or outside UNHCR resettlement 
quotas, paying off this crisis economy for preventing irregular onward 
movement to Europe by ‘upgrading’ it to the status of a least developed 
country, so as to make it eligible for EBA preferences. 
Such ‘compensatory’ use of trade agreements pioneers a new era of 
‘multi-focused’ issue linkage between trade and migration policy in the EU, 
which so far has been limited to labour and the environment. It could also 
prevent backsliding over EU and European Convention on Human Rights 
guarantees on expulsions of refugees in situations of real risk of ill-treatment. 
In sum, it seems that trade ‘can do it all’. Through the case of the Jordan 
Compact, we have demonstrated how trade preferences can maximise rather 
than undermine respect for human rights. We have advanced how the trade 
and migration nexus has evolved from a ‘post-humanitarian’ livelihood 
strategy to a frontline ‘humanitarian’ intervention mechanism, potentially 
shifting paradigms of relief, rights protection and responsibility for root 
causes, which the UN’s New York Declaration has been pioneering. 
 
References 
Betts, A. (2016), “International Relations and Forced Migrations”, in E. Fiddian-
Qasmiyeh, G. Loescher, K. Long and N. Sigona (eds), The Oxford Handbook 
of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
pp. 60–74.  
Betts, A. (ed.) (2011), Global Migration Governance, New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Cardwell, P.J. (2013), “New Modes of Governance in the External Dimension of 
EU Policy”, International Migration, Vol. 51, No. 3, pp. 54–68. 
140  MARION PANIZZON 
Carrera, S., L. den Hertog and J. Parkin (2012), “EU Migration Policy in the wake 
of the Arab Spring: What prospects for EU–Southern Mediterranean 
Relations?”, MEDPRO Technical Report No. 15, CEPS, Brussels, August. 
Carrera, S., S. Blockmans, D. Gros and E. Guild (2015), “The EU’s Response to 
the Refugee Crisis: Taking Stock and Setting Policy Priorities”, CEPS 
Essay No. 20, CEPS, Brussels. 
Carzaniga, A. (2008), “A warmer welcome? Access for natural persons under 
PTAs”, in J.A. Marchetti and M. Roy (eds), Opening Markets for Trade in 
Services, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, pp. 475–502. 
Cassese, S. (2016), Research Handbook on Global Administrative Law, Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Chétail, V. (2008), “Paradigm and Paradox of the Migration–Development 
Nexus: The New Border for North-South Dialogue”, German Yearbook of 
International Law, Vol. 52, pp. 183–215. 
Chétail, V. (2016), “Migration and International Law: A Short Introduction”, in 
International Law and Migration, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 
pp. i–xxiii. 
Cholewinski, R. and P. Taran (2010), “Migration, Governance and Human 
Rights: Contemporary Dilemmas in the Era of Globalization”, Refugee 
Survey Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 1–33. 
Collyer, M. (2016), “Geopolitics as a migration governance strategy: European 
Union bilateral relations with Southern Mediterranean countries”, Journal 
of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 42, No. 4, pp. 606–624. 
Crépeau, F. and I. Atak (2016), “Global Migration Governance Avoiding 
Commitments on Human Rights, Yet Tracing a Course for Cooperation”, 
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 113–146. 
Crisp, J. (2008), “Beyond the nexus: UNHCR’s evolving perspective on refugee 
protection and international migration”, New Issues in Refugee Research 
Paper No. 155, UNHCR, Geneva. 
Donner Abreu, M. (2013), “Preferential Rules of Origin in Regional Trade 
Agreements”, WTO Staff Working Paper ERSD-2013-05, World Trade 
Organization, Geneva, 22 March. 
Guild, E. and S. Grant (2016), “Migration Governance in the UN: What is the 
Global Compact and What does it Mean?”, Queen Mary School of Law 
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 252/2017, Queen Mary University of 
London. 
Hafner-Burton, E. (2005), “Trading human rights: How preferential trade 
agreements influence government repression”, International Organization, 
Vol. 59, No. 3, pp. 593–629. 
TRADE AND MIGRATION LINKAGES IN EU EXTERNAL MIGRATION POLICIES  141 
Hoekman, B.M. (1998), “Determining the need for issue linkages in multilateral 
trade negotiations”, International Organization, Vol. 43, No. 4, pp. 693–714. 
Jordan Strategy Forum (2016), “Relaxing the Rules of Origin for Jordanian 
Industries, A Necessary Step Towards Expanding Jordanian Exports”, 
Amman, July. 
Koslowski, R. (2008), “Global Mobility and the Quest for an International 
Migration Regime”, in J. Chamie and L. Dall’Oglio (eds), International 
Migration and Development: Continuing the Dialogue, Legal and Policy 
Perspectives, International Organization for Migration, Geneva. 
Lavenex, S. and F. Jurje (2014), “The Migration-Trade Nexus: Migration 
Provisions in Trade Agreements” in L. Talani and S. McMahon (eds), 
Handbook of International Political Economy of Migration, Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 259–284. 
Manger, M.S. (2009), Investing in protection: The politics of preferential trade 
agreements between north and south, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University 
Press, pp. 1–26. 
Martin, S. (2016), “The Global Refugee Crisis”, Georgetown Journal of International 
Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 5–11. 
Milewicz, K., J. Holloway, C. Peacock and D. Snidal (2016), “Beyond Trade: The 
Expanding Scope of the Non-Trade Agenda in Trade Agreements”, Journal 
of Conflict Resolution, pp. 1–31. 
Monsutti, A. (2008), “Migration und Entwicklung: eine Debatte zwischen Zwist 
und Annäherung”, Schweizerisches Jahrbuch für Entwicklungspolitik, 27-2, 
pp. 25-46. 
Nyberg-Sørensen, N., N. Van Hear and P. Engberg-Pedersen (2003), “The 
Migration–Development Nexus: Evidence and Policy Options”, 
International Migration, Vol. 40, No. 5, pp. 49–73. 
Opeskin, B., R. Perruchoud and J. Redpath-Cross (2012), Foundations of 
International Migration Law, Cambridge MA: Cambridge University Press. 
Reslow, N. (2015), “Deciding on EU External Migration Policy: The Member 
States and the Mobility Partnerships”, Journal of European Integration, Vol. 
34, No. 3, pp. 223–239. 
Sieber-Gasser, C. (2016), Developing Countries and Preferential Services Trade, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Trachtman, J.P. (2009), The International Law of Economic Migration: Toward the 
Fourth Freedom, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 
Kalamazoo, MI. 
Trauner, F. and I. Kruse (2008), “EC visa facilitation and readmission 
agreements: A new standard EU foreign policy tool?”, European Journal of 
Migration and Law, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 411–438. 
 142 | 
 
16. TRADE COMMITMENTS IN GATS,  
EU–CARIFORUM AND CETA,  
AND THE INCLUSION OF BLANKET  
REFERENCES TO ENTRY, STAY, WORK 
AND SOCIAL SECURITY MEASURES 
SIMON TANS 
16.1 Introduction 
In 1996, the EU Member States adopted a series of so-called ‘Mode 4’ 
commitments within the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
framework.1 While the intention was to progressively liberalise trade in 
services through multilateral negotiations, up to the time of writing, this has 
not happened. The difficulties surrounding the Doha Round negotiations 
have led the EU to channel its momentum in service trade liberalisation into 
various bilateral or plurilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). While the 
legal rules included in the GATS are copied in such FTAs, there are 
variations. In essence, FTAs have a tendency to go further in breadth, 
including more service sectors or more categories of service providers, as 
well as in depth, leading to more openness.2 
The EU Mode 4 GATS commitments can be summarised as follows. 
The specific categories of service providers and service sectors that were 
negotiated during the Uruguay Round are listed in the commitments. The 
                                                     
1 Although the Uruguay Round had finished by that time, developing countries were 
unhappy with the poor result in relation to Mode 4 commitments, which did not reflect 
a fair balance with commitments interesting to developed countries, such as Mode 3 
commitments. See GATT, Decision on Movement of Natural Persons, MTN/FA III-7(h) 
(www.wto.org); see also Trebilcock et al. (2013), p. 481. 
2 While various publications have addressed FTAs from the perspective of GATS-Plus, 
attention is now also on the issue of GATS-Minus, or less preferential treatment in FTAs 
– see for instance Adlung and Morrison (2010), p. 1103. 
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commitments also contain all the specific conditions that apply to these 
service providers. Thus, an accountancy firm based in a World Trade 
Organization (WTO) member country may send its employees to an EU 
Member State to provide services to clients in the EU host state. This form of 
mobility, referred to as Contractual Service Suppliers (CSS), is conditional on 
the worker being regular staff of the accountancy firm, and thus a prior 
employment condition of one year is included in the EU GATS commitment. 
Moreover, the commitment specifies that this accountant can stay for a 
maximum of three months, in a twelve-month period (the cooling-off 
period).3 
One major uncertainty with this specific form of reciprocal agreement 
on international trade liberalisation lies in the inclusion of a ‘blanket 
reference’. It is quite understandable that the EU has chosen not to include 
all the legislative details that may apply to the accountant in the just 
provided example. For instance, the national legislation of several Member 
States will not accommodate full access to social security, or will impose a 
minimum wage, maximum work hours and other similar conditions. The 
blanket reference, which is part of the GATS EU commitment itself, provides 
a solution, avoiding the inclusion of these details in the commitments 
through this statement: “All other requirements of [Union] and Member States’ 
laws and regulations regarding entry, stay, work and social security measures 
shall continue to apply, including regulations concerning period of stay, 
minimum wages as well as collective wage agreements.”4  
The inclusion can certainly be seen as a clear answer to the question of 
which labour law and social security measures are applicable in situations 
involving cross-border service provision. Due to the temporary nature of 
service provision, the country-of-home principle would apply in such 
situations; however, the matter is more complicated than that. As explained 
by Engblom et al. (2016, part II), Mode 4 covers a wide range of activities that 
do not neatly classify as typical service provision. The GATS provisions are 
silent on the matter, yet the question of which set of such rules is applicable 
(home or host state) should be resolved by the EU in light of the inclusion of 
the blanket reference. Note that commitments are an integral part of the 
                                                     
3 See WTO, Council for Trade in Services, Communication from the European 
Communities and its Member States Consolidated GATS Schedule, 9 October 2006, 
S/C/W/273, horizontal commitment Mode 4 (www.wto.org). 
4 See the EU’s horizontal commitment, Mode 4. 
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GATS.5 The blanket reference also avoids having to address changes made 
in relation to the types of measures addressed by the reference. Thus, entry, 
stay and work conditions continue to apply. 
Despite the clarity provided in the blanket reference itself, this chapter 
will put forward the argument that this clarity is likely false. The main 
question addressed is how to accommodate changes at the national level 
relating to the legislative sectors listed in the blanket reference. The relevance 
of this question specifically lies in the fact that some EU Member States have 
consistently tightened the conditions relating to entry for migrants in 
general.6 Clearly, if the commitments provide specific conditions, such as the 
right for CSS to reside for three months in an EU Member State, the issue is 
not problematic. If national legislation were to limit that right to two months, 
such a measure would violate the commitment. Yet, the matter is far from 
straightforward in relation to requirements not specifically addressed by the 
commitments, such as a general refusal ground for authorities on the basis 
of prior criminal convictions. 
The blanket reference is also part of various FTAs of which the EU is a 
party. Interestingly, in for instance the EU–CARIFORUM7 Agreement and 
the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), the blanket 
reference can be found in the form of a provision, which has important 
ramifications in comparison with the blanket reference in the GATS 
commitments. 
To support this position, it is first necessary to provide an overview of 
the manner in which GATS and other trade agreements addressing Mode 4 
operate. To test the blanket reference, some typical national measures that 
can be found in rules on migration and access to the labour market of EU 
Member States will be described and held against the light of the 
international obligations. The conclusion will compare the GATS version of 
the blanket reference with those to be found in the selected FTAs, and 
provide an analysis of the legality of newly introduced, stricter access 
conditions. From the outset, it must be made clear that this analysis is new 
                                                     
5 See Art. XX:3 GATS. 
6 The author has investigated this matter in Dutch and British legislation and both 
Member States are an example of this tightening of entry conditions, see extensively Tans 
(2015), ch. 7. The author has also investigated Swedish legislation, and there this problem 
does not seem to arise, as the Swedish entry conditions have in fact become more liberal 
since the inscription of the GATS commitments in 1996 – see Tans (2017). 
7 CARIFORUM refers to the Caribbean Forum of African, Caribbean and Pacific States. 
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ground. As such, the author will limit this analysis to a warning that the 
matter should be investigated by negotiators and relevant national 
authorities. More is simply not possible given the absence of case law and 
additional literature on this matter. 
16.2 The international framework liberalising Mode 4 trade in 
services 
As a starting point, the GATS addresses measures affecting trade in services. 
Although much can be written on the scope of the GATS, there is little doubt 
that the measures addressed in this contribution indeed fall within the scope 
of the GATS.8 Three key obligations play a role in relation to the inscribed 
commitments. If a certain service sector is addressed by the commitments, 
obligations relating to market access, national treatment and domestic 
regulation will apply. Market access addresses typical forms of barriers to 
service trade, such as economic needs tests and other forms of quotas. The 
domestic regulation provision in essence addresses qualification 
requirements, licensing procedures and technical standards if the conditions 
imposed in such measures are unnecessarily restrictive. Finally, the national 
treatment obligation ensures equal treatment between foreign services or 
service providers and national services or service providers.9 In addition to 
these three core obligations, the GATS aims at transparency and several of 
its rules provide publication requirements and conditions, such as that 
admission procedures must be transparent, not unnecessarily time 
consuming and subject to review.10 At the same time, certain measures that 
breach these obligations can be excepted based on the general exception 
grounds, security exception grounds and a specific Mode 4 carve-out for 
“measures to regulate the entry of natural persons into, or their temporary stay 
in, its territory, including those measures necessary to protect the integrity of, 
and to ensure the orderly movement of natural persons across, its borders”.11 
As these agreements concern service trade liberalisation, measures on 
seeking access to the employment market or measures concerning 
                                                     
8 See for instance Trebilcock et al. (2013), pp. 475–76 and Leal-Arcas (2008), pp. 35, 39. 
The GATS aims at the reduction of barriers to trade in services due to governmental 
measures (Krajewski, 2003, p. 62). 
9 Feketekuty (2000, p. 101) refers to the approach as a “three-legged stool”. 
10 See Kruger (2011), pp. 7, 2; Krajewski (2003), pp. 124–25 and Delimatsis (2008), pp. 93–
95. 
11 See the GATS Annex on the Movement of Natural Persons. 
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citizenship, residence or employment on a permanent basis are exempted 
from the GATS as well. In this author’s view, the main concern with blanket 
references is that they could be used to deviate from the national treatment 
obligation in a manner unintended at the time the commitments were made. 
16.3 Tightening immigration control and restricting access to the 
labour market 
Both the Netherlands and the UK have introduced two new hurdles to be 
overcome by migrants in general. The wording of the previous sentence 
certainly has to do with the openly provided reason behind these new 
hurdles, as both EU Member States clearly indicate that migration needs to 
be selective, restrictive for unwanted migration and simple, with fast-track 
procedures for migrants beneficial to the host states.12 This is simply a 
legitimate choice of these Member States, and it is implemented in the 
general entry conditions applying to most, if not all forms of regular (labour) 
migration. The problem is that if such conditions apply in general, they will 
also apply to sectors and migrants addressed by international trade 
commitments. Obviously, this regulatory freedom is limited to the extent 
that the international commitments must be observed. 
Since the inscription of the GATS commitments, the Netherlands and 
the UK have both introduced a generally applying sponsorship system. 
Those that have an interest in the migrant need to serve as the sponsor of 
that migrant. This entails acceptance of sponsorship duties, which include 
information duties and reporting obligations. The least that can be said of 
sponsorship is that it adds formal requirements, as sponsors need to submit 
information relating to themselves and the sponsored migrant to the 
government.13 This introduces additional obligations. 
                                                     
12 For the Netherlands, see Dutch Parliament, Kamerstukken II, 2008/09, 32 052, Nr 3 
(Memorie van Toelichting), para. 1. See also Groen et al. (2013, p. 184), referring to the 
Dutch Parliament, Kamerstukken II, 2009/10, 32 052 D, p. 1; and Dutch Ministry of Safety 
and Justice, government notice (2007), “Naar een modern migratiebeleid”, ve06000709. 
For the UK, see Clayton et al. (2016) p. 21 and pp. 24–25; and Seddon (2010), pp. 11–12 
and 19. Specific UK examples are the raising of earnings thresholds, more restrictive 
employment conditions and a more onerous resident labour market test. This language 
is also reflected in the UK Coalition Programme for government, 20 May 2010, 
immigration paragraph, p. 21 (https://www.gov.uk). 
13 See extensively Tans (2015), paras 5.2.2.3. and 6.2.2.4. 
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Similarly, general entry conditions notably introduce a bias against 
those who have committed criminal offences. The UK imposes a general 
refusal ground related to prior imprisonment. Depending on the length of 
the imprisonment, the migrant may be refused entry, and thus effectively 
utilising Mode 4 commitments, for five years since the end of the sentence. 
A one- to four-year sentence may lead to refusal for ten years. Longer 
imprisonment will lead to refusal.14 This imposes another condition for 
Mode 4 service suppliers as well, namely that the service supplier may be 
refused based on prior imprisonment. 
16.4 Mode 4 commitments and changes in national legislation 
The GATS specifically provides a clear indication of regulatory freedom. The 
GATS is not intended to deregulate; it is intended to remove barriers to 
international service trade. The question now becomes just how far this 
regulatory freedom applies in relation to the examples provided above.15 To 
conclude that these measures are still part of the regulatory freedom, two 
distinctive aspects need to be investigated. First, these measures should not 
run counter to one of the GATS obligations. Second, if a measure does indeed 
breach a GATS obligation, it can still fall within the scope of an exception 
ground or these measures may be part of the carve-out provided in relation 
to Mode 4. Note that the Mode 4 carve-out is not an exception ground, rather 
the GATS does not apply to such measures. 
As to the breach that sponsorship and prior imprisonment conditions 
may cause, these measures are not part of the market access commitment, as 
the types of measures listed there are different.16 Moreover, in the author’s 
                                                     
14 See the UK Immigration Rules, para. 320(2)(b). 
15 The GATS Preamble indicates that the agreement will give due respect to national 
policy objectives and specifically recognises the right of members to regulate trade in 
services on their territory. On the right to regulate, see Jackson (2006), pp. 57, 62. 
16 If a measure does not take the form listed in Art. XVI, it is not covered by that provision, 
as the list is exhaustive. See Pauwelyn (2005), p. 159; Krajewski (2005), pp. 431–32; and 
Zleptnig (2008), p. 393. See also the WTO’s US – Gambling Panel Report (United States – 
Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services (US – 
Gambling) WT/DS285/R, 10 November 2004), paras 6.298 and 6.318. This Panel finding 
seems to be implicitly confirmed by the Appellate Body in the US – Gambling Appellate 
Body Report (WTO, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of 
Gambling and Betting Services (US – Gambling) WT/DS285/AB/R, 20 April 2005), para. 
215. The exhaustive nature of the list was confirmed by the Panel in the Argentina – 
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opinion, even though sponsorship takes the form of a licence, sponsorship is 
not addressed by the domestic regulation provision either. Art. VI GATS 
does address qualification requirements and procedures, technical standards 
and licensing requirements (QTLs), yet these measures relate to the 
standards and quality of the service provided. Sponsorship does not address 
the quality of the service provider; it essentially entails a shift in migration 
control from the government to employers.17 However, it is argued here that 
both measures breach the national treatment obligation. 
National treatment requires no less favourable treatment of foreign 
services and foreign service providers in comparison with domestic services 
or service suppliers. A condition is that the foreign and domestic service are 
‘like’, which is essential to any non-discrimination provision as equal 
treatment requires similar conditions for similar situations.18 
Are domestic Mode 4 service suppliers like their counterparts in other 
WTO member countries? Taking the accountant as an example (relying on 
CSS), a domestic company providing accountancy services to a domestic 
client will use its employees to provide the service. Clearly, such employees 
will be nationals, or others with access to the domestic labour market. The 
conditions of no prior imprisonment and sponsorship will not apply.19 If, 
however, a non-EU accountancy firm will provide the service it will use its 
own third-country national personnel, and compliance with the sponsorship 
                                                     
Financial Services Panel Report (WTO, Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods 
and Services (Argentina – Financial Services) WT/DS453/R, 30 September 2015), paras 
7.418-7.419. 
17 In relation to Dutch sponsorship, see Lange (2011). 
18 A useful overview of this obligation is provided by Muller (2016). For case law 
addressing the GATS national treatment provision, see the WTO’s China – Publications 
and Audiovisual Products Panel Report (China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and 
Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products 
(China – Publications and Audiovisual Products) WT/DS363/R, 12 August 2009), para. 
7.975; see also the WTO’s Argentina – Financial Services Appellate Body Report 
(Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services (Argentina – Financial 
Services) WT/DS453/AB/R, 14 April 2016), paras 6.38-6.45. 
19 Note that the GATS does not facilitate domestic companies hiring third-country 
nationals to perform a service contract, and to such situations national law would apply. 
The GATS applies to international trade in services and cannot be used to ‘circumvent’ 
national law, that is, using GATS commitments to provide services in the home state 
through foreign employees. See WTO (CTS) 2009 (Presence Natural Persons), para. 19; 
see also Engblom et al. (2016), p. 73. 
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and prior imprisonment conditions will be required. Note that the entire 
purpose of CSS is exactly that of non-EU service providers being allowed to 
bring their own personnel to provide a service. Under EU law, this form of 
service provision is referred to as the posting of workers, and on many 
occasions the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has held that 
not being able to bring one’s own personnel to provide a service is a 
competitive disadvantage in comparison with domestic companies that can 
use their own personnel. Needing to work with host state personnel leads to 
a disadvantage, if only due to the company needing to work with unknown 
employees.20 Given the purpose of CSS, there can be little doubt that 
domestic service providers using their own personnel to provide a service 
are in a like situation as foreign service providers using their own personnel. 
As these measures introduce additional hurdles, the conditions of 
competition are upset as well. Sponsorship obligations and refusal grounds 
based on prior imprisonment make it more difficult for the foreign service 
provider to work in the EU host state than without these requirements. 
16.5 Can the measures be exempted? 
Of the various GATS exception grounds, in this author’s opinion the logical 
ground to exempt the no-prior-imprisonment condition is the invocation of 
the public order. As is clear from the footnote included with this ground, this 
requires that a “genuine and sufficiently serious threat is posed to one of the 
fundamental interests of society”. Unfortunately, case law on this matter is 
badly needed but unavailable. An analogy with EU law is not going to help 
either. Although the phrase is similar to the criterion adopted by the CJEU 
in the Adoui case, the intention to create an internal market is simply far more 
ambitious than the liberalisation provided under the GATS.21 This leaves the 
following question: Is a one-day prior imprisonment sentence a logical 
refusal ground for a migrant, otherwise allowed entry on the basis of Mode 
4, as that person constitutes a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to 
public order? Posing the question itself can be viewed as providing the 
answer as well, be it that this exemption becomes far more logical in relation 
to those having prior criminal convictions of more than four years. Still, the 
                                                     
20 See Case C-113/89 Rush Portuguesa Lda mot. Office national d’immigration 
ECLI:EU:C:1990:142, para. 11; and Case C-43/93 Raymond Vander Elst v Office des 
Migrations Internationales ECLI:EU:C:1994:310. 
21 See Joined cases C-115/81 and 116/81 Adoui and Cornuaille v Belgian State 
ECLI:EU:C:1982:183. 
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measure includes one-day sentences as well. In any case, the analysis in 
relation to sponsorship is even more clear, as a shift in migration control 
from the government to those having an interest in the migrant does not 
address a genuine and sufficiently serious threat related to the public order. 
The other grounds provided in Art. XIV are less likely to provide an 
exception for these two types of measures. 
This leaves the Mode 4 GATS carve-out. Are these measures needed to 
“regulate entry, or temporary stay, including measures necessary to protect 
the orderly movement of natural persons across, its borders”? This 
immigration carve-out may indeed, with a little creativity be relevant to 
refuse the entry of those having a criminal past. Nevertheless, this ground 
can be viewed as really being concerned with border measures, as the one 
example provided by the GATS Annex on the Movement of Natural Persons 
is a visa requirement. Sponsorship may indeed fall within this definition. 
Yet, studying the extent of sponsorship obligations, again it seems highly 
doubtful that all the conditions imposed by that system are genuinely 
imposed to regulate the orderly movement of persons across borders. Some 
conditions, such as reporting that a migrant is no longer working for the 
company concerned, indeed will relate to this ground. But surely using a 
licensing system of sponsorship with all the conditions imposed by it is 
beyond the scope of the carve-out. 
This author believes that these additional obligations do indeed breach 
the GATS obligation of national treatment, and are not covered by exceptions 
or carve-outs. This interim conclusion allows us to return to the initial 
problem pointed out in this chapter. 
16.6 Regulatory freedom and blanket references 
The no-prior-imprisonment condition and sponsorship are imposed as entry 
conditions. They are formulated as general refusal grounds applying to most 
migrants wishing to enter the Netherlands and the UK. In both national legal 
orders, they are part of the rules on immigration and on access to the labour 
market. As the blanket reference is part of the commitments, these conditions 
can simply be imposed on Mode 4 service providers. As indicated in the 
reference, despite the provided commitment, these measures continue to 
apply. The problem is not whether such conditions may be imposed, the 
problem is which version of these conditions is intended with the phrase 
“shall continue to apply”? Put differently, does the phrase refer to the 
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conditions as they stood at the time the commitments were inscribed, or as 
they exist today? 
As indicated earlier, no guidance in case law or examples from the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade framework are available. It then 
comes down to the intention that those involved in the negotiations that have 
led to these commitments had. It must be stressed that this is quite different 
from the EU’s intention, as negotiations are reciprocal. A prime example is 
the US and the gambling case. It is clear that the US never intended to be 
bound by a cross-border commitment relating to (Internet) gambling 
services, yet such services are part of the “other recreational services (except 
sporting)” sector, and that sector was indeed subject to a Mode 1 
commitment of the US.22 
Although other positions can surely be adopted, to the author the 
question boils down to the following: Do the conditions that continue to 
apply refer to those conditions as they stood in 1996 (the time of the 
inscription of the GATS Mode 4 conditions) or as they stand today? Here it 
is argued that it should be the former, thus the conditions as existed at the 
time of inscription continue to apply. In essence, this means that the GATS 
comments do allow the imposition of these additional requirements, yet at 
the same time the GATS commitments entail a standstill clause, limiting the 
regulatory freedom of the WTO member country. The author adopts this 
position a contrario, as the other option comes down to the possibility to 
introduce additional barriers to Mode 4 movements. In fact, this is exactly 
what has happened since 1996. This author does not believe that this will be 
acceptable to those who have pushed for Mode 4 commitments, in particular 
as the GATS negotiations on Mode 4 continued due to unsatisfactory results 
during the Uruguay Round itself.23 
It must be clarified here that this author does not have the answer to 
the question of whether the blanket reference covers the newly introduced 
conditions. The main purpose of this contribution is to bring this matter to 
the attention of service trade liberalisation negotiators, from both the EU and 
its trading partners, as this matter is unresolved in relation to the GATS, and 
it continues to play a role in other FTAs, which consistently include blanket 
references. 
                                                     
22 See WTO, US – Gambling Panel Report (op. cit.), paras 6.136-6.137; see also Krajewski 
(2005), p. 426. 
23 See the GATT Decision on the Movement of Natural Persons; see also Trebilcock et al. 
(2013), p. 481 and J. Bast (2008), pp. 576–577. 
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16.7 Comparison with other FTAs 
The blanket reference can be found in other FTAs as well. In the EU–
CARIFORUM Agreement, which has entered into force, the EU has included 
a blanket reference in relation to commitments on CSS and independent 
professionals in Annex IV(D): 
The list below does not include measures relating to qualification 
requirements and procedures, technical standards and licensing 
requirements and procedures, and measures regarding 
employment, work and social security conditions when they do not 
constitute a discriminatory limitation within the meaning of Arts 
83(2) and (3) of the Agreement. Those measures (e.g. need to obtain 
a licence, need to obtain recognition of qualifications in regulated 
sectors, need to pass specific examinations, including language 
examinations, need to have a legal domicile where the activity is 
performed, need to comply with national regulations and practices 
concerning minimum wages and with collective wage agreements 
in the host country), even if not listed, apply in any case to 
contractual services suppliers and independent professionals of the 
other Party.24 
Note that this provision also contains the counterpart of the GATS 
domestic regulation provision, be it that QTL measures apply.25 The 
provision explicitly provides examples of the measures addressed by the 
blanket reference, which is a great improvement over the uncertainty of the 
reference in the GATS commitments. 
In the draft CETA, Art. 10(2) included in the chapter on the temporary 
entry and stay of natural persons for business purposes26 provides: 
                                                     
24 See the Economic Partnership Agreement between the CARIFORUM States, of the one 
part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part (EU–
CARIFORUM) Annex IV(D), para. 3 (http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/ 
february/tradoc_137971.pdf,). 
25 The GATS system is still incomplete, as disciplines on domestic regulation are under 
negotiation. The outcome of those negotiations is unclear, yet a version of a necessity test 
is intended, which is more intrusive than non-discrimination as provided in the EU–
CARIFORUM Agreement; for more on these negotiations, see extensively Tans (2015), 
para. 2.5.4.3. 
26 See the CETA between Canada of the one Part, and the European Union and its 
Member States, of the other part (http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/ 
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4. To the extent that commitments are not taken in this Chapter, all 
other requirements of the laws of the Parties regarding entry and 
stay continue to apply, including those concerning period of stay. 
5. Notwithstanding the provisions of this Chapter, all requirements 
of the Parties’ laws regarding employment and social security 
measures shall continue to apply, including regulations concerning 
minimum wages as well as collective wage agreements. 
6. This Chapter does not apply to cases where the intent or effect of 
the temporary entry and stay is to interfere with or otherwise affect 
the outcome of a labour or management dispute or negotiation, or 
the employment of natural persons who are involved in such 
dispute or negotiation.27 
A major difference with the GATS blank reference is the fact that the 
EU–CARIFORUM Agreement and the CETA have not included the blanket 
reference in the commitment itself. This avoids the oddity described above 
that a GATS commitment includes a flexible limitation in the form of the 
measures addressed by the blanket reference. As explained, a measure 
regulating entry that would nullify the substance of the GATS commitment 
leads to a circular argument, as the option to nullify this commitment is 
inherent to the commitment itself. 
Moreover, for example the CETA consistently refers to the substance 
of the blanket reference. Art. 10(3), para. 1 indicates: “Each Party shall allow 
temporary entry to natural persons for business purposes of the other Party 
who otherwise complies with the Party’s immigration measures applicable 
to temporary entry, in accordance with this Chapter.” Art. 10(6), para. 1 
provides: “This Agreement does not impose an obligation on a Party 
regarding its immigration measures, except as specifically identified in this 
Chapter and in Chapter Twenty Seven (Transparency).”28 Finally, the CETA 
intends to abolish work permits, or similar prior approval procedures, in 
                                                     
february/tradoc_154329.pdf); chapter 10 includes CSS, independent professionals, 
business visitors and intra-corporate transferees. 
27 See CETA Annex IV(D), Art. 10(2).  
28 Art. 10(6), para. 3 CETA provides that the market access provision and the national 
treatment provision apply to Mode 4 financial service suppliers; however, the provision 
again explicitly indicates that these obligations do not apply to measures granting 
temporary entry of natural persons of a Party or of a third country. 
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relation to business visitors for investment purposes and for short-term 
purposes.29 
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide a full analysis of these 
provisions included in the EU–CARIFORUM Agreement and the CETA. In 
any case, both FTAs are much more informative on the content of the blanket 
reference, which is the main problem with the GATS blanket reference. 
However, the main problem is not addressed by these references. Rules 
concerning entry and stay, where the discussed examples of no prior 
imprisonment and sponsorship can be found, clearly continue to apply. It is 
unclear whether this is a reference to the rules at the time the FTAs enter into 
force, or the rules as they stand today. For business visitors relying on CETA 
(for short-term purposes and investment purposes), the matter has become 
moot in relation to conditions attached to work permits, as CETA prohibits 
this. That notwithstanding, the no-prior-imprisonment condition is part of 
the general entry conditions, and thus not part of a work permit. 
16.8 Conclusion 
As will be apparent from this chapter, it is not easy to provide clear 
conclusions in relation to the topic under discussion here. This has to do with 
the lack of literature dealing with the question of what the international 
obligations will specifically mean in relation to the conditions included in 
national immigration rules. Moreover, case law on GATS is rare, and no 
cases exist dealing with Mode 4. The intention of this chapter is twofold. 
First, a case can be made that the EU GATS Mode 4 commitments are no 
longer observed by the Netherlands and the UK. It is not possible to draw a 
conclusion due to the blanket reference being part of the commitment itself, 
which complicates the matter. Still, the author is of the opinion that 
reciprocal negotiations cannot have led to the possibility to undermine or 
nullify a commitment via immigration rules. While one may disagree with 
the above analysis of sponsorship and no-prior-imprisonment measures, 
that is not the point. Even if the current national rules do not nullify the 
commitments, nothing prevents the EU Member States from including more 
restrictions in their immigration rules. The second conclusion is that at first 
glance, the EU–CARIFORUM Agreement and CETA demonstrate 
improvement, owing to the inclusion of the blanket reference in the form of 
provisions and to added detail. Nevertheless, the issue remains that it is not 
                                                     
29 See Art. 10(7), para. 3 and Art. 10(9), para. 2 CETA. 
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clear what happens when signatory states add conditions to the rules 
referred to in blanket references. 
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17. CAN THE EU USE TRADE AGREEMENTS TO 
FACILITATE REGULAR MIGRATION? 
EXAMPLES FROM THE WESTERN BALKANS  
ELSPETH GUILD 
A clear and well implemented framework for legal pathways to entrance 
 in the EU (both through an efficient asylum and visa system) will reduce 
 push factors towards irregular stay and entry, contributing to enhance 
security of European borders as well as safety of migratory flows.1  
17.1 EU trade agreements with the Western Balkans 
The EU concluded trade agreements with all of the Western Balkan states, 
which entered into force between 2004 (Macedonia) and 2015 (Bosnia). All of 
the trade agreements, entitled Stabilisation and Association Agreements, 
have provisions on establishment, which include two rights that are relevant 
to the issue of the role of trade agreements in providing routes for migration. 
The first is the right of companies based in each of the parties to send key 
personnel to the other to achieve the establishment of the company on the 
territory of the other party. This can be classified as a form of intra-company 
transfer but the rules that cover this right (as defined in the agreements) are 
more favourable than in the Directive on Intra-Corporate Transfer (ICT) 
(2014/66/EU). For example, Art. 55 of the EU–Albania Agreement states that 
from the date of entry into force of the Agreement (1 April 2009) Albanian 
companies are entitled to employ or have employed by one of its subsidiaries 
(in accordance with the legislation of the host state) employees who are 
nationals of Albania and who are key personnel of the company. Their work 
and residence permits must cover the period of their employment by the 
Albanian company in the EU Member State. Similar provisions exist in the 
Stabilisation Agreements concluded with the other Western Balkan states. 
                                                     
1 See European Commission, A European Agenda on Migration, COM(2015) 240 final, 
Brussels, 13.5.2015. 
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Second, the Albania Stabilisation Agreement provides that five years 
after entry into force of the Agreement(s) the Association Agreement shall 
establish the modalities to extend the above provisions to the establishment 
of nationals of both parties to take up economic activities as self-employed 
persons (on the territory of the other) (Art. 50(4) EU–Albania). 
 The Albania Agreement has a delay of five years after its entry into 
force for the modalities for Albanian nationals to be self-employed in the 
Member States, which means that the deadline passed on 1 April 2014. The 
modalities referred to in the Agreement have not been adopted by the 
Association Council. Yet, as the provision is obligatory – the modalities shall 
be established – there are strong arguments in EU law that the failure of the 
Association Council to adopt the necessary modalities, and thus frustrate the 
objective of the Agreement and nullify and impair one of its benefits, must 
result in the provision having direct effect notwithstanding this failure.  
The relevant delay for the application of the self-employment right in 
the Bosnia Agreement is four years after entry into force, the date of which 
will arrive on 1 June 2019. For Macedonia, the wording is slightly different 
and only requires the Council to examine the matter; thus, the argument of 
direct effect is weakened. However, the date when this was supposed to have 
happened was five years after entry into force, that is to say by 1 April 2009. 
Regarding Montenegro, the delay is four years but the wording is obligatory 
as in the Albania and Bosnia Agreements. The date when the right should 
have taken effect is 1 May 2014. For Serbia, once again the obligation is a 
prescription and the date for the right to take effect is 1 September 2017. 
The use of a right of establishment for businesses to send their key 
personnel and for individuals to be self-employed in EU trade agreements is 
not new. It was inserted into all the agreements with the Central and Eastern 
European countries (CEECs) from 1990 onwards and as it was used by 
nationals of those states who came to EU states to work, it provided a very 
important mechanism to meet the demand for mobility and circulation of 
economic migration. While interior ministries of a number of Member States 
challenged and opposed the exercise of the rights by individuals, the Court 
of Justice of the European Union consistently interpreted the agreements in 
accordance with the intentions of the negotiators in recognition of the 
importance of the obligation to open up their respective markets. The right 
of companies to send their key personnel to a Member State is included in 
the agreement with Russia and other successor states of the Soviet Union.  
Was the experience with the right of self-employment in the 
association agreements with the CEECs important for trade and did it relieve 
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irregular migratory pressure? These are critical questions and ones for which 
little direct data have been collected. Certainly, from the issues that came 
before the courts of those states resisting the exercise of the right of self-
employment of CEEC nationals under the agreements, it is evident that for 
them the agreements provided very important mechanisms to achieve 
economic ambitions across borders. In a number of the cases, the applicants 
were persons whom the Member State had designated as irregularly present 
and the possibility of the claim to self-employment under the agreements 
transformed their positions into that of regularly present. In some cases 
(Barkoci and Malik for instance), the applicants were asylum seekers whose 
asylum applications had been rejected and who had stayed irregularly 
thereafter in the Member State establishing businesses that were 
economically successful. Only the provisions of the agreements saved them 
from economic ruin and expulsion from the Member State.  
17.2 Is there migratory pressure from the Western Balkans that 
could be resolved by the Stabilisation Agreements? 
This question will be examined by taking Albania as an example. According 
to the most recent information available from Frontex (second quarter, 
2016),2 Albanians were the second highest nationality of persons refused 
entry to the EU: 4,733 Albanians were refused entry in that quarter. 
Albanians were ninth in the list of nationalities of persons applying for 
asylum in the EU (5,102 applications). In respect of document fraud, 
Albanians came in fourth with 94 claims in the second quarter of 2016. 
Finally, as regards expulsion decisions, Albanians once again were the fourth 
nationality in the number of decisions taken in that quarter (5,192). The most 
expensive form of expulsion is forced return, where the Member State has to 
assume the high costs of transport, escorts and logistics, which can include 
detention. Albanians were the top nationality of persons subject to forced 
returns in the second quarter of 2016 at 5,450. For voluntary returns, they 
came fourth with 1,406 such returns.  
Considering the size of the population of Albania, these statistics are 
surprising if not shocking. Compared with the competition on expulsion 
decisions, in first place was Afghanistan followed by Iraq and Ukraine. All 
of these countries have substantially larger populations than Albania. 
                                                     
2 See Frontex, “FRAN Quarterly”, Quarter 2, April–June 2016, Warsaw, 2016 
(http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/FRAN_2016_Q2.pdf). 
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Ukraine is also a neighbouring country to the EU, though the other two, 
Afghanistan and Iraq, are refugee-producing countries.  
What do these figures tell us about migratory pressure from Albania? 
It would seem that relative to its population there is a quite a lot of interest 
among Albanians to improve their life chances by moving to and exercising 
economic activities in the EU. It is also evident that the current possibilities 
for them to do so do not correspond to their economic or educational profiles 
or family situations. Thus, for many of them it seems there is no alternative 
to migrate irregularly. What has been the policy response of the EU? For the 
moment, the response has been coercion and expulsion. There is some 
frustration in the interior ministries of a number of Member States regarding 
Albanian asylum seekers. Increasingly they are placed on the safe country-
of-origin lists, which means that the examination protections of the 
Procedures Directive (2011/95/EU) can be dispensed with unless the 
applicant can displace the presumption that Albania is a safe country for him 
or her. This is rare and usually occurs only where there are serious claims by 
victims of trafficking.  
17.3 What does the European Commission’s report reveal about 
possible causes of migratory pressure from Albania? 
The Commission published its latest report on Albania in the context of the 
EU’s enlargement policy in November 2016.3 It provides a fairly clear picture 
of why there is migratory pressure regarding Albanians seeking economic 
opportunities abroad. Youth unemployment stood at 40% in 2015, an 
increase from 20% in 2007. The general unemployment rate in 2015 was 
approximately 17% (compared with 14% in 2007). Youth unemployment has 
risen dramatically since 2007, while general unemployment has risen much 
more slowly and it began to drop in 2015. According to the report, and 
perhaps part of the explanation for the high youth unemployment, “the 
quality of education needs to be raised at all levels to better equip people 
with skills and knowledge in line with labour market needs”. The lack of 
alignment of skills and opportunities in Albania for its young people is a 
classic concern regarding migratory pressure. The Commission’s report is 
not particularly optimistic about the process in the fight against corruption 
and notes in particular the need for more efforts to tackle corruption at high 
                                                     
3 See European Commission, Albania 2016 Report, SWD(2016) 364 final, Brussels, 
9.11.2016 (https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/ 
key_documents/2016/20161109_report_albania.pdf). 
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levels. It is equally disappointing with respect to the fight against organised 
crime, stating that “cooperation between police and prosecution needs to be 
strengthened to dismantle criminal networks more effectively”. Further, 
there is a need for greater independence of regulatory authorities and public 
broadcasters. The living conditions of Roma are also highlighted as 
unacceptable, as is the level of protection of children and the lack of efforts 
to tackle gender-based violence.  
The picture is not a particularly sunny one, especially for young 
people, women, children and minorities in Albania. The general picture is 
one of rapid degradation of educational and employment opportunities for 
young people over the past ten years accompanied by a political and 
economic situation still characterised by corruption at high levels and 
inadequate action against organised crime. These are all factors that make it 
difficult for young people to engage in economic activities either in 
employment or as self-employed individuals, as they face a dearth of formal 
jobs and a hostile environment for youth entrepreneurship, which is 
particularly vulnerable to negative externalities related to corruption and 
organised crime.  
17.4 Using trade agreements to provide solutions? 
The question posed at the start of this chapter is what role is there for trade 
agreements to provide solutions to incoherence between demand and 
opportunities in economic migration to the EU. The approach adopted in the 
Stabilisation Agreements has also been examined, which follows a respected 
tradition in EU agreements with its neighbours of including provisions on 
the establishment of companies and rights for companies to send their key 
personnel to their establishments on the territory of the other party. These 
agreements add also a well-used mechanism to support economic migration 
by individuals – a right to movement for the purpose of self-employment. 
The delay periods for this right have passed in most of the Stabilisation 
Agreements (only the delay period in the Serbia Agreement remains to 
expire in September 2017).  
However, this opportunity to use trade agreements to achieve better 
outcomes in economic migration has been shunned by a number of EU 
interior ministries. As far as we are aware, no Member State has made 
provision in its national immigration law to give effect to the entitlement of 
companies based in the Western Balkan countries to send their key personnel 
to their subsidiaries in the EU. Instead, where the issue has even been 
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addressed, lawyers and their client companies have been shunted off into 
the national, generally applicable immigration rules, which are frequently 
less favourable than the provisions of the agreements. The right of 
individuals to exercise self-employed activities has been greeted by relevant 
interior ministries with even less enthusiasm than the rights of companies. 
The consequence is the frustration of the objectives of the trade agreements, 
the nullification of rights promised to people and the creation of a hostile 
environment for regional cooperation and development.  
Instead of clearly set out (and circumscribed) economic migration 
possibilities in trade agreements being used to assist neighbouring countries 
to deal with what may be temporary economic turmoil (as in the case of 
Albania and its youth unemployment issue), Member States’ interior 
ministries have been left free to use exclusively coercive, non-entrée, refusal 
of admission and expulsion measures to block economic migration in the 
region. Perhaps it is time to address the prejudices within these ministries 
against economic migration and use the trade agreements already in 
existence with provisions for movement of persons for economic activities in 
the way they were intended to operate when negotiated. This would be a 
much less expensive option for the Member States than coercion and would 
have a very positive effect on diminishing irregular economic migration to 
the EU. It might even reduce the number of asylum applications from 
nationals of the Western Balkans in the EU if nationals of those states were 
able to access the economic movement rights they were promised in the 
trade agreements. 
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18. RESEARCH–POLICY DIALOGUES ON 
MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION AT THE EU 
LEVEL: WHO TELLS WHOM WHAT TO DO? 
RINUS PENNINX 
18.1 Introduction 
Good governance is based on a sound analysis of the issues to be governed; 
good policies are ‘evidence based’. Research has an important task to 
provide data and analysis to politicians and policy-makers. Politicians and 
policy-makers should use such scientific input for better policy decisions and 
practices. Scientific research funded by DG Research of the European 
Commission must be relevant for politics and society. These are the mantras 
of Eurospeak on how research should relate to politics and policy-making, 
and vice versa.1  
But what does the practice of research–policy dialogues (RPDs) 
actually look like? Is there a dialogue, implying reciprocity between 
independent, autonomous bodies? Or is there a one-way communication in 
which Policy tells Research what to deliver and picks and chooses from 
scientific knowledge what suits the Policy cause? 
This chapter will examine three questions. What silent assumptions are 
behind these slogans, and how could we best look analytically at the 
research–policy relation? How in actual practice does research relate to 
politics and policies and vice versa? What recommendations can we deduce 
from an analysis of RPDs to improve them? 
The analysis that follows is based on my long personal involvement in 
research and in policy-making as a researcher, a policy-maker (in a Dutch 
ministry) and a policy adviser (Penninx, 2005; 2013). I will also heavily lean 
on a recent book, Integrating Immigrants in Europe: Research–Policy Dialogues, 
                                                     
1 See European Commission, Migration and Mobility, Research and Innovation Projects 
in support to European Policy: The European Union’s Research Framework Programme, 
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2016. 
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which I co-edited with Peter Scholten, Han Entzinger and Stijn Verbeek 
(2015). That study analyses RPDs in the EU, in seven of its Member States, 
and at the local level of cities during the past two decades. In this 
contribution, I focus on the EU level. 
18.2 What questions to ask on RPDs? 
In the above-mentioned book (Scholten et al., 2015, p. 3), RPDs are defined 
as all forms of interaction between researchers and policy-makers. We use 
the term dialogues to refer to the reciprocal nature of research–policy 
relations: we are not just looking at how research is used in policy-making, 
but also how (the) policy (context) influences what is researched and how.  
Analytically, three aspects of RPDs can be distinguished, as 
diagrammed in the figure below.  
Figure 18.1 Research Policy Dialogue 
 
First, there are the concrete structures of RPDs, i.e. the formal and 
informal arrangements that exist through which knowledge itself, decisions 
on knowledge production and the relevance of knowledge for policy are 
communicated and exchanged. Second, there are cultures and practices of 
knowledge utilisation in policy processes. Here the key question is what role 
is attributed to knowledge and research by policy-makers in the process of 
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policy-making. Third, focusing on the researchers’ primary task, there are 
cultures of knowledge production in the field of migration research. A key 
question here is whether the production of knowledge is autonomous within 
the scientific world or (slightly or heavily) influenced by its policy users (and 
funders). 
18.3 The nature of science versus policy-making and 
assumptions of RPDs 
RPDs are exchanges between two worlds that have basically different tasks, 
attitudes and ethics in relation to migration and integration. The essential 
task of researchers is to build scientific knowledge on the movement of 
people across national borders and on the process of their entry and possible 
settlement in a society. They try to understand these phenomena by 
developing theories that ideally are able to predict the course of migration 
and processes of integration. While working towards such theories, they 
(should) develop their own specific scientific concepts, definitions and 
analytical models (i.e. autonomous and independent from political and 
policy definitions). 
Policy-making and implementation of policies in the field of migration 
and integration is a fundamentally different work and process. The essential 
characteristic of a policy is that it intends to steer processes in society. Policies 
are normative in nature: they define a problem and design policy action to 
solve that problem. (If there is no problem, there is no need for a policy.) In 
democratic societies, policies are defined politically by majorities in society. 
In the case of migrants and minorities this complicates things significantly: 
migration and integration policies represent expectations and demands of 
(majorities in) this society rather than those of immigrants. This is 
particularly the case when these issues are politicised. Politicisation 
reinforces the interests of the majority in the host society and increases 
demands on immigrants. In the process of making and implementing 
policies, specific concepts, categorisations and assumptions are developed 
that follow from the initial problem definition. These concepts, 
categorisations and assumptions may differ significantly from the ones used 
in scientific work.  
These differences of tasks and in the nature of research and policy lead 
to quite different expectations on what the contribution of researchers to 
policy-making should be, and what use the policy-maker should make of 
available or commissioned research. In the scientific study of policy, a 
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number of idealised models of research–policy relations have been defined. 
The enlightenment model (“speaking truth to power”; Wildavsky (1979)) 
comes close to the ideal typical image that outsiders of both worlds have of 
the role that scientific research has in relation to policy-making. 
Enlightenment assumes sharp boundaries between research and policy, but 
at the same time there is a great confidence that scientific knowledge will 
eventually become part of the policy-making process and of the policy-
makers’ interpretation of the policy problems (Weiss, 1977). In contrast to 
this, Hoppe (2005) formulates a technocratic model of research–policy 
relations, where researchers (‘experts’) are more directly involved in policy-
making. In this model, researchers do not just provide knowledge, but they 
also frame policy problems and develop solutions. They come close to taking 
over the role of policy-makers themselves.  
In the enlightenment and the technocratic models research is given a 
primary role in all phases of policy-making, from conceptualisation to 
evaluation. But other models, such as the bureaucratic model and the 
engineering model, are built on the primacy of politics in policy-making. The 
latter two models assume that research contributes to policy-making and 
political decisions, but that the scientific input is only one element: policy-
making is also – and often more – determined by values, norms and power. 
The bureaucratic model assumes a sharp Weberian fact–value dichotomy 
between research and politics: research is supposed to provide data (‘facts’) 
that policy-makers need to develop policies and reach decisions. The 
engineering model allows researchers a more influential role in policy, but 
preserves the primacy of politics, particularly when it comes to the 
conceptualisation and framing of policies; policy-makers are at liberty to 
select (‘pick and choose’) those strands of expertise that fit their 
conceptualisation.  
With the foregoing key questions and analytical ideas on research–
policy relations in mind, the next two subsections will look at RPDs at the 
EU level. Concretely, the first considers the question of how the European 
Commission has stimulated the scientific world to come up with research 
results that are relevant for EU policies. The second subsection offers some 
observations about how scientific input is used at the EU level. In answering 
these two questions, RPD structures will be mentioned en passant. 
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18.4 The demand for (specific) knowledge for EU policies and EU 
funding 
Large-scale investment in (funding of) research on migration and integration  
Within the European Commission, the DG for Research & Innovation is the 
most prominent funder of research on migration and integration. The 
website of the Migration Research Platform of the DG mentions that not less 
than 80 large-scale projects have been financed since the beginning in 1994. 
Singleton (2009) has described 50 of these comparative research projects 
funded by the Research Framework Programmes (FPs) 4, 5 and 6 up until 
2009. One of these early projects was the IMISCOE Network of Excellence 
(financed in the period 2004–10), which was meant to (and actually did) 
build an infrastructure for research at the European level. As a follow-up of 
Singleton’s overview, King and Lulle (2016) have recently analysed 17 large-
scale comparative research projects of FP7. A recent listing of projects by the 
European Commission2 adds to these overviews of direct FP-funded projects 
another 20 projects that DG Research co-funded with national funding 
agencies in the ERA-Net NORFACE programme on migration in Europe and 
the ERA-Net programme on welfare state futures.  
The funding of research in FPs and FP-related programmes is done 
according to institutionalised procedures. The size and the general topics of 
each FP research programme are proposed by DG Research after internal 
(with the policy DGs) and external consultation on importance and 
relevance, and decided upon politically by the European Council and 
Parliament. General FP programmes are specified later in time, in line with 
available funding and according to more specific issues in work 
programmes. The research world is given the opportunity to react to open 
calls by making specific research proposals for specific elements/issues of 
the work programmes. The societal relevance of the proposals is an 
important element in the evaluation and allocation.  
Apart from DG Research, there is sizeable funding of research by DGs 
that are directly responsible for migration and integration policies, 
particularly by the DG for Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME). Two 
ways of financing research by this DG can be distinguished. The first is 
financing policy-oriented research as a structural part of the policy 
programme. This started with the INTI programme 2003–07, which funded 
research projects related to (often local) integration of third-country 
                                                     
2 Ibid. 
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nationals. From 2007 onwards, such research became part of the European 
Integration Fund (EIF). Numerous research projects – again selected in open 
competition – were funded by the community action programme of the EIF 
between 2007 and 2013. Of these, 69 are described by Bruquetas Callejo 
(2015). 
Apart from the EIF, DG HOME has funded an uncounted number of 
short-term, policy-defined research projects. These are more instantly 
planned, short-term projects in which the research question stems directly 
from policy practice and is narrowly described. The research institutes (in 
this stream more often based in the commercial bureaus than in universities 
and academic institutions) are again chosen in open competition.  
More ‘open’ integration research as compared with ‘closed’ migration 
research 
All in all, the first question can be answered unequivocally: the 
European Commission has invested in research on migration and integration 
since 1994 and these investments have become sizeable since 2003. Both DG 
Research and DGs in charge of migration and integration policies have 
contributed to this. DGs have been explicit on their motivation to generate 
knowledge relevant for European societies and for EU policies. DG Research 
has done this in a somewhat more open way, by only selecting the relevant 
issues for funding and leaving the task of how to research these issues to 
scientists. DG HOME (and recently other policy directorates) have done this 
by defining more precisely the research aims, questions and contexts. Within 
this general conclusion, however, some observations can be made that 
differentiate this general picture.  
An important observation is that there are significant differences in 
how the topic of migration appears in EU-commissioned research as 
opposed to the integration issue. Migration research was dominant at the 
beginning and its commissioning has always been more ‘closed’, i.e. the 
issues have been narrowly described and from a policy perspective. 
Integration research started later (in 2003), but became more dominant than 
migration research; integration research is relatively stronger in the more 
‘open’ forms of research commissioning (by FPs and the EIF). Where do these 
differences stem from? Let us look back on these different tracks of policy-
making and how they shape ‘demand’. 
Migration policy has been a first pillar, communitarian policy since the 
Amsterdam Treaty of 1997. Policy-making in this field entails the politically 
sensitive balancing of making binding common regulations both for internal 
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free movement (mobility) and for controlled external movement 
(international migration of third-country nationals). In such a context, there 
is little room or demand for external knowledge or for alternative framing. 
Indeed, there is a strong inclination on the part of the Member States to keep 
procedures in policy-making closed and data collection internal. This is well 
illustrated by the rejection in the late 1990s of the European Commission’s 
proposal to establish a European migration observatory, an external and 
independent data-collecting institution, such as those existing in a number 
of other areas (Salt et al., 1998). After this rejection, a long internal debate 
followed on how to organise data collection and research, ending with the 
establishment of the European Migration Network (EMN) in 2003. The 
national EMN teams are under the direct management of national 
governments, and in most cases within ministries. In the Dutch case, for 
example, the EMN team is located within the IND, the Immigration and 
Naturalisation Service of the Ministry of Justice.  
Integration policy at the EU level started later than migration policy. 
The EU integration concept as defined initially in the 1999 Tampere 
programme is strictly legal: citizens of non-EU states are integrated at the 
moment that their formal rights are the same as those of national citizens. It 
was only in the 2003 Communication on Migration and Integration3 that a 
more comprehensive concept of integration was announced (still only for 
third-country nationals and not applicable to EU citizens who were 
supposed to be integrated by definition!). But the policy-making on 
integration is not communitarian, as in the case of migration, but 
intergovernmental. It has to be based on a consensus of nation-states and 
their voluntary cooperation; no binding legislation or directives underpin 
integration policies, but only soft instruments, such as the Common Basic 
Principles for Integration.4 The strategy for developing such a policy is the 
open method of coordination. In such an open context of non-binding policy-
making that involves furthermore several levels (the city, the region, the state 
and the EU) and multiple stakeholders (migrants, civil society and 
government) systematic data collection, evaluation and research have 
become important tools of policy-making in this open method of 
coordination.  
                                                     
3 See European Commission, Communication on Immigration, Integration and 
Employment, COM(2003) 336 final, Brussels, 3.3.2003. 
4 See European Commission, Common Basic Principles for Integration, adopted by 
the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 19.11.2004. 
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The explanation for the explosion of research funding on integration 
research since 2003 and its dominance over migration research over the 
whole period is to be found in the specific position of the European 
Commission in policy-making in the two domains of respectively migration 
and integration. In the migration domain, external autonomous scientific 
input was not in demand, but it was rather seen by Member States as a threat 
to (communitarian) policy-making. In the integration domain, research was 
drawn into multi-level and multi-stakeholder (non-binding) policy-making 
as a tool to build consensus. No wonder that most of the FP-funded research 
projects were on topics of integration rather than migration. And no wonder 
that the large European Integration Fund had a structural part earmarked 
for integration research, while a comparable fund for migration research 
does not exist; the European migration observatory was stillborn.  
18.5 Knowledge utilisation in policy-making 
Boswell (2009) claims that there are different ‘cultures’ of knowledge 
utilisation. These are built on the function that research has for policy-
making. The most basic function involves the instrumental utilisation of 
knowledge and expertise. In this case, research is effectively taken as content 
input into policy-making; research is an instrument for policy-making. It is 
this type of knowledge utilisation that is assumed in the notion of ‘evidence-
based policy-making.’  
In addition to such instrumental use of knowledge, Boswell 
distinguishes two more symbolic types of knowledge utilisation. The first is 
that knowledge provides authority to policy decisions already taken by 
substantiating these policy decisions with relevant (and supportive) 
knowledge and expertise. The second symbolic type of knowledge 
utilisation is legitimatisation of policies and policy institutions. This 
legitimatising function of research and expertise goes beyond substantive 
research findings: it refers to the mere symbolic act of having knowledge and 
expertise to claim authority over a particular policy.  
Knowledge utilisation in the EU 
Boswell’s (2009) landmark work on knowledge utilisation in migration 
policy-making in the UK, Germany and the EU indicates various important 
contextual factors that may help explain why, where and when a specific 
type of knowledge utilisation emerges. For instance, her examination of the 
EMN revealed that this organisation primarily served to substantiate EU 
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migration policies in the context of the fierce politicisation of this issue at the 
European level. In addition, her UK and German case studies point to the 
relevance of the organisational structure of the policy domain. She claims, 
for instance, that the fragmented and contested nature of the migration 
policy domain in Germany helps explain why the role of the BAMF (the 
Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees) was mostly substantiating 
rather than instrumental or legitimating.  
Unfortunately, there have been only a few attempts to study 
knowledge utilisation at the EU level in terms of Boswell’s cultures of 
knowledge utilisation. Furthermore, some have a broader scope, such as 
Geddes and Achtnich (2015) and Singleton (2015), who cover the wider field 
of science–society dialogues – which include more stakeholders than RPDs. 
Others use different concepts and methodologies, such as Pratt (2015), who 
uses the case study method to analyse RPDs around the preparation of two 
policy documents. There is thus still a lot of systematic work to do to 
establish firm conclusions. For now, I will make a few preliminary 
observations. 
My first observation is that there is certainly a significant part of EU-
funded research that has had – at least partly – an instrumental function for 
policy-making. This is particularly the case with projects that made 
inventories and comparisons of existing, national statistical data on 
migration and integration, such as the COMPSTAT, PROMINSTAT and 
THESIM projects. In the same vein, there have been many research projects 
that made inventories and comparisons of existing national regulations and 
policy practices in the legal–political domain (such as naturalisation and 
political participation), in the socioeconomic domain (such as work, labour 
market regulation and immigrant entrepreneurship; migrants in housing, 
education and health systems) and in the domain of culture and religion (the 
regulation of the position of culture, language and worldview of 
immigrants). The comparative character of these projects made them 
informative, in terms of both the facts and the analytical insights on the 
societal processes that led to these facts. The instrumental use of these facts 
and insights, however, is mostly indirect (partly through use at levels other 
than the EU) and is not easy to recognise immediately in policy-making and 
documents.  
There is certainly a strong symbolic use of research by the European 
Commission. This symbolic use refers not so much to the substantiating role 
of research: if the European Commission were to use knowledge to 
substantiate its own political stances, we would expect far more references 
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to research and scientific work in the many policy documents that have been 
produced at the EU level in the last two decades. The symbolic use seems to 
have predominantly been the function of legitimising the role of the 
European Commission. The huge investments of the European Commission 
(through DG Research and policy departments) can best be explained by the 
fact that it sees a good knowledge base and research as important 
instruments for policy-making in a context in which the Commission itself is 
dependent on the cooperation of national (and local) authorities. This 
dependence is different for migration and integration policies, as I have 
outlined above.  
18.6 New directions for policy–research relations and dialogues 
We concluded in the foregoing paragraphs that the European Commission 
has (had) a strong influence on migration research in Europe through (the 
way of) funding it. The Commission does not just influence the extent of the 
research efforts, but also its content, the framing of issues, the choice of 
research topics and the concepts used are shaped by the European 
Commission’s research policies. We have also seen that at the EU level the 
use of knowledge in general and of commissioned research in the policy-
making process is seldom directly visible. A certain indirect, instrumental 
use of part of the commissioned research can be made plausible, but the 
dominant use appears to be symbolic, particularly legitimising the European 
Commission’s position as a policy-maker in two politicised fields. This 
picture is not in line with the mantras that we mentioned at the beginning of 
this chapter. What could be done to improve this situation? I formulate two 
directions in which we should look to make RPDs at the EU level more fertile 
and healthy. 
The first relates to the protection and preservation of the autonomy of 
commissioned scientific work. One can accept to a certain extent that policy 
DGs feel the need to commission strongly predefined, short-term, policy-
oriented research projects to solve problems of policy-making (rather than 
problems with the content of policies). But if a serious contribution of science 
is expected from structural research funding, such as in the FP programmes 
of DG Research or the EIF (or its successor), researchers should be involved 
much earlier and more closely in the formulation of research questions. 
Concretely, the academic world should have more influence on the 
programming and selection of research funded by DG Research. Procedures 
for programming and selection should be more open for argumentation 
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based on the state of the art of knowledge and theory building than for policy 
definitions and pressure.  
The second relates to the role that politicians and policy-makers assign 
to scientific knowledge and research. If a serious quality contribution of the 
scientific world to policy-making is expected, policy-makers should not only 
expect such a contribution from research they commission and fund. Policy-
makers should also be more receptive to and more serious about developing 
ways of collecting knowledge that is relevant for their issues in the broad 
sense. RPD frameworks that bring academics and policy-makers together in 
a structured way may have beneficial effects for direct instrumental use of 
available knowledge as well as for programming new – policy-relevant – 
research. 
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19. EU LEGAL MIGRATION TEMPLATES AND 
COGNITIVE RUPTURES: WAYS FORWARD 
IN RESEARCH AND POLICY-MAKING 
DORA KOSTAKOPOULOU 
he evolution of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) 
exemplifies the visionary template for European integration enshrined 
in the Schuman Declaration (9 May 1950): “Europe will not be made 
all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete 
achievements which first create a de facto solidarity.”1 Through consistent 
action in variable, and often unpredictable, environments as well as through 
processes of trial and error, European institutional actors have designed 
legal templates for migration governance that can better address the needs 
of European societies and polities, along with citizens, residents and 
admission seekers. There is a lot to commend ‘Europe’ for in this area. 
Hardly anyone would have predicted the adoption of so many legal 
migration directives in the early 1990s when the intergovernmentalist pillar 
of justice and home affairs (JHA) was established by the Treaty of European 
Union (in force on 1 November 1993).2  
Transcending theirs fears about possible sovereignty losses and 
learning to trust each other and the common European Community 
institutions they had designed, national executives agreed on the partial 
communitarisation of the JHA pillar at Amsterdam (the Amsterdam Treaty 
entered into force on 1 May 1999) and finally on its full communitarisation 
by the Treaty of Lisbon ten years later (in force on 1 December 2009).3 The 
first decade of the new millennium saw the adoption of the first five legal 
                                                     
1 See the Schuman Declaration (https://europa.eu/european-union/about-
eu/symbols/europe.../schuman-declaration_en). 
2 See the Treaty on European Union, 7 February 1992, OJ C 191/1, 29.7.1992. 
3 See the Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community, 13 December 2007, OJ C 306/1, 17.12.2007. 
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migration directives: the Long-Term Residence Directive; the Family 
Reunification Directive; the Directive on the Conditions of Admission of 
Students, Pupils, Unremunerated Trainees and Volunteers; the Directive on 
a Specific Procedure for Admitting Third-Country National Researchers; and 
the Blue Card Directive.4 Shortly afterwards, the Single Permit Directive, the 
Seasonal Workers Directive and the Intra-Corporate Transfer Directive were 
adopted.5 True, the processes of negotiating and agreeing on the legal 
content of the directives have not been smooth. But it is equally true that 
discontent, rival national interests and the prevailing ideological lenses did 
not stall the institutional journey of the AFSJ. After all, short-term opposition 
and temporary obstacles can delay and frustrate regulatory choices but these 
eventually become absorbed in long-term processes of continuous feedback 
loops of learning, trust-building and searching for better and more efficient 
policy designs.  
What has also been remarkable in this institutional journey is the depth 
of the institutional change that has taken place. More openness and 
accountability was infused into the AFSJ, effective parliamentary 
supervision and judicial scrutiny provided improvements in the governance 
of legal migration, and the one-sided prevailing belief in restricting, 
controlling and securitising migration was supplemented by a more liberal 
                                                     
4 See Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-
country nationals who are long-term residents, OJ L 16/44, 23.1.2004; Council Directive 
2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification, OJ L 251/12, 
3.10.2003; Council Directive 2004/114/EC of 13 December 2004 on the conditions of 
admission of third-country nationals for the purposes of studies, pupil exchange, 
unremunerated training or voluntary service, OJ L 375/12, 23.12.2004; Council Directive 
2005/71/EC of 12 October 2005 on a specific procedure for admitting third-country 
nationals for the purposes of scientific research, OJ L 289/15, 3.11.2005; Council Directive 
2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country 
nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment, OJ L 155/17, 18.6.2009. For 
an analysis, see Wiesbrock (2010).  
5 See Directive 2011/98/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
December 2011 on a single application procedure for a single permit for third-country 
nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member State and common set of rights 
for workers, OJ L 343/1, 23.12.2011; Directive 2014/36/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on conditions of entry and stay of third-country 
nationals for the purposes of employment as seasonal workers, OJ L 94/375, 28.3.2014 
and Directive 2014/66/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 
on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals in the framework of 
an intra-corporate transfer, OJ L 157/1, 27.5.2014, respectively. 
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approach and a stronger focus on the rights of the individual. The EU citizen 
has also been placed at “the heart of the project”.6 Such a liberal approach 
characterised the Tampere and Stockholm programmes.7 In this respect, 
although ideology and security challenges led to a restrictive and security-
based discourse and policy on external migration,8 political pragmatism, a 
more positive frame for labour migration and the situation of European 
migration policies, which the global dynamics of human mobility and a 
rights-based focus fuelled by the binding EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
also played an important role in shaping the EU’s legal migration acquis 
(Fletcher et al., 2016). In fact, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the 
latter has effected a cognitive change in how human mobility is perceived 
and should be regulated, thereby enriching the policy menu of the EU and 
of national governments.  
To this end, the European Commission has played a remarkable role 
by providing forward-thinking, creative approaches and often an audacious 
reappraisal of some of the underlying assumptions that underpin policy 
selection in the migration field. Its numerous Communications have 
enriched the cognitive menu of national institutional actors and have 
prompted them to view migration as a resource and an opportunity for 
economic regeneration and societal enrichment. They have also emphasised 
the need for a flexible and proactive migration policy and consistently 
promoted the vision of a “Europe of rights”9 and a ‘Europe of citizens’. In 
reality, this vision of Europe was no other than the Schuman Declaration’s 
vision of a Europe of solidarity. Promoting a more integrated social space 
and a Europe of solidarity was a political priority of the Stockholm 
programme. To this end, the Commission at that time called for a dynamic 
                                                     
6 See European Commission, Communication on an Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice serving the citizen: Wider freedom in a safer environment, COM(2009) 262/4, 
Brussels, 10.6.2009, p. 2. 
7 See European Council, Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere European Council, SN 
200/99, Brussels, 15-16 October 1999 and Council of the European Union, The Stockholm 
Programme – An Open and Secure Europe serving and protecting the citizens, 17024/09, 
Brussels, 2.12.2009; see also Guild and Carrera (2009) and Kostakopoulou (2007), pp. 153–
191. 
8 This was evident in The Hague programme, which was agreed by the European Council 
in November 2004; see European Council, The Hague Programme: Strengthening 
Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union, OJ C 53/1, 3.3.2005.  
9 See European Commission, COM(2009) 262/4, op. cit., p. 7. 
EU LEGAL MIGRATION TEMPLATES AND COGNITIVE RUPTURES  179 
and comprehensive migration policy, which consolidates the Global 
Approach to Migration and is anchored on responsibility and solidarity.10  
But a ‘Europe of solidarity’ needs to be a Europe of comprehensive 
solidarity and not of EU national solidarity. In other words, solidarity cannot 
be confined to nationals of the Member States. It has to embrace all residents 
in the EU and all those seeking sanctuary or admission to it. This, in turn, 
requires a positive commitment to the ideal of partnership and cooperation 
among the Member States and the EU’s neighbours and third-country 
partners and to fundamental rights. Such a positive commitment to 
fundamental rights was exemplified very recently in Advocate General (AG) 
Paolo Mengozzi’s opinion in X and X v Belgium.11 He argued that the Member 
States have a positive obligation to issue humanitarian visas to Syrian 
applicants under Art. 25(1)(a) of the Visa Code and Art. 4 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, which protects individuals against inhuman and 
degrading treatment. Such an obligation exists where there are serious 
grounds to believe that the refusal to issue a visa would lead to the applicants 
being subjected to treatment prohibited by Art. 4 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and would prevent them from the only legal recourse 
to enjoy their right to apply for international protection.12 A positive 
commitment to partnership, on the other hand, rules out both attitudes of 
insularity and national centrifugalism.  
Social scientific research could aid policy-making in this area by 
studying the rise of neo-nationalism and populism in Europe and the 
serviceability of such discourses. At first sight, one might be tempted to view 
these discourses as regressive steps and a return to ethno-nationalism. 
However, as the political environment is undergoing change, ideology 
cannot but adapt to it. In this respect, one might find new elements in them 
or new articulations that draw and redraw boundaries among human beings 
and create ‘othering’. Social scientists could add valuable knowledge to how 
conservative forces exploit economic uncertainty in order to arouse fears and 
prejudice among Europe’s citizens and residents. Research on racism, 
xenophobia, the rights of hate crime victims and processes of othering is thus 
needed. For othering is essentially about distancing, that is, about creating 
barriers that keep human beings apart. These might be physical – that is, 
                                                     
10 Ibid., Priority 5, p. 23. 
11 See Case C-638/16 PPU X and X v Belgium, Opinion of AG Mengozzi of 7 February 
2017. 
12 Ibid.  
180  DORA KOSTAKOPOULOU 
manifested in practices of ‘walling’ which separate ‘ins’ from ‘outs’ – or 
social or psychological. The latter happens when individuals share the same 
public space but are made to feel that they do not belong to it. It also happens 
when the other’s empirical presence is denied in law and she or he is kept 
apart by policies that posit obstacles to full inclusion. Access to citizenship, 
for example, has become more difficult in Europe and civic integration 
policies have exclusionary effects. It would be interesting to map the scope 
and organisational structure of the integration policies of the Member States 
and to juxtapose these with the scope and structure of their anti-
discrimination and anti-marginalisation policies. How much input do 
migrants have in the design and implementation of integration policies and 
what scope is there for achieving societal integration via a non-
discrimination and citizenship-driven agenda? 
Notwithstanding the work of social researchers, these are difficult 
times and the EU needs to avoid the capture of its values and policies by 
centrifugal nationalism and populism. It has to stand firm, affirm its values 
and defend its achievements. If it fails to do so, it will compromise its 
operation, the ethos of internationalism and connectivity among peoples, 
societies and states, as well as its principles of fundamental rights protection 
and non-discrimination. It also has to defend internal mobility and to extol 
its benefits for economies, societies, politics and individuals. And of course, 
the defence of mobility has to take place within a paradigm characterised by 
a positive appraisal of migration. For both internal mobility and external 
migration are transformative. Even during these challenging times, 
progressive forces need to challenge vigorously the negative and security-
based narrative about migration and to defend both the experience of 
relating to one another and the openness of societies. 
As the architectural foundations of the legal migration governance 
have been established, the reappraisal of the legal migration acquis could 
assess the implementation of the directives mentioned above. This is a 
perfect time for reflection and for improvements in the implementation of 
the existing instruments with a view to ensuring a fundamental rights-
compliant implementation. Given the existing configuration of political 
forces, the robust defence of what has been adopted and the correction of 
gaps in implementation in ‘old’ and ‘new’ Member States are advisable. And 
as the Charter becomes more prominent in the EU legal order, social 
scientific research could aid policy-making by examining the extent to which 
the implementing measures adopted by the Member States affirm migrants’ 
rights, including the right to health, education, family reunification and 
political participation. 
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An important aspect of the EU’s institutional framework on legal 
migration would also be the drafting of an immigration code, which would 
incorporate the existing sectorial directives and provide a uniform level of 
rights. The Commission proposed this in 2009, but the Council sought to 
close the conversation about the immigration code by excluding it from the 
Stockholm programme. The Commission’s “Action Plan Implementing the 
Stockholm Programme” resurrected this mandate, which national executives 
had left out of the Stockholm programme.13 The code would provide “a 
uniform level of rights and obligations for legal immigrants” and further 
contribute to the aim of designing a common migration and asylum policy 
“within a long-term vision of respect for fundamental rights and human 
dignity”.14 But the Council was not open to this idea. A few months later, it 
reacted by noting that “some of the actions proposed by the Commission 
were not in line with the Stockholm Programme” and it urged the 
Commission to “take only those initiatives that are in full conformity with 
the Programme”.15  
The vision of the Commission and the Stockholm programme of a 
‘dynamic and fair migration policy’ in the 21st century was interrupted by 
the economic crisis in the eurozone, the rise of Eurosceptic and neo-
nationalist political parties in Europe and a sudden increase in the number 
of migrants and refugees seeking admission. Although the political 
environment continues to be restrictive, the long-term goal of an EU 
immigration code should remain on the agenda. For such a code would 
integrate all the existing instruments, eliminate inconsistencies and 
unjustified variations among them, and provide an opportunity for clarity, 
simplification and raised standards in rights protection. Such an institutional 
template would lead to a changed cognitive menu, since migrants would` be 
viewed as rightful participants in practices of economic cooperation. In this 
respect, a future immigration code would not be a subtraction from, but an 
important addition to the EU’s legal migration architecture.  
                                                     
13 See European Commission, Delivering an area of Freedom, Security and Justice for 
Europe’s citizens – Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm Programme, COM(2010) 
171 final, Brussels, 20.4.2010, 7. 
14 Ibid., 7. 
15 See Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on the Commission’s 
Communication “Delivering an area of freedom, security and justice for Europe’s 
citizens – Action Plan implementing the Stockholm Programme”, COM(2010) 171 final, 
Luxembourg, 3.6.2010, p. 2. 
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20. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: 
TOWARDS A FAIR EU AGENDA 
FACILITATING LEGAL CHANNELS 
FOR LABOUR MOBILITY 
SERGIO CARRERA, ANDREW GEDDES 
AND ELSPETH GUILD 
he collection of chapters making up this book have provided a 
detailed and multidisciplinary examination of the main issues and 
challenges associated with legal migration policies in the EU as well 
as in the context of EU cooperation with third countries. The book has 
studied the extent to which EU legal migration policies, and the concepts 
substantiating their rationales, are well suited to capture the social 
characteristics and changing trajectories of individuals exercising cross-
border mobility. Special attention has been paid to the relationship between 
the policies and the international and EU standards on fair working and 
living conditions of third-country workers.  
A first cross-cutting finding emerging from the various chapters is 
that current frameworks on migration policy in the EU often lead to a 
‘mismatch’ between the law/policy, their underlying working notions and 
expectations, and the actual features of people’s cross-border movements, 
their changing life courses and motivations. The chapters also address the 
complex relationship between labour migration (patterns and policies) and 
economic/social changes in the EU and beyond.  
The book has also investigated the interactions between research and 
migration policy. While there is much to gain in basing EU policies on the 
best social science and humanities knowledge, EU lawmaking has generally 
preferred a kind of ‘knowledge’ that uncritically substantiates political 
decisions already taken, or which is aimed at the legitimation of EU 
institutional actors’ interests and pre-set agendas.  
This chapter identifies and explores the main findings that have 
emerged from the analysis. In light of these, it puts forward policy 
T 
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recommendations for the EU to consider in the current Legal Migration 
Fitness Check (REFIT Initiative), which was originally included in the 2016 
Commission Communication “Towards a Reform of the Common 
European Asylum System and Enhancing Legal Avenues to Europe”.1 The 
REFIT Initiative aims at “improving existing rules as far as possible also in 
light of the need to prevent and combat labour exploitation”.2 This chapter 
concludes by calling for the adoption of a fair EU agenda facilitating legal 
channels for migration to guide the next phases that result from the Fitness 
Check. 
20.1 EU labour immigration policy and law: The state of play 
The last 15 years have witnessed an increased ‘EU dimension’ and a gradual 
process of ‘Europeanisation’ of labour migration policies in the Union 
(Geddes and Niemann, 2015). They also show that Europeanisation is not a 
linear process and that there can be bumps on the road as well as, at times, 
resistance by different actors.  
The development of a common EU policy and approach in this 
domain remains by and large a long-standing political goal. The existing EU 
policy and legal framework dealing with the conditions of legal entry and 
residence of third-country nationals (TCNs) – legal immigration – and 
specifically those dealing with employment, has been said to be 
characterised by fragmentation, legal uncertainty and multi-layered 
migratory statuses across the Union (Carrera et al., 2011 and 2014).  
Originally the European Commission tried to implement a 
‘horizontal’ harmonisation approach through a unique legal act in the form 
of the 2001 proposal for a directive covering conditions of entry and 
residence for employment/self-employment of all categories of third-
                                                     
1 See European Commission, Towards a Reform of the Common European Asylum 
System and Enhancing Legal Avenues to Europe, COM(2016) 197 final, Brussels, 
6.4.2016, p. 18. See also European Commission, “Regulatory Fitness and Performance 
Programme (REFIT) – State of Play and Outlook – REFIT Scoreboard”, Commission Staff 
Working Document, SWD(2015) 110 final, annexed to the Communication on Better 
Regulation for Better Results – An EU agenda, COM(2015) 215 final, Strasbourg, 
19.5.2015. 
2 Ibid., p. 18. 
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country workers.3 The proposal, however, was withdrawn in March 2006 
without ever reaching any necessary accord among Member State 
representatives within the Council rooms. 
The Commission followed up with the launch of a public consultation 
on the 2004 Green Paper on an EU approach to managing economic 
migration. The Green Paper addressed the ‘added value’ of, and the most 
appropriate form for, EU rules governing the admission and residence of 
TCNs in the field of employment.4 Several respondents to the open 
consultation procedure expressed concerns about the sectorial step, 
featuring a worker-by-worker approach. At that time this included the 
European Parliament, which was of the opinion that “this legislation should 
define an overall regulatory framework of reference”.5 
The Commission then embarked on what has been considered a 
‘partitioning strategy’, consisting of splitting its original proposal into 
various drafts focused on particular categories of labour migration (Geddes 
and Niemann, 2015). The resulting picture was delineated by the 
Commission in the 2005 Policy Plan on Legal Migration,6 which followed 
an open consultation procedure on the way forward. The 2005 Policy Plan 
consisted of the implementation of a worker-by-worker normative 
approach guiding the shapes of EU labour immigration policy.  
The official justification offered by the Commission for taking this 
approach was that Member States had not shown sufficient support for a 
horizontal strategy. According to the 2005 Policy Plan, the package of 
sectorial directives aimed at developing “non-bureaucratic and flexible 
tools to offer a fair, rights-based approach to all labour immigrants on the 
                                                     
3 See European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on the conditions of entry 
and residence for the purpose of paid employment and self-employment activities, 
COM(2001) 386 final, Brussels, 11.7.2001. 
4 See European Commission, Green Paper on an EU approach to managing economic 
migration, COM(2004) 811 final, Brussels, 1.11.2005. See also Carrera and Formisano 
(2005). 
5 See the European Parliament Resolution on an EU approach to managing economic 
migration (COM(2004)0811 – 2005/2059(INI)), point 26. 
6 See European Commission, Policy Plan on Legal Migration, COM(2005) 669, Brussels, 
21.12.2005. See also Carrera (2007). 
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one hand and attracting conditions for specific categories of immigrants 
needed in the EU, on the other”.7 
The policy framework that has emerged since then has therefore been 
one deeply embedded in what can be called ‘systemic fragmentation’. As 
Guild underlines in chapter 6 of this volume, this fragmentation relates to 
both the territory to which labour migration is permitted and the basis of 
the type of employment/specific sector for which the TCNs are admitted. 
There is indeed a very high degree of diversity of EU legal instruments and 
statuses, which include not only a large body of EU secondary legislation 
but also a body of international agreements, and political instruments and 
policy tools lacking legally-binding force.8  
Chapter 6 by Guild provides an account of existing EU legal acts on 
labour migration. These cover common rules on entry and residence of 
highly qualified workers (EU Blue Card), seasonal workers and intra-
corporate transferees, as well as researchers, trainees and students. These 
have been complemented by a Single Permit Directive, which foresees a 
single application procedure and single permit for access and residence for 
employment-related reasons in the EU. Yet this package of directives falls 
short in securing a common EU policy on labour migration. 
The above-mentioned Communication, “Towards a Reform of the 
Common European Asylum System and Enhancing Legal Avenues to 
Europe”, called for ensuring a more “effective enforcement of the relevant 
EU acquis to ensure the protection of the rights of the migrants who are 
working in the EU, in particular to prevent labour exploitation, irrespective 
of their legal status”.9 The Commission could additionally pay attention to 
identifying and addressing any potential counter-productive effects at the 
various stages of implementation of EU labour migration legislation.  
Chapter 9 by Kroes observes some of the paradoxes that the domestic 
implementation of the Directive on Intra-Corporate Transfer (ICT) has 
posed in the Netherlands in comparison with the national scheme on 
mobility programmes that existed beforehand. Kroes shows how this has 
led to a high degree of confusion among key stakeholders in the country 
                                                     
7 Ibid., p. 5. 
8 For a detailed analysis of how these EU legal instruments define the room for 
manoeuvre by EU Member States, refer to Verschueren (2016), pp. 373–408. See also 
Peers et al. (2012). 
9 See European Commission, COM(2016) 197 final (2016), op. cit., p. 18. 
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and to companies trying to ‘legitimately’ avoid the application of the 
directive.  
20.2 EU migration policy goes abroad: The external dimensions 
The ‘internal’ framework of EU law and policy on legal and labour 
immigration discussed above has developed alongside a body of multiple 
instruments delineating the EU’s cooperation with third countries. EU 
external migration law and policy are characterised by a similarly patchy 
picture of instruments that differ in objectives, scope, nature and effects, as 
well as in the involvement of EU and domestic actors. 
These include for instance international agreements with direct and 
indirect relevance for the treatment and rights of third-country workers 
migrating from those countries to the EU and which have taken the 
following forms: Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, Association 
Agreements with the Maghreb countries (Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria) 
and with Turkey (Eisele, 2014). The fact that these international agreements 
deal with some aspects of legal and labour migration debunks the myth that 
the EU has no competence to deal with these domains in its external 
relations in accordance with the Treaties. 
The Union has also actively developed non-legally binding 
instruments and tools of a predominantly ‘political’ (non-legally binding) 
nature aimed at covering labour and circular migration schemes, i.e. 
Mobility Partnerships (MPs) and the Common Agenda for Migration and 
Mobility (CAMM) (Carrera et al., 2015b). These have been part of the EU’s 
Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM), and are now among 
the instruments implementing the EU Migration Partnership Framework 
with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration and the so-
called EU compacts.10 
EU external migration policies have provided new venues and fields 
for actors to pursue their interests and have developed in ways that often 
escape accountability or democratic and judicial ‘checks and balances’ 
similar to those in the domestic arenas (Stefan, 2016). EU external migration 
policies too often relegate or subsume the rights of individuals to interstate 
                                                     
10 See European Commission, Communication on establishing a new Partnership 
Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration, COM(2016) 
385 final, 7.6.2016, Brussels.  
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or inter-actor interests and priorities. The flexible nature and multi-purpose 
functions of these instruments have important repercussions for principles 
of legal certainty, transparency, accountability and human rights 
protections. EU MPs constitute a case in point.  
As chapter 12 by Den Hertog and Tittel-Mosser points out, MPs have 
a very complex and multi-actor implementation structure that blurs 
scrutiny and their democratic, legal and financial accountability. The 
analysis provided by chapter 12 of MP projects with Cape Verde, Moldova 
and Morocco confirms that, despite their actual name, Mobility 
Partnerships have contributed very little to fostering ‘mobility’ or ‘circular 
migration’ to the EU. The overwhelming priority of the envisaged projects 
has instead been on security and irregular immigration. 
Chapter 13 by Stefan argues that one of the main functions pursued 
by EU external policy instruments is to persuade third countries to interlink 
cooperation on legal migration (e.g. visa facilitation deals) with the 
advancement of the EU’s readmission agenda. This includes strategic 
partners such as China and India, which paradoxically do not represent a 
source of irregular migration to the EU. Stefan adds: “Very little or no 
consideration is instead given to the individual motivations for travelling 
to the EU.” 
As Weinar further explains in chapter 11, “[l]egal migration seems to 
be less of an objective than a bargaining chip in negotiations to obtain 
cooperation on border management”. Legal migration is, in her opinion, 
“more like an afterthought”, which is particularly absent in cooperation 
frameworks with African countries. It has certainly taken a long time for EU 
actors to finally realise that these issues are deeply ingrained in national 
economic policies, where the interests of all the actors involved simply do 
not match and cannot be kept hostage by EU border management and 
readmission agendas.  
This book has equally explored the relationship between migration 
and trade policies. The exact shape and implications of that nexus call for 
careful consideration and analysis. Chapter 15 by Panizzon indicates that 
“there are several shades of grey” in the increasing linkages between 
migration and trade. The risks include commodifying migrants by 
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undermining their rights and labour standards, and facilitating their 
exploitation and abuse.11 
It is clear from chapter 16 by Tans that some EU Member States do not 
always comply with their commitments to apply equality of treatment for 
foreign service providers in line with domestic service providers, and 
instead tend to apply more protective and restrictive policies as regards 
access to the labour market, which are incompatible with international trade 
commitments. There are also interesting opportunities, however. Panizzon 
argues in chapter 15 that there is still positive potential to be explored on 
how trade preferences may compensate for refugee employment and better 
secure refugee protection standards. 
Trade agreements additionally offer interesting potential as 
mechanisms for legal migration and relieving irregular immigration to the 
EU. Guild’s chapter 17 shows that trade agreement provisions on a right to 
move for self-employment and ICTs can provide solutions to address the 
inconsistencies between demand and opportunities for labour migration to 
the EU. Immigration possibilities in trade agreements could also be used to 
assist neighbouring countries, such as those in the Western Balkans, to deal 
with economic difficulties and reduce the number of asylum seekers from 
these countries.  
The prevailing, interior ministries-led approach driving Union and 
Member State policies on migration constitutes a central obstacle to 
achieving better outcomes in labour immigration to the EU.  
20.3 Legal migration: Whose legal competence? 
Discussions on EU migration policy have been characterised by legal 
competence issues and struggles as regards ‘how much EU’ there can be in 
this domain in light of the powers conferred by the Treaties to the EU. One 
of the most controversial issues regarding Member States’ control relates to 
labour immigration into the EU, covering not only access to the labour 
market, but also residence conditions and labour rights/protection. Still, as 
Kostakopoulou’s chapter 19 underlines, rival national interests have not 
stalled the institutional journey of EU immigration policies, and few would 
                                                     
11 See the UN Human Rights Council, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human 
rights of migrants on the impact of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements on the 
human rights of migrants”, A/HRC/32/40, 4 May 2016. 
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have predicted the dynamism that has driven the emergence and 
development of this policy area. 
The 2009 Lisbon Treaty states that migration policy issues are under 
‘shared legal competence’ between the EU and its Member States. 
Determining the conditions of entry and residence for purposes of 
employment are no longer in the exclusive hands of the Member States. The 
‘Lisbonisation’ of EU migration policy has meant the consolidation and full 
application of the Community method of cooperation in this field 
internally, and the adoption of a dynamic EU legal framework in these 
areas. As Geddes and Niemann (2015) have pointed out, the EU as an 
‘institutional venue’ has become thicker over time. 
Art. 79 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) lays down the main legal basis for the Union to develop a common 
immigration policy. This competence includes measures dealing with 
aspects related to conditions of entry and residence, and common standards 
on long-term visas and residence permits, as well as family reunification. It 
also expands towards the definition of rights of TCNs residing legally, 
including conditions for them to move and reside in the EU. The only 
express limitation to the exercise by the EU of this shared legal competence 
is laid down in Art. 79(5) TFEU: “This Article shall not affect the right of 
Member States to determine volumes of admission of third country 
nationals coming from third countries to their territory in order to seek 
work, whether employed or self-employed.” 
This provision has often been alluded to in order to set limits as 
regards what the EU can do within and abroad (in cooperation with third 
countries) when dealing with matters related to migration for reasons of 
employment and self-employment. It is also often used to justify the slow 
and sometime inexistent progress in developing legal channels for third-
country workers into the EU. This article, however, means that the EU can 
legislate on every other aspect pertaining to legal migration except 
determining volumes of admission.  
The idea of an ‘EU immigration code’ has been proposed and 
recommended by the European Commission on a few occasions since 2009. 
The Commission Communication on “An area of freedom, security and 
justice serving the citizen: Wider freedom in a safer environment” states: 
The EU must strive for a uniform level of rights and obligations for 
legal immigrants comparable with that of European citizens. These 
rights, consolidated in an immigration code, and common rules to 
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effectively manage family reunification are essential to maximise 
the positive effects of legal immigration for the benefit of all 
stakeholders and will strengthen the Union’s competitiveness.12 
The code reappeared in the Commission Communication on 
“Delivering an area of freedom, security and justice for Europe’s citizens: 
Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm Programme” of April 2010.13 This 
Communication highlighted that  
[f]urther steps could be taken to codify and streamline the 
substantive conditions for admission, as well as of the rights of third 
country nationals. This would be a step towards a ‘single area of 
migration’, with the aim of facilitating intra-EU mobility of third 
country nationals, including through mutual recognition of national 
permits.14 
The idea of the code has not seen the light of day as originally 
planned. Instead the European Commission called for the above-mentioned 
Legal Migration Fitness Check. Continuing the discussion on a future 
codification seems to be inevitable given the challenges affecting the current 
configurations of EU labour migration policy and law, in both their internal 
and external dimensions. Similar experiences have already been had in the 
context of Schengen, with the adoption of the Schengen Borders Code15 and 
the EU Visa Code.16  
Kostakopoulou in chapter 19 considers that the adoption of an 
immigration code incorporating all sectorial EU directives, and providing a 
uniform level of rights to third-country workers, would be an important 
step in building a common EU migration policy. This view has been 
previously shared by Peers, who has called for establishing a more 
                                                     
12 See European Commission, An area of freedom, security and justice serving the citizen: 
Wider freedom in a safer environment, COM(2009) 262, Brussels, 10.6.2009.  
13 See European Commission, Delivering an area of freedom, security and justice for 
Europe’s citizens: Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm Programme, COM(2010) 171 
final, Brussels, 20.4.2010. 
14 Ibid., p. 4. 
15 See Regulation (EU) No. 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 
March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across 
borders (Schengen Borders Code), OJ L 77, 23.3.2016. 
16 See Council Regulation (EC) No. 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 listing the third countries 
whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and 
those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement, OJ L 81, 21.3.2001. 
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ambitious level of harmonisation of existing rules, which would be a central 
component in the development of a common immigration policy (Peers, 
2012 and 2014). The consolidation and simplification of the existing EU 
legislative instruments in the domain of legal and labour migration, 
however, seems to be an inevitable way forward. Any codification of the 
existing rules should indeed focus on addressing the gaps and challenges 
raised above that reflect the fragmented and discriminatory legal 
framework.  
20.4 Consequences of sectorial policies and fragmentation: 
Incoherence, obscurity and discrimination 
A first direct consequence of the present shape and dispersed matrix of legal 
and policy instruments that EU policy comprises is inconsistency and 
incoherence. The existence of parallel legal and policy schemes constitutes 
a major obstacle to the coherency and added value of the EU in these 
domains, as well as to ensuring consistency in their compatibility with EU 
Treaty-based principles and objectives in both letter and implementation.  
A second effect is that the existing legal framework results in a high 
degree of obscurity and a lack of transparency, which in turn makes access 
to information difficult for those individuals wanting to move to the EU. 
There are still hugely diverse priorities, regulations and systems across the 
EU in respect of the legal and labour immigration of TCNs. An illustrative 
example of that complexity and legal uncertainty is the above-mentioned 
EU Blue Card Directive, which runs in parallel with national schemes 
offering varying conditions for admission and residence for highly 
skilled/qualified migrants (Eisele, 2013).  
A third consequence relates to inequalities and discrimination in the 
treatment granted to various groups of third-country workers under EU 
law. The sectorial legal framework and approach leads de jure to the setting-
up of a model built on a hierarchy of rights, labour and living conditions 
that differ according to the extent to which the worker is deemed to be more 
‘highly qualified/skilled’ and ‘useful’ to EU Member States. The scope and 
specific manifestations of inequality of treatment among third-country 
workers under the EU directives is studied in chapter 7. 
The current arsenal of EU labour migration directives puts emphasis 
on guaranteeing equal treatment of migrant workers with nationals of the 
receiving Member States, including as regards employment and social 
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security rights. This has resulted, as Guild reflects in chapter 6, from the 
influence of civil society organisations, such as trade unions. It has also 
stemmed from the input of the Employment and Social Affairs Committee 
at the European Parliament, in negotiations as co-legislator in EU labour 
migration directives, that third-country workers must not be used to 
undercut the wages and working conditions of those already in the labour 
force of the Member States. 
That notwithstanding, inequality among third-country workers 
emerges clearly when zooming away from the broader EU legal and policy 
setting. This is particularly the case with respect to the rights conferred on 
third-country workers who fall under statuses considered to be 
‘temporary’, which usually correspond to those not categorised as ‘highly 
qualified’, i.e. seasonal workers. For instance, the limitations of the equal 
treatment approach in the Seasonal Workers Directive has led to criticism 
of it not being fit for purpose for effectively preventing labour and social 
exploitation of seasonal migrant workers (Fudge and Herzfeld Olsson, 
2014).  
Another legal category of third-country worker that is framed as 
‘temporary’ in EU labour migration law concerns those involved in intra-
corporate transfers. The ICT Directive includes special provisions for EU 
Member States to ensure or enforce the ‘temporariness’ of these workers, so 
they will not stay at the end of the assignment. Nor are they granted the 
possibility to cross the bridge towards long-term residence status in the 
receiving Member State. 
Inequality of treatment also manifests itself in more difficult 
conditions for family members of these workers to join them in the EU and 
have equal access to fair working and living conditions (refer to chapter 1 
by Korpela and Pitkänen). This approach (as Fridriksdottir in chapter 7 also 
demonstrates) is reflected in the ways in which EU labour immigration 
directives dealing with “temporary migration” include express derogations 
to family reunification and to equal working and living conditions in 
comparison with EU nationals.  
Guild (2011, p. 216) has underlined that the sectorial approach of EU 
labour migration law is significant when ascertaining the ways in which 
labour migration control is viewed by EU Member States; the allocation of 
rights and different degrees of equality is driven by migrants’ perceived 
value to labour markets, as well as factors like qualifications and attributed 
skill levels.  
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‘Highly qualified’ third-country workers are granted more rights and 
better conditions than ‘low-skilled’ migrant workers. As the above-
mentioned EU Blue Card scheme shows, they are also given more ways to 
become permanent residents and bring their families to the EU. 
Controversially, the principle is one whereby the economically weaker 
third-country worker can justifiably be deprived of rights and have fewer 
administrative avenues for entry and residence.  
EURA-NET project research has shown how categories of third-
country workers labelled as ‘temporary migrants’ are often exposed to 
slower and complicated bureaucratic processes related to visas and 
residence/work permits in the EU (Pitkänen, 2017). Chapter 13 by Stefan 
shows that the necessity for Chinese, Indian, Thai and Filipino nationals to 
undergo the documental, procedural and individual requirements for 
access to a Schengen visa entails a series of practical challenges for 
travellers. This finding is corroborated in chapter 14 by Sabharwal on 
India’s experience. 
The external dimensions of EU migration policies are not exempt from 
similar concerns. Chapter 5 by Weinar points out that the lack of proper 
monitoring instruments covering the implementation of concluded 
agreements is especially problematic for ‘temporary workers’ because “the 
lower the skill level, the more abuse there is” of their rights. Fridriksdottir 
in chapter 7 argues that discrimination is higher the less qualified and less 
economically desired a group of migrants is. 
The discriminatory treatment underlying the current EU legal 
framework was an issue raised by the European Economic and Social 
Committee (EESC) during the above-mentioned open consultation 
launched by the European Commission. The EESC Opinion on the 
European Commission Green Paper underlined that such a sectorial 
approach “would be discriminatory in nature”.17 The categorisation of 
third-country workers by distinct legal acts covering different worker 
statuses leads to economic and human rights inequalities among 
individuals falling within the scope of EU legal migration legislation and 
policy.  
Securing equal access to fundamental and socioeconomic rights 
protection remains a major challenge for the current and next generation of 
                                                     
17 See EESC, Opinion on the Green Paper on an EU approach to managing economic 
migration (COM(2004) 811 final), OJ C 286/20, 17.11.2005, point 2.1.4. 
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EU legal migration policies. More research is needed on the gaps and 
barriers that create inequalities, as well as on the actual costs of these 
inequalities and the added value that having ‘more EU’ could bring to legal 
migration policies. 
20.5 Temporariness as inequality, injustice and insecurity  
Concepts play a fundamental role in framing migration policy priorities and 
agendas. They also have profound implications for the allocation of rights 
and protection of third-country workers and their families. The notion of 
‘temporary migration’, and its assumptions, calls for critical re-
examination. The EURA-NET project has actively engaged in that scientific 
process and provided in-depth analysis of this concept in the EU–Asia 
context.  
A key finding emerging from the EURA-NET project is that migration 
policy frameworks in the EU often lead to a mismatch between the 
law/policy and the social characteristics of people’s mobility (Aksakal and 
Schmidt-Verkerk, 2016). The temporary cross-border mobility of people is 
an increasingly common phenomenon that is more complex than existing 
policies tend to assume. There are various kinds of phenomena that could 
be viewed through the lens of ‘temporary migration’.  
There is no consensus on a definition of what temporary migration 
actually is (Geddes, 2015). Neither policy-makers nor academics have 
reached a commonly agreed and clear understanding of this phenomenon 
and inherently ambiguous notion. Historical experiences have shown that 
temporary migration schemes have been unable to capture and deal with 
the dilemmas raised by the mobility of people (Carrera et al., 2015a). Still, 
temporary labour migration programmes (TLMPs) have continued to exist 
and have proliferated in several world regions. 
Battistella argues in chapter 2 that TLMPs are often flawed, and that 
these flaws are in fact inherent to the system. ‘Temporariness’ is often 
fictitious: “It originates from a permanent demand for labour, met through 
temporary workers whose migration experience is extended for many 
years, but always under a temporary status.” Controversially, temporary 
schemes for labour migration go hand-in-hand with sub-standard living 
and working conditions and issues with the fundamental rights of third-
country workers.  
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Temporary migration schemes are also intimately related to ‘irregular 
migration’. Irregular channels may become the only option for people in 
light of the restrictions embedded in migration policies. Limited legal 
channels of migration lead to irregular entry and stay, and prevent security 
of residence. Tayah’s chapter 4 further illustrates that when countries of 
origin sanction abuses resulting from restrictive temporary schemes at 
destination, this has often led to an increase in human trafficking, 
smuggling and exploitation. Tayah also underlines the importance of taking 
into account the role of ‘transit countries’, where migrants may be 
compelled to stay for a long time taking up jobs in informal sectors. 
Korpela and Pitkänen conclude in chapter 1 of this volume that the 
status of a temporary migrant means insecurity. This is closely linked to 
uncertainty over the time one may be allowed to stay in a particular country 
and thus the impossibility of future planning. Their contribution notes that 
the concept of temporariness needs to be understood from the perspective 
of the receiving state, in terms of both security concerns and perceived 
economic needs. Temporary migration policies are designed as a means of 
managing migration and justifying the limitation of migrants’ rights in the 
destination country.  
Korpela and Pitkänen argue that temporary migration policies are 
seen as “convenient solutions” for temporary labour shortages, and the 
assumption is that when migrant workers are no longer needed they will 
depart. Temporary migration can therefore not exist without return or 
expulsion policies. Furthermore, they remind us of how the veil of 
temporariness in migration management policies and schemes often hides 
low-skilled jobs and measures looking for cheaper sources of labour that are 
tied to lower labour standards, fewer rights and exploitation.  
This is equally emphasised in chapter 3 by Marti. She concludes that 
temporary migrants are not granted access to permanent residency and 
citizenship and thus some become “permanently temporary” migrants. She 
asserts that the ‘win–win–win’ framing behind the use of TLMPs fails to 
acknowledge that there is no evidence showing that they have actually 
contributed to sustainable development, notably when it comes to 
remittances. In her opinion, “that low-skilled, temporary migrant workers 
should bear the responsibility of reducing poverty and developing the 
Global South by way of their remittances seems profoundly unjust”. 
Conceptually framing migration merely as temporary human flows 
across borders can be highly misleading. The EURA-NET project results 
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show that these policies are too often mismatched and fail to take into 
account that people’s intentions and life situations alter over the course of 
time and in practice. People’s motivations, ideas and intentions are known 
to be ever-changing and often irrational. Several chapters in this book and 
research findings from the EURA-NET project have underlined that 
‘normative temporariness’ and labour migration policies that constrain 
rights increase individuals’ vulnerability and insecurity. They also generate 
downward pressure and unfair competition on wages, employment and 
living conditions.  
On the other hand, Herzfeld Olsson points out in chapter 8 that if not 
dealt with in a careful way, attempts to inculcate the idea that third-country 
workers should not work under conditions inferior to those of nationals can 
lead to counter-productive results. The Swedish system, for instance, shows 
that if the required level of working conditions has not been upheld, a 
highly qualified TCN may lose the authorisation to work and the right to 
stay in a given Member State. This leads to a situation that does not 
encourage the third-country worker to try to enforce the required working 
conditions at the risk of expulsion.  
Herzfeld Olsson argues that all the risks connected to upholding the 
admission requirements related to working conditions are often borne by 
the labour migrant and not the employer. She argues that it is of central 
importance to develop mechanisms encouraging the employer to fulfil the 
prescribed working conditions. In her view, the model of protection and 
sanctions for employers laid down in the Seasonal Workers Directive could 
provide an interesting approach to mainstream across all the other EU 
categories of third-country workers. 
20.6 International labour standards and the EU’s fairness 
approach 
Are there any international or EU standards guiding legal migration policy? The 
Tampere European Council Conclusions of 15–16 October 199918 laid down 
the first political guidelines for the EU to follow in implementing the new 
provisions enshrined in the Amsterdam Treaty. Under the heading of “A 
                                                     
18 See European Council, Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere European Council, SN 
200/99, 15–16 October 1999, para. 18 (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/ 
tam_en.htm). 
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Union of Freedom, Security and Justice: The Tampere Milestones” the 
Council held that  
[t]he European Union has already put in place for its citizens the 
major ingredients of a shared area of prosperity and peace: a single 
market, economic and monetary union, and the capacity to take 
on global political and economic challenges. The challenge of the 
Amsterdam Treaty is now to ensure that freedom, which includes the 
right to move freely throughout the Union, can be enjoyed in conditions 
of security and justice accessible to all. It is a project which responds 
to the frequently expressed concerns of citizens and has a direct 
bearing on their daily lives. This freedom should not, however, be 
regarded as the exclusive preserve of the Union’s own citizens. 
(Emphasis added) 
The 1999 Tampere Council Conclusions also expressed, for the first 
time, the fair-treatment paradigm for TCNs who reside legally in Member 
States’ territories (Wiesbrock, 2009; Carrera, 2009). The European Council 
emphasised the need to approximate national laws “on the conditions for 
admission and residence of third-country nationals” and “the legal status 
of third-country nationals”. Para. 21 states:  
A person, who has resided legally in a Member State for a period 
of time to be determined and who holds a long-term residence 
permit, should be granted in that Member State a set of uniform 
rights which are as near as possible to those enjoyed by EU citizens; e.g. 
the right to reside, receive education, and work as an employee or 
self-employed person, as well as the principle of non-
discrimination vis-à-vis the citizens of the State of residence. 
(Emphasis added) 
The principles of fair and equal treatment and non-discrimination 
enshrined in the Tampere milestones were directly reflected in the Treaties 
and became codified in the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. Art. 79(1) TFEU stipulates 
that “[t]he Union shall develop a common immigration policy aimed at 
ensuring, at all stages, fair treatment of third-country nationals”. This brings 
us back to the question of what ‘fairness’ means in the context of legal 
immigration, particularly that for employment and related purposes. What 
are these “working and living conditions” referred to in the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (hereinafter EU Charter)? And how can fairness be 
understood in light of international, regional and EU standards?  
EU and international labour standards call for all workers – 
irrespective of their nationality – to be treated equally in comparison with 
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EU citizens once admitted to the Union’s territory. International 
socioeconomic rights are codified in the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and in ILO conventions and 
recommendations. An issue of specific concern is that the number of 
Member State ratifications remain by and large very low.19 
In light of these international and regional standards, Fridriksdottir in 
chapter 7 argues that third-country workers already working in the EU 
should be entitled to equal treatment in relation to nationals. All the EU 
legislation regarding TCNs must therefore comply and be compatible with 
these established standards. Chapter 7 shows how the inequality of 
treatment characterising EU labour migration law and policy stands in stark 
contradiction with international and EU labour standards.  
The ILO has also taken up the issue of addressing discrimination in 
the labour markets. It has underlined the importance of guaranteeing a 
rights-based approach in debates on this matter, which is firmly rooted in 
the universal values of equal treatment and non-discrimination (ILO, 2014, 
para. 42):  
Migrant workers must enjoy equal pay for work of equal value and 
they must be able to exercise their fundamental rights, including 
trade union rights. This is a basic issue of human rights, and it is 
also the best way of ensuring that migration is not misused for the 
purpose of undercutting existing terms and conditions of work. 
The Expert Committee on the Application of ILO Conventions and 
Recommendations has recently emphasised the need for states to repeal and 
modify legislative measures, administrative instructions or practices that 
are discriminatory (ILO, 2016, para. 627). The Committee highlighted the 
importance of such an approach to effectively address the vulnerability of 
migrant workers to various forms of discrimination and prejudices in the 
labour market on grounds of nationality, and which often intersect with 
other grounds such as race, ethnicity, colour, religion and gender. The 
Committee stressed in para. 626 (ibid., p. 190) that 
                                                     
19 Out of 186 Member States of the ILO, 49 have ratified Convention No. 97 and 23 have 
ratified Convention No. 143. Only 17 States have ratified both conventions. As regards 
EU Member States, Cyprus, Italy, Portugal and Slovenia have ratified both conventions. 
Italy, Portugal, Slovenia and Sweden have ratified Convention No. 143, and Belgium, 
Cyprus, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia and the UK have 
ratified Convention No. 97. 
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Member States should actively develop and pursue a national 
equality policy for migrant workers, in collaboration with employers’ 
and workers’ organizations. Such national equality policies 
should be composed of varied measures designed with the 
objective of effectively protecting and promoting the rights of migrant 
workers in a regular situation to equality of opportunity and 
treatment, taking into account national circumstances. Member 
States should ensure that national equality policies are coherent 
with other national policies, including employment policies. The 
Committee believes that the existence of effective national policies 
in this regard would contribute to an improvement in the global 
governance of labour migration. (Emphasis added) 
20.7 Intra-EU mobility and the single market template: Towards 
a single EU area of migration 
The foreword by Ruete raises a very important and pertinent question: What 
would it mean for this policy field if the focus were only on the single market? The 
EU’s specificity of free movement of workers is part of the logic of the 
internal market20 and the EU as a de-securitisation project for the labour 
migration of EU nationals, which is closely tied to the abolition of border 
controls of persons (Guild, 2011).  
Art. 26(2) TFEU states that “the internal market shall comprise an area 
without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of the 
Treaties”. What is original in this EU labour mobility system, as Guild 
explains, is that it is based on reducing to the point of vestigial the labour 
migration controls of Member States and leaves in the hands of EU nationals 
the choice of whether to move (Guild, 2011). 
Art. 45(3) of the EU Charter, relating to the objective of granting 
freedom of movement to third-country nationals who legally reside in the 
territory of a Member State, should be activated in order to complete the 
construction of a single market encompassing intra-EU mobility of 
temporary and permanent migrant workers. Similarly, Art. 79(2)(d) TFEU 
lays down an aspect that takes the single market logic – free movement 
within the Union’s territory – to the heart of the EU’s migration policy. This 
provision establishes that the EU has the legal competence to adopt legal 
                                                     
20 See ch. 17 on “The Single Market” in Craig and de Búrca (2011), pp. 581–610. 
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acts covering “the definition of rights of third country nationals residing 
legally in a Member State, including the conditions governing freedom of 
movement and of residence in other Member States”. 
The Lisbon Treaty brought the EU Charter to the heart of the EU 
constitutional system by turning it into a legally binding instrument for 
both Member States and European institutions. Art. 15 of the EU Charter 
stipulates the “[f]reedom to choose an occupation and right to engage in 
work”, and its para. 3 envisages that “[n]ationals of third countries who are 
authorized to work in the territories of the Member States are entitled to 
working conditions equivalent to those of citizens of the Union”. The 
material and personal scope of the notion of ‘equivalence’ mentioned in this 
provision must find its answer in the international and EU standards 
addressed in section 20.6 above. 
Title IV of the EU Charter, which deals with ‘solidarity’, covers several 
workers’ rights, such as those to information and consultation, collective 
bargaining and action, and access to placement services. These apply to 
“workers”, “every worker” or “everyone”, irrespective of nationality or 
migration status. Of particular relevance is Art. 31, which envisages “[f]air 
and just working conditions”, and states that “every worker has the right to 
working conditions which respect his or her health, safety and dignity”. Art. 
33 of the EU Charter lays down the right to family and professional life to 
“the family” and “everyone”. Kostakopoulou argues in chapter 19 that “a 
Europe of solidarity needs to be a Europe of comprehensive solidarity … 
[which] cannot be confined to nationals of Member States. It has to embrace 
all residents in the EU.” 
During the last 15 years the EU has already applied the single market 
template to some of the labour migration directives. Several of these EU 
directives include the freedom of TCNs to move (intra-EU mobility) to a 
second EU Member State and to enjoy there, subject to a number of 
conditions and requirements, ‘near equality’ of treatment and non-
discrimination in comparison with nationals of the receiving state. 
The Commission has often argued that high barriers to geographical 
mobility for highly qualified third-country workers represent a specific 
weakness of the EU labour market and, more generally, of EU policy on 
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economic immigration.21 This argument is replicated in chapter 10 by 
Barslund and Busse, who remind us that the EU’s added value lies in 
ensuring coordination on rights at the EU level – in particular those related 
to EU mobility – in a way that makes each Member State more ‘attractive’ 
for TCNs than similar national schemes would. 
Indeed, “[t]he role that the freedom for EU-intra mobility has in the 
promotion of Europe’s role (and added value) and to a certain extent 
identity in this process remains central” (Carrera and Wiesbrock, 2010). An 
illustrative example is the EU Blue Card Directive, which presents ‘intra-EU 
mobility’ as an important element to ensure the added value of the Union’s 
legal system. The European Commission’s original proposal was clear 
when expressly stating that “intra-EU mobility” constitutes one of the 
strongest incentives for “third-country highly qualified workers” to enter 
the EU labour market.22 The intra-EU mobility dimension has also been 
further facilitated and liberalised in the latest Commission proposal for a 
directive revisiting the EU Blue Card of 7 June 2016,23 which is currently 
under negotiation.  
Another example of this same approach is the ICT Directive,24 which 
includes an intra-EU mobility scheme (Recital 25), whereby the holder of a 
valid ICT permit is allowed to enter, stay and work in one or more of the 
Member States in accordance with short-term mobility (up to 90 days) 
and/or long-term mobility (more than 90 days in a period of 180 days).25  
                                                     
21 Refer for instance to European Commission, Accompanying document to the proposal 
for a Council Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country 
nationals for the purpose of highly qualified employment – Impact Assessment, 
Commission Staff Working Document, SEC(2007) 1403, Brussels, 23.10.2007, pp. 14–15. 
22 See European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on the conditions of entry 
and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified 
employment, COM(2007) 637 final, Brussels, 23.10.2007. For an analysis, refer to Guild 
(2007). 
23 See European Commission, COM(2016) 378, (2016), op. cit.  
24 See Directive 2014/66/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 
2014 on the conditions of entry and residence of third country nationals in the framework 
of an intra-corporate transfer, OJ L 157, 27.5.2014 (transposition date, 29 November 2016). 
25 Refer to Arts 21 and 22 of the ICT Directive. 
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20.8 Conclusions and way forward: Towards a fair EU agenda 
facilitating legal channels for migration 
The European Commission should move forward by implementing a 
‘beyond crisis’ policy agenda, in keeping with the political guidelines set by 
President Jean-Claude Juncker in 2014.26 There could be a potential rationale 
for a move beyond crisis in the EU’s economic performance and evidence 
of recovery of the eurozone.27  
Immediate priority should be given to developing a fair EU agenda 
facilitating legal channels for migration. Such an agenda would need to be 
firmly rooted in existing international, regional and EU standards and the 
principles laid down in EU Treaties as well as international and regional 
labour standards, chiefly those envisaged in ILO instruments.  
Voices referring to the lack of public support for such policies in the 
EU are not well-founded. It is a myth that there is some kind of tidal wave 
of hostility to immigration sweeping across Europe. There are clearly some 
segments of the population that oppose immigration, but – as recent 2014 
European Social Survey data illustrate28 – there is also evidence that views 
on immigration are more nuanced and that there is support for approaches 
that target certain kinds of labour migration.  
All too often EU policy documents differentiate between ‘short-term’, 
‘medium-term’ and ‘long-term’ priorities. The 2015 European Agenda on 
                                                     
26 See J.C. Juncker, “A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and 
Democratic Change, Political Guidelines for the Next European Commission”, Opening 
Statement in the European Parliament Plenary Session, Strasbourg, 15 July 2015. In his 
political guidelines, he underlined that: 
I want to promote a new European policy on legal migration. Such a policy 
could help us to address shortages of specific skills and attract talent to better 
cope with the demographic challenges of the European Union. I want Europe 
to become at least as attractive as the favourite migration destinations such as 
Australia, Canada and the USA. 
27 See Financial Times, “German GDP growth accelerates to 0.6% at start of 2017”, 12 May 
2017.  
28 See European Social Survey, “Immigration” (http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/ 
data/themes.html?t=immigration; refer also to the Observatory of Public Attitudes to 
Migration, part of the Migration Policy Centre within the Robert Schuman Centre for 
Advanced Studies at the European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole 
(http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/observatory-of-public-attitudes-to-
migration/). 
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Migration is a case in point. Legal migration policies always end up under 
the heading of ‘long-term’ planning. This illustrates that EU priorities are 
still driven by ‘the politics or policies of the now’ and not a long-term vision. 
These politics of the now are predominantly framed by an interior ministries 
or policing approach to migration. Such an approach overemphasises and gives 
immediate priority to issues related to expulsions of irregular immigrants 
and border controls. In turn it underestimates and neglects the 
opportunities and potential of legal pathways for human mobility to the 
EU. 
EU policy responses need to move from a home affairs-centric focus 
towards a ‘multi-sector policy approach’ (Carrera et al., 2015c) guaranteeing a 
balanced setting of priorities across all relevant policy sectors. The single 
market template is already present in some of the EU labour migration 
directives. It could prove to be a decisive component for EU migration 
policy to further nurture and develop in the near future. Special emphasis 
could now be given to incentivising and ensuring intra-EU mobility and 
equality of treatment of third-country workers in comparison with EU 
citizens, as well as robust protection of labour rights and safe and secure 
working environments for all third-country workers within the EU.  
Coming back to the question put forward by Ruete in the foreword of 
this book, do we need more comprehensive rules on legal migration, and 
particularly on labour migration? This book has answered in the positive. A 
central objective to guide the stages that will follow the Commission’s Legal 
Migration Fitness Check should be streamlining and harmonising the 
substantive conditions for admission, as well as a uniform framework of 
rights and standards for all third-country workers in the EU.  
The adoption of an EU immigration code seems to be an inevitable 
step forward in European integration in this domain. It would be a way to 
effectively address the challenges affecting the current configurations 
delineating the EU legal and policy framework on labour migration, while 
using the Union single market template as its foundation.  
The options foreseen in existing trade agreements (as well as in 
association and partnership agreements with third countries), in the set of 
ILO standards on working and living conditions, and in the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, should be fully exercised and applied by EU Member 
States. The use of legal acts and international agreements laid down in the 
EU Treaties should be given priority over policy tools – such as Mobility 
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Partnerships and the CAMMs – which lack proper democratic, financial and 
judicial scrutiny and accountability.  
In the Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants on 
a 2035 agenda for facilitating human mobility issued by the UN Human Rights 
Council in April 2017, the former UN Special Rapporteur called for “a fact-
based response” in this policy domain. In his view, authorities should 
recognise “real labour needs and open up considerably more visa 
opportunities or visa-free travel programmes for migrant workers at all skill 
levels”. The former Special Rapporteur also emphasised that “with 
appropriate selection and organization, the numbers would be entirely 
manageable”, and that “[f]acilitating increased mobility and matching skills 
to labour needs, as in an accessible, regular, safe and affordable labour 
market, with appropriate visa systems and security controls, would ensure 
that most migrants would use regular mobility channels”. 
The EU should set out an ambitious agenda that would make a 
difference and vigorously integrate EU Treaty values into current UN 
discussions. In 2016, the UN’s New York Declaration on Migration and 
Refugees29 highlighted the need to develop regular and fair channels (‘legal 
pathways’) for access to international protection and economic migration 
(at all skill levels). The EU should insist during these UN processes that the 
global compacts are built firmly on international human rights standards 
(Guild and Grant, 2017). 
The EU should become a more active promoter of international and 
regional standards on labour and fundamental human rights. A priority 
should be to avoid a ‘race to the bottom’ in the working and living 
conditions of workers by EU Member States and to promote effective and 
full implementation by EU Member States of ILO and EU standards. The 
EU should develop concerted partnerships with regional and international 
                                                     
29 See the UN’s New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, General Assembly, 13 
September 2016 (http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/71/L.1). 
Para. 57 states: 
We will consider facilitating opportunities for safe, orderly and regular 
migration, including, as appropriate, employment creation, labour mobility at 
all skills levels, circular migration, family reunification and education-related 
opportunities. We will pay particular attention to the application of minimum 
labour standards for migrant workers regardless of their status, as well as to 
recruitment and other migration-related costs, remittance flows, transfers of 
skills and knowledge and the creation of employment opportunities for young 
people. 
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actors – particularly the ILO – so as to encourage Member State ratifications, 
and join forces in ensuring effective compliance with their commonly 
shared standards. 
What role could research be expected to play in a fair EU agenda 
facilitating legal channels for migration? EU action and law-making in 
migration policies has generally preferred ‘policy-driven’ research. EU 
migration policies have often been based on ‘knowledge’ that is expected to 
uncritically substantiate political decisions already taken (which has been 
referred to as ‘policy-based evidence making’) (Geddes, 2015), or aimed at 
providing legitimation of EU institutional actors’ interests. This kind of 
uncritical knowledge tends not to be provided by academic institutions and 
scholars. 
In chapter 18, Penninx has illustrated and examined the complex 
research–policy articulation on migration and integration policies at the EU 
level. There are indeed different uses or functions that academic knowledge 
can have when interacting with policy venues and actors (Boswell, 2009). 
These frequently take us beyond a simplistic understanding of the 
instrumental or rational use of academic research by policy-makers in 
European institutions. EU institutions have accorded particular value to 
supporting external academic knowledge on migration.  
A case in point has been the framework programmes supported by 
the DG for Research & Innovation of the Commission. Social science and 
humanities knowledge is often criticised for being ‘policy irrelevant’ for the 
daily needs of EU lawmakers. Yet the contributions of many projects under 
the framework programmes, such as EURA-NET, show a different and 
more complex picture.30 As Penninx explains, there are many ‘impacts’ or 
functions that research can have beyond instrumental or ‘evidence-based’ 
understanding, which should not be overlooked.  
Even research that may be considered by some to be policy irrelevant 
for addressing perceived or ‘current needs’ of policy-makers or not proving 
                                                     
30 See European Commission, “Understanding and Tackling the Migration Challenge: 
The Role of Research”, Conference Report, Brussels, 2016. See also European 
Commission, Migration and Mobility, Research and Innovation Projects in support to European 
Policy: The European Union’s Research Framework Programme, Luxembourg: Publications 
Office of the European Union, 2016; (http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-
sciences/pdf/project_synopses/ki-na-27-592-en.pdf) and King and Lulle (2016) 
(https://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/pdf/policy_reviews/ki-04-15-
841_en_n.pdf). 
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to have an immediate or direct use, can in fact be extremely relevant and 
influential when identifying new policy challenges or illustrating the 
unintended social consequences of present policies. Social science and 
humanities research can also prove particularly powerful when developing 
or re-framing the concepts underpinning EU policies and bringing about 
new notions that better capture changing dynamics and developments. The 
interactive use knowledge between scholars and policy-makers, and the 
role played by think tanks as platforms bringing together all the relevant 
communities of actors, should not be underestimated.  
This book, and the policy workshop that led to it, co-organised by 
CEPS and the DG for Migration and Home Affairs of the Commission, are 
manifestations of the various uses and potential of critical social science and 
humanities knowledge in EU migration policies.  
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Legal Migration and integration, Head of Unit 
 The Role of Social Sciences and Humanities Research for EU 
Migration Policy: Philippe Keraudren, DG Research and Innovation, 
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Chair: Helene Calers, DG HOME B1: Legal Migration and Integration 
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 Mari Korpela, University of Tampere, Faculty of Social Science 
 Bjarney Fridriksdottir, Radboud University, Faculty of Law, Centre for 
Migration Law 
 Petra Helzfeld Olsson, Uppsala University, Department of Law 
 Mikkel Barslund, CEPS, Economy and Finance Section  
 
Discussants:  
 Mauro Gagliardi, DG HOME C1: Irregular Migration and Return Policy 
 Andrew Geddes, European University Institute, Migration Policy 
Centre, Director 
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11:00 – 11:30 Coffee break 
11:30 – 13:00 Challenge II: Migration and Cooperation with Third Countries 
Chair: Myriam Watson, DG HOME A3: International Cooperation 
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 Claudia Finotelli, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Department of 
Sociology, Human Ecology, and Population 
 Agnieszka Weinar, European University Institute, Migration Policy 
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 Christiane Timmerman, University of Antwerp, Centre for Migration 
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15:30 – 15:45 Coffee break 
15:45 – 17:15 Closing Session: Ways Forward in Research 
                            and Policy-Making 
Chair: Laura Corrado, DG HOME B1: Legal Migration and 
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Speakers: 
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 Open Discussion 
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Are EU policies on legal migration fit for managing and governing 
the movement of people across borders? Over the last 15 years, the 
‘Europeanisation’ of policies dealing with the conditions of entry and 
residence of third-country nationals has led to the development of a 
common EU acquis. However, questions related to policy consistency, 
legal certainty and fair and non-discriminatory treatment in working 
and living standards still characterise the EU’s legal framework for 
cross-border mobility. 
This book critically explores the extent to which EU legal migration 
policies and their underlying working notions match the transnational 
mobility of individuals today. It addresses the main challenges of 
economic migration policies, both within the EU and in the context 
of EU cooperation with third countries. Special consideration is given 
to the compatibility of EU policies with international labour standards 
along with the fundamental rights and approach to fairness laid down 
in the EU Treaties. 
The contributions to this book showcase the various uses and potential 
of social science and humanities research in assessing, informing and 
shaping EU migration policies. Leading scholars and experts have brought 
together the latest knowledge available to reappraise the added value 
of the EU in this area. Their reflections and findings point to the need 
to develop a revised set of EU policy priorities in implementing a new 
generation of legal pathways for migration. 
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